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Author(s): A. N. Sherwin-White

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CAESAR AS AN IMPERIALIST

By A. N. SHERWIN-WHITE

SO much is written nowadays about the propagandist element in Caesar's *Commentaries*, and his supposed misrepresentation of his own actions, that it is almost forgotten that he provides the only contemporary narrative of a major Roman imperialist war, and that by its principal agent. The obscure record of the wars of Augustus has been subjected to a severe scrutiny, and the most diverse and recondite theories propounded about his purposes. But this long and detailed account of the greatest single extension of the Roman Empire has hardly been examined seriously for the things that its author was not concerned to conceal—the springs and purposes and means of that new form of imperialism that under Pompey, Caesar, and Augustus converted the Roman dominion from a suzerainty over a maritime fringe of Mediterranean provinces into a solid and broad-based continental empire. Caesar is most valuable in his admissions, for he admits such actions, methods, and objectives as were commonly approved by the opinion of the governing class, whether political friends or enemies.

Perhaps the most remarkable thing about Caesar's conquest of continental Gaul is that it certainly was not the original intention of its author when he secured himself an extended command in 59 B.C. Despite the best efforts of his panegyrists, it is apparent that Caesar in his first provincial war, as *propraetor* of Further Spain in 61–60 B.C., had secured only such successes as any vigorous and efficient governor might expect, who made the most of the advice of his leading officers. He had no reason as yet to regard himself as a thunderbolt of war. In 59 his own choice of province was Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, with an army of no more than three legions: Cisalpine Gaul for its political value as part of Italy, and Illyricum in the hope of bettering the victories and triumphs, over the ever-troublesome border tribes of Rome's north-eastern frontier, which had graced the names of many consuls in the preceding century.¹ At the opening of 58 B.C. his army was poised at Aquileia, the natural base for any campaign over the Julian Alps into the valley of the Upper Save.² As late as the end of his second season he was engaged in gathering military intelligence for a drive into Illyricum, which until then he conceived to be his main task.³ But—*dis aliter visum*.

¹ Suet. *Div. Iul.* 22. 1, Dio Cassius xxxviii. 8. 5.

² B.G. i. 10. 3.

³ Ibid. iii. 7. 1.

He had been engaged meanwhile in central Gaul because he had accepted as a subsidiary task, not by the Lex Vatinia but by a subsequent decree of the Senate,¹ the protection of the unexpectedly vacant province of Transalpine Gaul (commonly known to us as Narbonensis) from the dangers with which the movement of the Helvetic folk were threatening it. It has been recently denied that any danger so threatened the Roman province, and implied that this move of Caesar against the Helvetii was a cunning first step in a planned scheme of Gallic conquest, on the grounds that, as Caesar admits, the Helvetii were planning to settle in northern Gaul in territory which was in fact a good hundred miles from the most northerly part of the then Roman province;² and, again as Caesar shows, that they did not pass through Roman provincial territory. But such a view of the situation is based on a definition of the Roman Empire that no Roman of the century before Caesar would have understood—that the Empire was confined to the territorial provinces. Until very recent years the greater part of it had instead consisted, and much still consisted, of large and wealthy dependent kingdoms and principalities. Caesar based the Roman interest in north Gaul on the alliance and protection, or clientship, of the great dominant folks of the north, the Aedui and the Arverni.³ This relationship went back to the wars of conquest in south Gaul during the years 123–120 B.C. The Aedui were certainly affected by the march of the Helvetii; and they were the oldest of the Roman *socii et amici* beyond the border of the Transalpine province.

The elimination of Ariovistus and his host—unwelcome guests or too dangerous mercenaries of the Sequani—followed on similar principles. But it was harder to explain away because Ariovistus had been placed by Caesar himself, as consul, on the official list of *amici populi Romani*. Hence Caesar emphasized the objectionable behaviour and characteristics of Ariovistus,⁴ and conjured up the ghosts of the Cimbric invasions.⁵ There are evasions in the narrative, and Caesar certainly seized the sudden opportunity of military glory, though in a way that could have been disastrous for himself had he failed, as his officers expected. But it is difficult to believe that Caesar in 58 was doing more than deal with situations as they arose. So far he had taken no steps to 'pacify Gaul'. That phase began in 57, the second season of his command.

At the end of 58 Caesar wintered his troops in north Gaul, and

¹ Cf. above, p. 36, n. 1.

² Ibid. i. 11. 4–6, 43. 6–8, 45. 1–2.

³ Ibid. i. 31–36, 44.

⁴ B.G. i. 10. 1.

