THE TACITURNITY OF AENEAS*

I

Aeneas’ speech of defence before Dido (A. 4. 333–61) is the longest and most controversial he delivers. Although by no means typical, it can open up some revealing perspectives over the rest of the poem.

The exchange between the two, having as its kernel a dispute over obligations and responsibilities, requires some words of context. The early part of the book describes the establishment of a liaison between the refugee leaders, while revealing amongst the poem’s characters a wide discrepancy of opinion over the nature of that liaison. Juno announces that she will arrange the marriage of the couple (125–7); after the ensuing marriage-parody of the cave-scene (165–8), Dido also calls what now exists a ‘marriage’: coniugium uocat, hoc praetexit nomine culpam (172). Fama too, moving around Libya, speaks as if Dido has taken Aeneas for husband (192). But the local King Iarbas regards Aeneas as a pirate who has carried off a successful job of plunder (217), while Jupiter looks down from heaven and sees ‘lovers’, amantis (221). Mercury is able to address Aeneas as uxorius (266).

Some scholars would have it that there is a genuine ambiguity of fact here. As they point out, Roman marriage was a matter of cohabitation and intent: any accompanying ceremonies had no legal status and were, strictly, irrelevant to the inception of the marriage. Dido, by this view, is quite justified in regarding their liaison as a real marriage: Aeneas is living with her and co-operating with her as consort, in building the new city of Carthage.

There are serious obstacles, however, to believing that Vergil can have intended his audience to regard it as a possibility that this ‘marriage’ might be an established fact. Elaborate ceremonies may not have been a legal necessity, but individuals of status and importance lived a public life in which such connections were formally marked and openly advertised. The ancient commentators have it right, when they elaborate upon Aeneas’ later denial that a marriage exists between them, showing that for persons of this rank there is more to a marriage than mere cohabitation. Donatus paraphrases Aeneas’ words thus: ‘iunctus sum, inquit, tibi, sed illud non potest coniugium uocari;

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non enim semper mulieri ac uiri conuentio matrimonium facit. aliud uocatur quod gessimus. Quae enim matrimonium est ubi nullus testis interfuit, nulla ex more sollemnitas, nulla pactio, faces nullae, nulla ipsius foederis consecratio? 4

The ambiguity here is not one of fact – are they really married or not? – because in real terms it is plain enough that they are not married. The ambiguity resides in the characters’ own interpretation. Aeneas is, by the Roman view, behaving in such a way as to give Dido (and various other characters) some justification for imagining that his intention involves marriage. By directing his focus away from Aeneas until the intervention of Mercury (259 ff.), Vergil is able to maintain a silence over his hero’s own beliefs on this score. 5

Mercury’s message reduces Aeneas to panic. He tells his men to conceal their preparations for departure: he will wait for the right opportunity to inform the Queen (287–94). Dido senses the deception and seeks Aeneas out. The speech which she then delivers (305–30) is conventionally described as being in the ‘high tragic-rhetorical tradition’, 6 the most important paradigms being the speeches of Euripides’ and Apollonius’ Medea. 7 Austin feels obliged to assert that ‘the strength of Dido’s personality towers above all the rhetoric’, 8 but we do not drain her speech of its emotion or individuality if we recognize its rhetorical organization and impetus. Vergil has given her an ideal rhetorical animus. She has a good case and she argues it all the way and from every side, with rage (305 f.), close logic (311–13), and appeals to pity (320–30). 9 Above all, two crucial points that admit of some doubt are transformed by her words into plain fact: the nature of his leaving, and the nature of their relation to each other. To Dido, there is no question about these matters, he is simply in the wrong: Servius ‘auctus’ has the tone of it, ‘hic quasi reus Aeneas a Didone accusatur’. 10

Aeneas’ opening words in reply give the first sign of the distinction between the two in their use of speech, and of Aeneas’ recognition of that difference. To begin with pro re pauc a loqu ar (337). pauc a of course is odd, since this is his longest speech in the poem; but the word betrays Aeneas’ intuition that anything he might say will be inadequate after a speech such as Dido’s. Conington’s comment on the earlier use of pauc a (tandum pauc a refert, 333) is equally applicable to this one: ‘...pauc a ... seems to express Virg.’s feeling that the words come slowly with effort, and bear no comparison to what the lover would have said had he given way to his emotion’, 11

4 On 339; Servius ‘auctus’ has similar comments. On the scale and cost of marriage ceremonies in the upper classes see L. Friedlaender, Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms 6 (Leipzig, 1919), 1. 274 f.
5 For the direction of the narrative away from Aeneas here, see Klingner, op. cit. (n. 3), pp. 444–6; R. E. Grimm, ‘Point of view in Virgil’s Fourth Aeneid’, CW 63 (1969), 81–5.
6 Austin, p. 98.
8 p. 98.
9 cf. the brief remarks of M. Clarke, ‘Rhetorical influences in the Aeneid’, G & R 18 (1949), 21: ‘the rhetorical system of eliciting all the arguments inherent in a situation lies behind Dido’s speech in Virgil as it lies behind Ovid’s letter [Her. 7]; also p. 26.
10 On 305. If my discussion of Dido’s speeches, here and below, appears harsh, let me say that I do not consider we are ever intended to lose our sympathy for the Queen (here I cannot agree with Quinn’s idea of a ‘shift’ in attitude as the book goes on, ‘Vergil’s Tragic Queen’, Latin Explorations (London, 1963), pp. 48 ff.). It is not a matter of ‘judging’, still less of deciding which ‘side’ we favour: cf. the sensible remarks of A. E. Douglas, in his excellent address to the Vergilian Society (‘The realism of Vergil’, PVS 1 (1961–2), 15–24); ‘What Vergil has done is to present an unpartisan view of all the issues. He has told the truth’ (p. 17).
11 George Eliot catches the sensation in a passage extensively modelled on this scene, when Daniel Deronda attempts to address the shattered Gwendolyn Harleth: ‘he paused a little
The meaning of *pro re* is a matter of dispute: the 'urgency of the case admits only a brief reply' (Conington ad loc.); 'I shall speak only briefly, in view of the situation' (Higet, p. 76); 'I will now briefly deal with the charge' (Page);{12} 'let me speak a few words to meet the case' (Austin ad loc.). Austin and Page come closest to the mark. Servius understood *res* thus, in the meaning 'a matter at issue (in a dispute, esp. in a court of law)';{13} 'remoto ingrati crimine descendit ad causam'.{14} Seneca took the phrase the same way, if we may judge by his imitation (which provides a parallel for the use of *pro*): *paucu pro causa loquar* | *nostra* (Her. F. 401 f.).

There is also present a very important subsidiary connotation of 'fact as opposed to words': cf. Matius to Cicero, *te rogo ut rem potiorem oratone ducas* (Cic. Fam. 11. 28. 5, 'the facts of Matius' present situation and past record', as Shackleton Bailey paraphrases in his commentary); Cic. Tusc. 5. 32, *rem opinor spectari oportere, non iverba*; Quint. 3. 8. 32, *quod nos honestum, illi uam... werbis quam re probabilius uocant*.{15} Euripides exploits a similar two-sidedness in *πράγμα*, when Hippolytus begins to answer the charges of his father: *τὸ μὲν τινος πράγμα* | *ἐχθνον καλὸν λόγος, | εἴ τις διαπτύξεις, οὐ καλὸν τὸδε* (984 f.): 'your case, your charge'{16} affords the opportunity for fine words, but if one should open it up, the *facts of the matter* are not at all fine'. In Hippolytus' speech, the *λόγος* | *ἐργον* antithesis is explicit in the collocation of *πράγμα* and *λόγος*; in Aeneas', the antithesis is more diffuse, looking forward to *ne finge* (338), and referring back to *qua plurima fando* | *enumerare uales uales* (333 f.).

It has been argued{17} that Aeneas is insulting Dido with these words, *qua plurima fando* | *enumerare uales*. But since Dido has in fact referred to her kindness to Aeneas only very briefly in her first speech (*si bene quid de te merui, 317*), it is more sensible to follow the interpretation of Servius 'actus', which refers the meaning to the future.{18} If the words refer to the future, we look to the future, and we find there, in Dido's second speech, a list of precisely the sort which Aeneas here tells her is superfluous: *iectum litore, egentem excepti regni demens in parte locauit...amissam classem, socios a morte reduxi* (373 f.).

What is the force of Aeneas' language in this clause? *enumerare* has aroused no comment, but it is an odd word to find in an epic. Vergil uses it once elsewhere, in its basic sense of 'numbering off', when Anchises in the underworld announces that he will 'count off' his future progeny: *hanc prolem cupio enumerare meorum* (6. 717). What Vergil intends here is quite different. He uses the word in its technical rhetorical sense of making an *enumeratio*, *cuvabrocosmos*, a list of conclusions, complaints, etc., which could be used in various parts of the speech.{19} Apart from Vergil, the only poets who exhibit the verb in this specialized rhetorical sense are those two most 'rhetorical' between his sentences, feeling a weight of anxiety on all his words', Daniel Deronda (Penguin, 1967), p. 839. Deronda's attempts at self-control remind one irresistibly of Aeneas: 'Deronda, too, felt a crushing pain; but imminent consequences were visible to him, and urged him to the utmost exertion of conscience' (ibid.).

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{12} *OLD* s.v. 'res' 11a.

{13} Vergil has capitalized upon the *antithesis* twice in the preceding section: *heu quid agat? quo nunc reginam amrire furentem | audite adfatu?* (283 f.); *tempitaturum aditus et quaemollissima fandi | tempora, quis rebus dexter modus* (293 f.).

{14} On 337.

{15} Barrett ad loc. compares Arist. *Rhet. 1415 b 22, οἱ ποιηροὶ τὸ πράγμα ἔχωντες, 'those speakers with a bad case to argue': see LSJ s.v. III 4 for this meaning.

{16} See Pease on 333.

{17} 'quantacumque enumerare potueris in me tuo beneficio conlata, eorum tibi debere gratiam non repugno' (on 335).

{18} See J. Martin, *Antike Rhetorik: Technik und Methode* (Munich, 1974), p. 307; for many examples of the technical use of the verb, see *TLL* s.v. 618. 44 ff., 'sensu technico rhet...'.

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poets, Ovid and Statius. Aeneas’ words are, more specifically, part of the ‘long enumeration’ motif, which stresses the undesirability or impossibility of making a long or complete list. 

Aeneas here is at once conceding the value of all that she has done for him and defensively anticipating that she can make up a fine list if she wants to. But it will do no good, pro re pauca loquar is a plea for both of them to eschew a parade of words, to face the facts, to stick to the point. Of course, to Dido (and to many readers), the services she has done for him are the point, and she returns to them in her next speech (373 ff.), listing them over until she is mad with pain (heu furiis incensa feror! 376), unable to believe that to Aeneas they are not everything as well.

Aeneas moves on to the two matters at issue, his ‘flight’ and their ‘marriage’: neque ego hanc abscondere furto sperarui (ne finge) fugam, nec coniugis umquam praetendi taedas aut haec in foedera ueni (337–9). These two and a half lines are all he has to say on the two counts. The two items are linked; moreover, it is important to realize that the linking is not a matter of economy: they are viewed under the same aspect. The problem of the marriage was discussed above: I turn to that of the departure.

When, after Mercury’s visitation, Aeneas orders his men to prepare to leave, he tells them classem aptent taciti sociosque ad litora cogant, arma parent et quae rebus sit causa nouandis dissimulent (289–91). When Dido’s first sentence of attack only fourteen lines later picks up these very words (dissimulare etiam sperasti, perfide, tantum posse nefas tacitusque mea decedere terras, 305 f.), the correspondence is seized upon by Hight as a sure means of exposing the shabbiness which Aeneas displays when he denies that he was attempting to run away without telling her: ‘to his hearer, and to nearly all readers, this must appear to be a bare-faced lie’. Vergil, however, takes four lines (291–4) to tell us that Aeneas fully intends to speak to the Queen before going; so that when Aeneas replies that he had not planned to run away without speaking to her, we have no option but to believe him.

The correspondence between Aeneas’ words and Dido’s serves to establish in the question of the departure the same ambiguity and the same atmosphere of partial justification which Vergil had set up in the question of the marriage. Dido has feared all along that Aeneas would run away from her, and she is now entitled to believe that it is happening, because Vergil has created a ready illusion that this is what Aeneas is in fact doing. Aeneas is deceiving her, but she does not know that he is deceiving her only for a time. She pounces on his actions and treats them as plain in fact and motive, with the (partial) justification for her interpretation made plain to Aeneas and the audience by her use of his very words. This is the quagmire which the poet, by a sleight of hand, reveals before his hero, as Aeneas hears his own words being, as it were, quoted back at him.

Aeneas digs his heels in and doggedly insists that she is mistaken. Faced with a tangle of right and wrong, of motive and justification, with an opponent, not an interlocutor, so single-mindedly insistent on her interpretation alone, he is blunt in disillusions

20 Twice: Met. 1. 215; Ars 1. 254 ff., quid tibi feminos coetus uenatibus aptos | enumerem . . . ? | quid referam Biaias . . . ?

21 Seven times: e.g. Ach. 1. 140, sed longum cuncta enumerare; Silv. 3. 1. 102, uix opera enumerem.

22 cf. Nep. Lys. 2. 1, ne de eodem plura enumerando defatigemus lectores; Cic. Planc. 74, omnes (gratis) enumerare nullo modo possent.

23 p. 75; cf. p. 289. It is surprising that, so far as I discover, Hight is the only writer on the problem to attempt to explain this striking and significant correspondence.

24 cf. 298, omnia tuta timens; 419 f., hunc ego si potui tandem sperare dolorem, et perferre, soror, potero.

25 Nor, of course, does she know why he is going.
her.\textsuperscript{26} The terse defensiveness of his speech, so notoriously chastised by Page and others,\textsuperscript{27} corresponds to the familiar silence or strained taciturnity of more modern heroes, when faced with an uncompromising attack from wife or lover.\textsuperscript{28} Thus Vronsky before Anna, towards the end: ‘And standing before her he brought out slowly: “Why do you try my patience?”’ He looked as if he could have said a good deal more but was holding himself in.’\textsuperscript{29} Governing all these reactions is the same sense of incapacity before an insistent pressure of words.

Dido’s determinedly one-sided view both of his departure and of their ‘marriage’ is rejected as if in one breath, for the same irresolvable problems of appearance and half-truth apply to both questions.\textit{hanc fugam} and \textit{haec foedera} are parallel, and some of the force of \textit{ne finge} carries over into the second clause: ‘this running away you speak of, those relations you speak of, they do not in reality exist: do not mould things so that it looks as if they do’.

With \textit{ne finge} Aeneas’ criticism of her speech comes into the open. The words are perhaps weary, or even plaintive, rather than brutal, but the force of the rebuke becomes apparent in the context of Vergil’s use of \textit{finge} elsewhere. The verb occurs in relation to speech in four other places. When Fama moves about Libya, she is described as \textit{tam fippi praviique tenax quam munitia ueri} (4. 188). Turnus tells off the disguised Allecto for trying to alarm him about the Trojans: \textit{ne tantos mihi finge metus} (7. 438), ‘don’t invent such fears and foist them upon me’. Finally, in the great clash of words between Drances and Turnus in Book 11, each man throws the word at the other. First Drances, \textit{inuisum quem tu tibi fingis (et esse nil moror)} (11. 364 f.), ‘I whom you misrepresent as being hostile to you’. Then Turnus, \textit{uel cum se pauidam contra mea iurgia fingis, | artificis scelus} (11. 406 f.). Aeneas’ use of the word is not savage as in the Turnus–Drances exchange – nor is it as indulgent as Turnus’ reproach to Allecto. What Aeneas tells her is that she should not ‘mould’ the facts into her own view; English perhaps says ‘twist’. Vergil puts into his mouth, to convey the criticism, a word that pinpoints with some precision the moulding and misrepresentation which is part of the orator’s stock-in-trade: cf., e.g., Cic. \textit{Flacc.} 51, \textit{tota enim comuertet atque alia finget.}\textsuperscript{30} Hence the mutual charges of distortion and pretence that pass between Turnus and Drances; hence Aeneas’ protest against Dido’s use of apparent ‘fact’ in her presentation of her charge on the matters of the departure and the marriage.\textsuperscript{31}

Aeneas now attempts to make Dido understand the pressures upon him. The comment of R. D. Williams upon this central section is extreme, but not representative of modern views: ‘His effort to minimise the pain of the situation by avoiding emotion makes his speech seem hard and unfeeling.’\textsuperscript{32} This desiccation of Aeneas’ words is a result of the false point of view from which his conflict is normally regarded:

\textsuperscript{26} Though it does not seem to be recognized that when Aeneas says \textit{nec coniugis unquam | praetendi taedas} he is in fact admitting a grave moral failing. If a man of Aeneas’ (even compromised) integrity says that he did not use promises of marriage as a pretext, he is not simply telling the woman she has nothing to complain about.

\textsuperscript{27} See, conveniently, Pease pp. 45 f., Austin p. 105.

\textsuperscript{28} Such is the preconception behind R. Speaight’s bluff appraisal of Aeneas’ predicament: ‘There are situations in which there is practically nothing a man can say’. \textit{The Vergilian Res} (London, King’s College, 1958), p. 8.

\textsuperscript{29} L. Tolstoy, \textit{Anna Karenina} (Penguin, 1954), p. 776.

\textsuperscript{30} Further examples in \textit{TLL} s.v. IIb of \textit{finge} as the hallmark of oratorical or impassioned speech.

\textsuperscript{31} For the antithesis present here between \textit{res} and \textit{finge}, cf. Cic. \textit{Brut.} 149, \textit{uereor ne finge uideantur haec, ut dicantur a me quodam modo: res se tamen sic habet.}

love for Dido on the one hand, dry duty on the other. Monti has sympathetically demonstrated that the issue is a clash between two ‘loves’: his obligations to his son, his men, his father's memory, his gods, these are emotional commitments, the force of which he expounds with urgency to Dido, trying to enable her to see why he must act as he does.

At the end of his exposition of the human and divine pressures upon him, Aeneas once more addresses Dido personally, saying *desine meque tuis incendere teque quarelis* (360). *quarelis* has been described as ‘one of the few words in the episode that are characteristic of the erotic elegy’, but such is not the tone here. Only once elsewhere does Vergil use the word of an articulate creature, when he puts it in the mouth of Juno, who rounds off her speech against Venus in Book 10 by pouring scorn on the other goddess’ remonstrations: *nunc sera quarelis | haud iustis adsurgis et inrita iurgia iactas* (10. 94 f.). In Juno’s mouth the word carries its technical rhetorical meaning of ‘expostulation’ or ‘protest’. Cicero gives as an example of the ‘communes’ of earlier orators *uitiorum et peccatorum acrem quamdam cum amplificatione incusationem aut queralam* (De Ora. 3.106); and in the *Topica* he lists *queralae* in the subheading ‘practical questions relating to emotion’: *quo ex genere sunt queralae, incitationes, miserationesque fìebiles* (86).

The rhetorical reference of *quarelis* is brought out by the rhetorical reference of *meque...incendere teque. incendere* is commonly used to describe the inflammatory effect of speech, whether on a crowd or an individual, and Vergil has this usage often: *incenditique animum dictis* (A. 4. 197); *talibus incensa est tuaenum sententia dictis* (12. 238). More specifically, *incendere* attains the status of a semi-technical term in Cicero’s oratorical writings, to describe the effect of the emotional weapons of which he was so fond – *hae dicendi faces*, as he calls them (De Ora. 2. 205). The orator will use his words to set his audience ablaze with emotion. Thus Demosthenes in the *De Corona*, though beginning calmly, *post sensim incendens iudices, ut udit ardentis, in reliquis exultauit audaci us* (Ora. 26).

Aeneas’ words, however, are more pointed than this: *both* of them are being set on fire by her remonstrations (*meque...teque*). Such is the power of her words that the more she tries to set Aeneas on fire the more inflamed she herself becomes, and the more inflamed she becomes the more she tries to set him on fire. This mutual conflagration is the effect which Cicero, and after him Quintilian, describe as the aim of the orator who wishes to achieve most effective ‘pathos’. No orator, says Antonius (De Ora. 2. 189 ff.), can set his listeners alight unless he himself is on fire: *ut enim nulla materies tam facilis ad exardescendum est, quae nisi admo to igni ignem*

34 op. cit. n. 1, pp. 42 f. Cf. note 10 to chapter 4 (p. 104): ‘...Aeneas tells Dido not only that his obligations prevent him from remaining with her, but also that he faces the choice between love for her and love for his own people and that he does not decide in her favor. This is not to deny that Aeneas loves Dido; it is a question of choices.’
37 Plaut. *Pseud.* 201, *sermone huils ira incendor;* Liv. 1. 59. 11, *his...memoratis incensam multitudinem perpulit ut...etc.*
38 cf. 1. 50, *talibus flammato secum dea corde uoluntas;* 11. 376 *talibus exarsit dictis uiolentia Turni.*
40 6. 2. 26 ff., esp. 28.
Concipere possit, sic nulla mens est tam ad comprehendendum uim oratoris parata, quae possit incendi, nisi ipse inflammatus ad eum et ardens accesserit (ibid., 190). Antonius singles out Crassus as supreme here: so powerful, he says, is Crassus’ repertory, ut mihi non solum tu incendere iudicem, sed ipse ardere uidearis (ibid., 188).41

What Aeneas is telling Dido here is that her words are a reckless incitement of passion, by which both of them are being made to suffer for no purpose: with remonstration and passionate protest alone nothing can be achieved but torture. She is, by a different metaphor, ‘intoxicated’ by her language. The effect he fears continues in her next speech. She uses her words to stoke her passion, until she feels herself ablaze with indignation and hurt – heu furiis incensa feror! (376).

Aeneas’ criticism here is of a piece with his criticism at the beginning of his speech. No solution or reconciliation is possible if her words are only vehicles of a one-sided offensive which, by its very nature, precludes compromise or understanding. We note, too, that his criticism is couched in specific, even technical language, which relates precisely to the use (or misuse) of language as employed by the orators: I return later to the significance of this fact.

It is impossible to tell how Vergil would have finished the speech had he lived to complete the poem. All we have is a truncated reference – the only one – to Aeneas’ emotions: Italiam non sponte sequor (361). But Aeneas is interrupted (‘bene dicentem’ non postquam dixit’, Servius ‘auctus’ on 362)42 by a Dido who expresses only contempt for his explanations: scilicet is superis labor est… etc. (379). Of his father, his son, his people, she makes no mention. Her second speech (362–87) abandons any attempt at persuasion, and develops passionately the attack which had formed only part of her first speech.43

She interrupts herself by fleeing his presence (388 ff.). And he is left, multa metu cunctantem et multa volentem | dicere (390 f.). After the gulf that has opened between them, the enjambment and isolation of dicere harshly expose the inadequacy of mere speech. Thus was Orpheus left standing by his wife, prensantem nequiquam umbras et multa volentem | dicere (G. 4. 500 f.); thus, more appositely, was Aeneas left by the shade of his wife Creusa in Book 2, lacrimantem et multa volentem | dicere deseruit (790 f.). The comfort he wishes to give Dido he cannot provide (393–6): any hope of solace or reconciliation is denied.

II

If we look at this block of speeches with our attention centred on the character Aeneas, two points stand out. First, the distinction, patent in the speeches themselves and picked out by Aeneas, between Dido’s use of speech and Aeneas’. Second, the ineffective and unnaturally truncated nature of the dialogue, with the denial to Aeneas of the opportunity to speak the words he wishes to speak.

We saw that Vergil marks the breaking-off of the dialogue with words that recall Aeneas’ enforced silence in Book 2, when the shade of his wife vanishes before he can reply to the speech it has delivered. With his mother Venus the same frustration of speech is to be observed. Near the beginning of Book 1 Aeneas has a long and

41 Speaking of his own prowess in the Orator, Cicero claims nulla me ingeni sed magna uis animi inflammat, ut me ipse non teneam; nec uim quam is qui audiret incedenteret, nisi ardens ad eum perueniret oratio (132).
42 Whenever Vergil has dicens (2. 550; 10. 744, 856; 12. 950) or dicente (10. 101), he means ‘even as X spoke’.
43 My description of this second speech is only a précis of the article by Williams (op. cit. n. 32).
important conversation containing much information and instruction (321–401); but he does not know he is speaking with his mother, for she is in disguise. As she turns away he recognizes her; he follows while she flees from him (fugientem, 406), calling out, cur dextrae iungere dextram | non datur ac ueras audire et reddere uoces? (408 f.). Their conversation has not in fact been genuine, and contact between them is deliberately broken off by the mother before the son may speak and hear ueras uoces. ‘Der Abstand zwischen Gott und Mensch bleibt auch bei Mutter und Sohn unaufhebar’, remarks A. Wlosok on the passage, with a degree of truth; but it is not simply because Venus is divine that Vergil has represented her as inaccessible to her son’s speech.45 Aeneas also suffers one such broken exchange with his father, at the end of Book 5 (722 ff.), when Anchises’ shade flees at the approach of dawn. ianque uale, says Anchises (738): the same phrase in the same position is spoken to Aeneas by Creusa’s ghost (2. 789).46 Aeneas speaks as the shade vanishes, quo deinde ruis? quo proripis?… | quem fugis? aut quis te nostris complexibus arcel? (741 f.). As the silent shade of Dido turns away from him, Aeneas likewise calls out, quem fugis? (6. 466); he follows his mother as she runs away from him, fugientem (1. 406).

These episodes are examples of a feature of the Aeneid which has often been commented upon, namely, the poem’s small share of dialogue or conversation. Heinzle chose this observation as the starting-point for his discussion of the speeches, taking Homer as the standard of comparison; Hight provides statistics, with some further discussion.48 Some picture of the homeric model is necessary in order to establish the background.49 The aspect I wish to concentrate on is the efficacy, the potency of homeric speech and dialogue, the way in which speech is used by Homer’s men and women to approach each other, to attain an end, to achieve a solution.

The councils of the Achaeans in the Iliad reveal progress and development as the words spoken work their way upon the minds of the hearers. Book 9 has two fine examples. At the beginning of the book there is a lengthy debate, in which we hear speeches from Agamemnon, Diomedes, Nestor, Agamemnon, and finally Nestor again. Agamemnon had at first been in despair, suggesting that they all go home to Greece (13–28); as one speech follows another, the men move away from this disastrous proposal and eventually arrive at a solution: ambassadors will go and plead with Achilles to abandon his wrath and be reconciled. The ambassadors do not succeed in their aim, but the various effects of their various styles of oratory work progressively upon Achilles, turning him to modify his stand.50 At first he is threatening to sail home the next day (356–63). After Phoenix’s long speech (434–605) he relents so far as to say that he will decide on the next day whether to sail home or not (618 f.). But it is the blunt rebuke of Ajax which crowns the weakening process (624–42), for his words prompt instinctive agreement from Achilles: πάντα τί μοι κατὰ θυμόν ἐκισαὶ μοῖδα ἀκεβαι (645). All thought of leaving is now gone, and Achilles will fight if Hector comes to the ships of the Myrmidons (650–5).

45 Further discussion of the lack of intimacy between Aeneas and Venus in Hight, pp. 37 f.
46 And to Orpheus by Eurydice’s ghost (G. 4. 497).
47 p. 404.
48 pp. 22 ff.
49 I might dispense with this section if there were an appropriate discussion to which I could refer; but I do not know of one. Indeed, there is surprisingly little written on the subject altogether, as J. Latacz remarks in the introduction to his useful survey, ‘Zur Forschungsarbeit an den direkten Reden bei Homer (1850–1970): ein kritischer Literatur-Überblick’, Grazer Beiträge 3 (1975), 395.
The most accomplished exponent of speech in the homeric poems is, of course, Odysseus, who is kept alive by his wits and tongue in his wanderings, talking his way home through a world which is 'menacing...with the mysteriousness of undeclared motives, inscrutable people, liars and cheats', and, once he is arrived, talking his way into a position where he can kill his enemies and regain his standing. The use of words between Odysseus and Penelope in their reunion scene (23. 85 ff.) has been well described by Stanford, who traces the modulation of their reactions as they speak to each other, feeling their way until recognition and reconciliation are achieved. Twenty years of separation still divide them, and Athené gives them a double night (241 ff.). τῷ δ’ ἔπει ὧν φιλότητος ἐκπρήτην ἔρατεν, τερπέσθην μῦθου, πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐνέποντε (300 ff.); as they speak to each other, sharing what each has suffered alone, their reunion is made complete: husband and wife re-establish their intimacy and heal their private hurt.

The healing and unifying power of dialogue is a constant feature of the homeric poems. In Odyssey 4, for example, we see Menelaus greeting Telemachus and Peisistratus, the son of Nestor. In speaking of his lost friends, Menelaus mentions Odysseus, so that Telemachus is moved to tears (113 ff.). Helen enters and guesses his identity (141–4), so that first Peisistratus may openly speak of Telemachus’ troubles (156–67), and then Menelaus may speak again of his own grief for his old friend (169–82). Their words bring the purging tears to all four (183–7); Peisistratus is moved to commemorate his brother Antilochus (190–202), and Menelaus graciously puts the seal on their weeping (212). Their open talk of their pain, and the resulting tears which they shed together, provide some measure of solace.

The Odyssean scene is a more humble statement of the theme which dominates the last book of the Iliad. The gods have ordered Achilles to surrender Hector’s body, and he has said that he will give it to any Trojan who may come (134–40). The arrival of Priam himself is completely unexpected, and stuns Achilles and his friends (480–4). Achilles’ reaction is left in suspense, and the factor that determines his response is, quite simply, Priam’s speech. Priam establishes between them the strongest link there can be, by reminding Achilles of his own father (486–506). They weep together, Priam for Hector, Achilles for Patroclus and for his father Peleus (509–12). Griffin’s comment on this scene is characteristically just: ‘as the great enemies...meet and weep together, we see the community of suffering which links all men’. So from the audience’s point of view. For the two men, the ‘community of suffering’ is not an awareness that comes spontaneously upon them; it is a truth established by the words of Priam, a truth recognized and acknowledged by Achilles when he too compares the lot of his father with that of Priam (534–48), thus putting into new perspective the pity for his father which has been a cloud on his mind ever since he accepted the inevitability of his own early death.

The link established is still fragile. Priam overplays his hand when he asks for the exchange to be made immediately, and provokes an angry outburst from Achilles (560–70); but it is Achilles who makes the next overture, by inviting Priam to eat and drink (599–620). After the meal, in a famous scene, they look at and adore each other (628–32). Priam marvels at Achilles, ὅσος ἐγὼ ὅλῳ τε (630); it passes oddly unremarked that the marvelling on Achilles’ side is not simply parallel: εἰς ἐπορῶν δὴ

53 op. cit. n. 51, pp. 56 ff.
54 cf. Griffin, op. cit. n. 52, p. 69.
55 ibid.
The Taciturnity of Aeneas

τ’αγαθὴν καὶ μὲθον ἀκοῆς (632). Achilles marvels at Priam’s power of speech: this is his ἀρετή. 57

In this way does Homer portray the palliation of a grief apparently beyond resource. The shared tears and the shared meal represent to us the stages in their reconciliation; but the reconciliation is made possible by the power of speech to draw men together and establish connections between them. 58

It is a shock to return to the Aeneid after the world of Homer. 59 ‘In the Homeric poems it is unusual for one character to address another without receiving a spoken reply, and conversations in which three or four people join are common. In Vergil, the reverse. . . of the 333 speeches in the Aeneid, 135 are single utterances which receive no reply in words’. 60 Heinze’s discussion of Vergil’s restrictions is still very valuable, especially on the subjects of Vergil’s concern for compression and narrative pace; 61 but a more thorough-going curtailment is at work. The world of the Aeneid is lacking in the homeric style of open, co-operative and sustaining speech. Vergil consistently excludes from his poem the intimacy, companionship and shared suffering which Homer’s men and women hold out to each other through speech.

In Book 3, for example, Aeneas arrives at Bathromium in Epirus, where he finds Andromache mourning Hector on the shore. We think of such scenes as that from Odyssey 4 where shared memory and tears brought some relief to the bereaved and isolated. Such a solution is not to be looked for in Vergil. Andromache’s tears are in vain (incassum, 345). Aeneas makes no reply to her long speech, nor to all the questions she asks him (337–43), since Helenus arrives and leads him off (345–8). We are not told what happens to Andromache, whether she follows, or whether she stays, weeping by the tumulus of Hector where Aeneas found her. When the Trojans leave, her obsessive misery is precisely the same as when they arrived (486–91). 62

The Aeneid is rigidly undomestic. We hear no human conversation between husband and wife, 63 father and son, 64 mother and child. 65 Viewed as a tableau, the single

57 The allusion to Priam’s speech must, as Colin Macleod puts it in his commentary, refer to things said while they ate; it cannot refer to the moment, because as they look at each other they are silent. This is plain from the lines immediately following: ‘when they had had their fill of looking at each other, then god-like Priam was the first one to speak’ (632–4).

58 Griffin’s observation is too bleak: ‘No Egyptian drug can obliterate the sufferings of the Iliad, for which there is no alleviation and the gods can only recommend endurance. . .’ (op. cit. n. 52, p. 69 n. 36). Men can do better than this in the Iliad, even if their sufferings are not ‘obliterated’. Contrast Priam’s mad grief before the reconciliation scene (24. 162 ff.) with his self-possession afterwards (713 ff., 777 ff.), a self-possession which is itself in strong contrast with the unrestrained passion of the mourning women.

59 In attempting to put Vergil’s speeches in perspective, I am afraid I may have put Homer’s speeches out of perspective. There is certainly unsuccessful speech in Homer; the first exchanges of words in the Iliad are disasters. But it is Homer’s norm which is important (if I may borrow the terminology of W. R. Johnson, Darkness Visible. A Study of Vergil’s Aeneid (University of California, 1976), chapter ii).

60 Hight, pp. 23 f. Of these 135, as Hight notes, eight are soliloquies, and there are a few more deductions to be made: see p. 24. 66 pp. 405 ff.

61 R. E. Grimm, ‘Aeneas and Andromache in Aeneid 3’, AJPh 88 (1967), 151–62. Grimm analyses well the lack of contact between the two, although I cannot accept his conclusions.

62 No speech between Helenus and Andromache in Book 3. Amata speaks once to Latinus (7. 359–72), but he does not answer; at 12. 10 ff. Latinus and Amata are both present, with Turnus and Lavinia, but do not address each other.

63 Aeneas and Anchises only converse in the Underworld. Evander speaks once to his son alive ( . . . dum tu, care puere, mea sola et tuis uoluptas, i complexu te neque . . . etc., 8. 581 ff.), and once to his corpse (11. 152 ff.). Pallas never speaks to his father.

64 Apart from the ‘unreal’ conversation between Aeneas and the disguised goddess in Book 1 (321 ff.). At 8. 612 ff. she speaks briefly to Aeneas, but he makes no reply.
‘homely’ scene in the poem is the sinister moment when Ascanius/Cupid hangs in an embrace from his ‘father’s’ neck, and then goes to sit in Dido’s lap and infect her with love (1. 715–22). The gods, to whom everything is easy, are a foil. The delightful scene between Venus and Vulcan in Book 8 (370 ff.), with the homely simile following (407 ff.), is unimaginable in the human action. Jupiter and Juno reach a reconciliation in Book 12 (791–842) in a way that no human characters do. Vergil has pruned back Homer’s gods, but there remains a freeness and domesticity in the scenes in heaven (e.g. 1. 227 ff., 4. 90–128) which is never seen on earth. W. R. Johnson is right to stress the importance in the poem of ‘the rarity of conversations and debates between the actors (which ease the sense of isolated anxiety, bad solitude, which is a Vergilian hallmark’.

The most intense expression of this anxious solitude is Dido’s dream: agiii ipse furentem | in somnis ferus Aeneas, semperque reliquii | sola sibi, semper longam incomitata uidetur | ire uiam et Tyrius deserta quaerere terra (4. 465–8).

From the beginning to the end of the poem Vergil keeps the character of Aeneas before our eyes as the principal exemplar of this unhomeric isolation. His lack of contact with mother and wife has already been noted. Of his affair with Dido only the formal beginning and the wretched ending are represented. We hear no conversation between Aeneas and his father Anchises, at least while Anchises is alive and upon the earth. In Book 2 there are four unconnected utterances between father and son from Aeneas, an outburst of angry grief when his father refuses to be carried from home (657 ff.), and an instruction to pick up the household gods and mount on his back (707 ff.); from Anchises, a line of acquiescence (704), and a line and a half of panic as the pair make their way out of the city (753 f.). More remarkably, during the course of Book 3, when father and son co-operate in steering the Trojans’ fortunes, Vergil does not once show us Aeneas addressing his father, while Anchises speaks to his son on one occasion only, seven lines acknowledging the Penates’ instructions to Aeneas to make for Italy (182–8). In the Underworld there is the form of a conversation, but there is something more than disquieting about the fact that Vergil allows his hero such indulgence only in this unreal place. Even here, although Anchises has held forth the hope ‘notas audirte et reddere uoces’ (6. 689), the conversation between them is strangely formal and unintimate; Aeneas’ questions are a naturalistic way of directing and organizing Anchises’ exposition.

To his son Ascanius, heir of all his hopes and companion throughout his travels, Aeneas speaks once only: ‘disce, puer, uirtutem ex me uerumque laborem, | fortunam ex alii... etc.’ (12. 435–40). This single address is a farewell, and it has the adumbrations of being a final farewell. Its models are Hector’s prayer for Astyanax.

67 Earlier in Book 2, when Aeneas and Creusa are together in Anchises’ house, she speaks once to him, without receiving a reply (657 f.).
68 ‘[Aeneas] is never heard saying any special words of love to Dido, as Paris does to Helen (II. 3. 438–46); nor is he ever seen embracing her, like Odysseus with Penelope (Od. 23. 231–40)’, Hight, p. 35.
69 ‘Nicht Rede und Gegenrede’, says Heinze (p. 410) of the bursts of speech in Anchises’ house.
70 One line of reported speech, pared and bald: Anchisen facio certum remque ordine pando (179).
71 cf. Austin’s introductory remarks on 679–702 (ed. 4. 6); Hight, p. 34. Lieberg, art. cit. n. 66, 189, has some good comments on the emptiness of contact between Aeneas and Anchises at this point.
72 See esp. 1. 646; 4. 234, 274–6, 354 f.; 12. 436 f.
73 Except for Books 8 and 9, when Aeneas is at Pallanteum without Ascanius.
74 II. 6. 476–81.
and Ajax’ words to his son.\(^7\) In each of these models the father never sees his son again, although Hector only suspects this fact (cf. 6. 448 ff.), while Ajax is determined upon it.\(^8\) Ascanius, in his turn, never speaks to his father in the course of the poem.

If Aeneas’ only words to his son are in the guise of a final farewell, his only words to Pallas, his ‘Patroclus’, are such in fact. As the Trojans arrive at Pallanteum, Pallas rushes to interrogate them (8. 110–14). Aeneas does not know him when he replies, 

\textit{Troia genuit ac tela uides inimica Latinis} (117); he goes on to speak in the plural, \textit{ferte haec et dicite . . . etc.} (119). Pallas welcomes him, and takes his right hand (122–4), but Aeneas makes no reply. From that moment until Pallas is killed, Aeneas does not address him; it is only to his corpse that Vergil represents him speaking, in a lament (11. 42–58), and a short farewell (11. 96–8: ‘\textit{salve aeternum mihi, maxime Palla, aeternumque vale.} nec plura effatus ad altos | tenebat muros.’). His terseness at such crises is most poignant, as are his appalled and resourceless silences before scenes of great pity or terror (3. 47 ff., at Polydorus’ tumulus; 6. 331 ff., seeing the souls of the unburied), or his strange reticence when we expect speech from him (8. 617 ff., 729 ff., looking at his shield).

Aeneas is distant from his men also.\(^7\) He moves in solitude through a world which yields him no intimacy or comfort, which progressively severs his ties with those who are close to him, and to whom he wishes to be close.\(^8\) His conversations are stifled, unconsummated. Here he is at his most unhomeric, particularly in Book 3, when he is following in the footsteps of his voluble Greek predecessor, Odysseus, conspicuously failing to engage in the whole range of discourse of which the more versatile hero is master. But even if Aeneas is cut off from the converse which enriches and supports the human life of the homeric poems, much of his speech is effective, although not reciprocal or personal. He offers prayer to win the goodwill of the gods for the common enterprise,\(^9\) and confidently interprets the signs they send (e.g. 7. 120–34, 8. 532–40). He encourages his men after disaster (1. 198–207), and orders them to decisive action. He is shown at the moment of decision ordering Anchises to get on his back and to pick up the household goods, telling his \textit{famuli} to follow on (2. 707–20). We hear him inaugurate the funeral games of his father, in a long\(^8\) and formal oration which is the first stage in re-establishing the group’s confidence and trust, weakened by the sojourn in Carthage (5. 45–71).\(^8\) He orders his army to the crucial step of marching on the city of Latinus, speaking in the harsh and authentic tone of the Roman commander (12. 565–73). He speaks as the representative of his people in diplomacy, most notably when he seals the vital alliance with Evander (8. 127–51).\(^8\) He does not make the initial alliance with Latinus in Book 7; one of the many reasons for this is that the alliance is broken, and whenever Aeneas makes a diplomatic arrangement it sticks (with the disastrous exception of his pact with Dido in Book 1): note his promise of friendship with the descendants of Helenus (3. 500–5), and the ties he establishes as he founds the city for Acestes (5. 749–61).

\(^{73}\) Soph. \textit{Aj.} 550 f., or Accius, \textit{Armorum Iudicium} fr. 10 Ribbeck.

\(^{74}\) This is so even if we accept the relocation of Ajax’s speech in Accius, as suggested by H. D. Jocelyn, \textit{CQ} n.s. 15 (1965), 128.

\(^{75}\) Highet, pp. 41 f.


\(^{77}\) Highet, p. 39.

\(^{78}\) The second longest he makes.

\(^{79}\) Cf. Quinn, op. cit. n. 10, p. 48: ‘One of the functions of Book V is to heal this alienation of commander from his men.’

\(^{80}\) His third longest speech in the poem.
The effectiveness of Aeneas' public speech, either civil or military, is put into perspective when seen beside the speech of the other characters in the poem. We look in vain in the Aeneid for examples of the homeric type of many-sided debates leading to a worthwhile result. On the few occasions in the Aeneid when more than four speeches from three or more speakers come together in a cluster, the atmosphere is panic-ridden and hysterical. The 'homic' consultation scene in Book 9, with speeches from Nisos, Aletes, Ascanius, Euryalus and Ascanius again (234–302), is an undisciplined and excited shambles, which issues in disaster: Aeneas, of course, is absent from his army. The set-piece debate in the Latin Senate in Book 11 is a mere shouting match: Latinus' proposals for peace are buried in the exchange of words between Drances and Turnus (225–461). The bedlam is shown for what it is by an interruption: illi haec inter se dubiis de rebus agebant | certantes: castra Aeneas aciemque muebatis (445 f.). As they tussle away Aeneas acts.83 Perhaps here lies some part of the explanation for the avoidance of conversation between Aeneas and Anchises in Book 3. Vergil may have been afraid that, by representing constant consultation instead of implying it, he would produce an impression, not of harmony, but of dither. Such an impression would undermine the image he wanted of an effective leadership, as opposed to the disorder of unstructured debate.

A more profound distinction is that which we saw at work in the private sphere, in the opposed speeches of Aeneas and Dido. Speech is not available as a palliative or a private bond in the Aeneid: worse, men and women use speech against each other and against their own interests, deceiving or bludgeoning with words to produce disastrous results. The most spectacular example is Sinon's speech in Book 2,84 but virtually all the major emotional speeches of persuasion or coercion contain falsehood and misrepresentation, generate and are generated by passion, and lead to calamity: so the speeches of Amata in Book 7 (359–72), Turnus and Drances in Book 11 (343–444), Tolumnius in Book 12 (259–65).85 Hight's conclusion is substantially correct: 'Vergil, it seems, held that powerful oratory was incompatible with pure truth, and that every speaker presented his or her own case by misrepresenting the facts'.86

It is as well to be precise about this, for there is little profit in bandying about the word 'rhetorical' as an indiscriminate term of abuse. Much of Hight's discussion is vitiated by the stance he adopts on the 'Vergilus poeta an orator' question,87 a stance which is little more than 'poetry good, rhetoric bad'. Rhetorical elements in the organization of the speeches in the Aeneid are simply an observable fact,88 and if we describe any particular speech as 'rhetorical' we do not commit ourselves to a necessary value judgement. What does emerge from the Aeneid is a mistrust of powerful language that divides into two aspects, corresponding to the two heads under which Aeneas criticizes Dido's speech: powerful language distorts reality, or the truth, in its singleminded pursuit of its particular aim; and it exploits ungovernably the emotions of speaker and audience. The power of words in a private and a public context is thus suspect in analogous ways.

83 A similar perflvid atmosphere prevails at the beginning of Book 12 (10–80), when we hear speeches from Turnus, Latinus, Turnus, Amata, Turnus. The appeals of Latinus and Amata, so far from inducing Turnus to give up the war, drive him into an even greater frenzy.
84 talibus insidios perurique arte Sinonis | credita res, capite dolis lacrimisque coactis | quos neque Tydides nec Larisaus Achilles, | non anns domuaec decem, non mille carinae (195–98).
86 p. 289.
87 pp. 277–90.
The rhetoricians themselves were fully alive to the force of such criticisms: *quidam uhehementer in eam (rhetoricam) iuueh solent...: eloquentiam esse quae poenis eripiat, scelestos, cuius fraude dammentur interim boni, consilia ducantur in petus, nec seditiones modo turbaque populares sed bella etiam inexpiabilia excitentur, cuius denique tum maximus sit usum cum pro falsis contra uritatem ualet*, Quint. 2. 16. 1 f. But when they are praising high-powered oratory, and giving advice on its use, the oratorical writers are almost disarmingly candid about their aims and methods: *ub iuo animis iudicum usis adferenda est et ab ipsa ueri contemplatione abducenda mens, ibi proprium oratoris opus est...sicut amantes de forma iudicare non possunt quia sensum oculorum praepicit animus, ita omnem uritatis inquirenda rationem iudex omittit occupatus affectibus*, Quint. 6. 2. 5 f.; *nihil est enim in dicendo...maius, quam ut faueat oratori is, qui audiet, utque ipse sic moueatur, ut impetu quodam animi et perturbatione, magis quam iudicio aut consilio regatur. plura enim multo homines iudicant odio aut amore aut cupiditate aut iracundia aut dolore aut laetitia aut spe aut timore aut errore aut aliqua permotione mentis, quam uritate aut praescripto aut iuris norma aliqua aut iudicii formula aut legibus*, Cic. De Orat. 2. 178; *illud autem genus orationis (sc. uhemens) non cognitionem iudicis, sed magis perturbationem requirit*, ibid. 2. 214. High rhetoric does not admit of dubiety: it is concerned in the first and last resort, not with any objective establishment of a truth, but with getting its way; and it gets its way by whirling speaker and audience up in a grip of passion in which judgement and discrimination are deliberately expelled, in which partial justification, half-truth, uncertainty are nothing but irrelevancies. Criticisms of such language as an evil have a long history, of which the *Aeneid* is a part. 90

Aeneas stands out prominently against this background. He does not lie when he speaks: 91 often he speaks with great emotion, but he does not use words to win his way by overpowering one emotion with another. The lassitude which so many readers sense in Aeneas' speeches 92 is in fact a restrained disavowal of the fervour which animates the language of the other characters when they seek to influence their listeners. The restraint tightens progressively into terseness as the tension of the last third of the poem increases, as Aeneas' role is restricted to the business of leading armies and killing Latins. 93

We are left with a discrepancy, blunt but not distorting, between Aeneas' private and public speech. In the private realm, he is the poem's most consistent and prominent paradigm of the weak and insubstantial nature of human interchange; in the public realm, he is increasingly successful through the course of the poem as the leader of the Trojan enterprise, whether as diplomat or general, with exhortation, encouragement and direction, free from the manipulation and distortion which

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90 These words should be read with *Aeneid* 7, 11 and 12 in mind.
92 Despite Hight's claims (pp. 287 ff.) that Aeneas distorts the truth like other speakers. His examples are ill founded. At, e.g., 1. 200 f., Aeneas tells his men, *uos et Scyllaeam rabiem penitusque sonantis | accessit scopulos*. 'Aeneas speaks as though he and his men had actually braved the dangers of Scylla and Charybdis, whereas the narrative shows that they avoided them by sailing southward along the Sicilian coast...'. (Hight, p. 288). Aeneas in fact tells his men that they went close to Scylla and Charybdis (accesset, 1. 201), and this is precisely what happened: *laeum cuncta cohors remis unemissque petuit. | tollimur in caelum curausto gurgite, et idem | subducta ad Manis imos deesdimus unda...etc.* (3. 563 ff.).
controls the words of the other outstanding orators of the poem. Hight etched out the right area for an understanding of the problem when he attempted to refer it to Vergil’s observation of Augustus, but his analysis is rather confused. A more satisfying discussion is that of D. J. Stewart, who writes with the assumption that ‘one of the tasks…Vergil set for himself in the Aeneid was to write literature about institutions and the political vocation.’ He catches well, though one might quibble with some of his expression, the truth about Aeneas’ position: ‘All those flat, dull speeches of encouragement, all that weariness, that general hangover quality which Aeneas both experiences and communicates when he looks out over the world, are the politician’s special burden. He must pretend to enthusiasm he does not feel, repress emotions he does feel, and generally behave not as a free individual but as the incorporation of a society’s needs, a trust-officer for other people’s future.’

Again, on Dido, ‘the Dido story is a metaphor for what any politician must be prepared to do: to sacrifice every last personal tie, if necessary, to help keep the political enterprise going.’ The same design guides the denial to Aeneas of free interchange with all those closest to him.

It is not a matter of Vergil looking at Augustus and writing down what he saw. Here is Higheet’s baulk, for as Higheet says, ‘Augustus was far more sociable and less lonely then Aeneas’. When we consider Aeneas, aloof, repressed in speech, devoid of close friends, the public servant without control over his own destiny and attachments, it is not Augustus who comes to mind: it is Tiberius. What other Julio-Claudian could have spoken with more feeling the words of Aeneas, me si fata meis paterentur ducere uitam | auspiciis et sponte mea componere curas…(4. 340 f.)? Douglas was not being facetious when he compared Aeneas’ last sight of Dido (prosequitur lacrimis longe et miseratur euntem, 6. 476) with Suetonius’ melancholy description of Tiberius’ last encounter with the wife Augustus had forced him to divorce: sed Agrippinam et abegisse post diuortium doluit, et semel omnino ex occursu uisam adeo contentis et [t]umentibus oculis prosecutus est, ut custoditum sit in unquam in conspectum ei posthac ueniret (Tib. 7. 3)

I am not suggesting that Vergil was attempting to foresee events; nor was he looking back, as C. A. McKay argues when he proposes Julius Caesar as the model for Aeneas. Aeneas is not a portrait of Augustus or of any other individual. He concludes, ‘For Vergil both Augustus and his prototype Aeneas were more godlike than human; and a god, as we know from Aristotle, cannot have human friends’ (p. 43). But his consequent remarks are more valuable: ‘Did he not also wish to show him as one who, after almost unendurable losses and sufferings, had grown into the melancholy of middle age and the grave contemplation of approaching death?’ (ibid.).


659 f. A fine example is the worthy but flat oration with which Aeneas inaugurates the funeral games (5. 45–71); this is the ancient equivalent of the Cabinet Minister’s speech at the opening of the bridge or factory.

p. 42. One suspects that it was the early part of Augustus’ principate, when Vergil knew him, that provided the material for the conventional assertion of his comites (Suet. Aug. 53. 2 f., 66. 1–3, 74). Vergil did not see the Augustus who lived through the deaths of all his early friends, and of Gaius and Lucius, who saw the disgrace of daughter and granddaughter, and survived into ‘the atmosphere of gloom and repression that clouded the last decade of the reign’ (R. Syme, History in Ovid (Oxford, 1978), p. 205).

art. cit. n. 10, 21.

Following Ihm’s Teubner text for [t]umentibus.

cf. Douglas, loc. cit. n. 100, ‘Vergil was dead before these events, but he knew all about dynastic marriages of convenience.’

represents generally the extreme case of the pressures and cruelties inflicted upon the individual who embodies in his own person the aspirations and future of a whole nation.\textsuperscript{104} Augustus was the only man Vergil knew who was such a 'man of destiny'; while it is impossible to believe that Augustus was not a major influence on Vergil's conception of his hero, it is likewise impossible to make any precise suggestions as to the nature of that influence.\textsuperscript{105} The character of Aeneas stands essentially in its own right, the representative of a predicament which his creator did not see as unique.

As Stewart observes, in the passage quoted above, 'the Dido story is a metaphor for what every politician must be prepared to do'.\textsuperscript{106} It is in his confrontation with Dido that the tensions inherent in Aeneas' role become most acute. In Dido he faces the most impassioned and eloquent speaker in the poem. He feels the justice and the injustice of her speech, but he does not answer her in the same tenor. With hard-won self-control he tells her that the way she uses words is profitless and cruel, and he attempts to give an explanation, to reach some understanding. His words do not achieve their aim: but there is nothing in the poem to give us reason to believe that any other words would have been more effective.

\textit{Harvard University, Society of Fellows} \\
D. FEENEY

\textsuperscript{104} cf. Stewart, art. cit. n. 95, 651: 'The \textit{Aeneid} is a study of the preternatural strains and anxieties a political vocation brings to mere natural man.'

\textsuperscript{105} But I cannot resist quoting the following passage from Suetonius, to which Prof. Nisbet referred me as being illustrative of Augustus' constrained and inhibited use of speech: 'sermones quoque cum singulis atque etiam cum Liuia sua grauiores non nisi scriptos et e libello habebat, ne plus minusue loqueretur ex tempore,' \textit{Aug.} 84. 2.

\textsuperscript{106} loc. cit. n. 98.