⁵ Ibid. i. 33. 4.

according to him this filled the Belgic folks with grave suspicions that the Romans were planning their conquest. Hence they organized a *coniuratio* against him, that is, an armed uprising of a confederation of tribes.¹ This is the very notion that Pompey invoked in his Armenian campaign, to justify or explain his attack on the sub-Caucasian peoples, the Iberi and Albani.² Caesar claims, like Pompey before him and Augustus after him, that the enemy struck first; the operation first mentioned is the invasion by the confederates of the territory of the Remi, who were on Caesar's side.³ Caesar's main action, the crushing of the powerful Nervii in battle, followed.⁴ The rest of the Belgic folk made formal submission either before or after this battle. While this was going on in Belgium, between the Rhine and Seine, Caesar dispatched his legate P. Crassus with a single legion into central Gaul, *Gallia* proper, between the Seine and the Loire.⁵ There was no fighting, but the peoples of Brittany and Normandy made formal submission to the Roman power. As a result of these two sets of operations in 57 Caesar claimed that all Gaul was pacified: 'his rebus gestis omni Gallia pacata.'⁶ And he believed it, for he now departed to north Italy and made serious preparations for an Illyrian campaign in 56.⁷

What situation did Caesar think that he had established in Gaul at this moment? Evidently not a territorial province, organized for taxation and exploitation, but the assertion or reassertion of Roman suzerainty over the tribal confederations of the north. It is remarkable that in all this phase there is not one word about Aquitania, the region of tribal states extending from the Garonne to the Loire. Indeed, there were no operations in the case of Aquitania between the Garonne and Loire until the rising of Vercingetorix, just as there were no operations in the north until then against the Sequani and Aedui, who appear instead as Caesar's principal allies. In Aquitania the principal people were the Arverni, who had once had a considerable empire throughout Gaul. Caesar describes at some length in passages of Books i and vi how three tribal states divided the leadership of Gaul—the Aedui, Sequani, and Arverni.⁸ The Loire is roughly the dividing line between the Aquitanian empire of the Arverni and the Gallo-Belgic zone under the leadership of the Sequani and Aedui. In Aquitania Caesar rested content with the nominal acknowledgement of Roman suzerainty secured in the wars of 123–122 B.C., which he quoted to Ariovistus to justify the Roman position in Gaul.⁹ Caesar's system so far was the establishment

¹ *B.G.* ii. 1–3.

³ *B.G.* ii. 5–6. For Augustus, *Mon. Anc.* 26. 3.

⁴ *B.G.* ii. 16–28, esp. 28. 1.

⁷ *Ibid.* iii. 7. 1.

² Dio Cassius xxxvii. 1.

⁵ *Ibid.* ii. 34.

⁶ *Ibid.* ii. 35. 1.

⁸ *Ibid.* i. 31. 3–4, 43. 7, vi. 12.

⁹ *Ibid.* i. 45. 2.

not so much of a province as of an enlarged protectorate, which was based on indirect rule through the pro-Roman elements controlling the three dominant tribal states. The situation was analogous to the organization of Roman power in Asia Minor through the dependent monarchies of Pergamum, Bithynia, Pontus, and Cappadocia in the century following the great victory of Magnesia. Book i contains a good deal of information about the pro-Roman elements among the Aedui and Sequani, notably in the Divitiacus-Orgetorix story.¹ When in the second season the great tribe of the Bellovaci offered submission Caesar noted that they were a dependency of the Aedui: 'omni tempore in fide atque amicitia civitatis Aeduae fuisse.' He accepts the mediation of the Aedui on their behalf, and thus expects 'greatly to increase the authority of the Aedui throughout Belgium'.² One may recall the position of the ruling house of Pergamum in Asia Minor before the creation of the Asian province, as satirized by Sallust: 'Eumenem habitum custodiae agri captivi. . . . ex rege miserrimum servorum effecere [sc. Romani]'.³

Caesar's plans for operations elsewhere outside Gaul in his third season were upset by the bitter Venetic revolt. This showed Caesar that a permanent military occupation of north Gaul was necessary. He finally gave up the Illyrian project, and settled down to the consolidation of his work in Gaul. The Gauls are now represented for the first time in the *Bellum Gallicum* as facing a choice of *libertas* or *servitus*.⁴ The Veneti were thoroughly pacified in a war of attrition, community by community. This style of warfare was very different from the technique of a single battle of annihilation whereby he had overwhelmed the Belgae the year before. At the same time the dependable Crassus was dispatched to the remotest corner of the south-west to effect the conquest of the folk dwelling between the Garonne and the Pyrenees, the Cantabrian quarter of Aquitania,⁵ more Spanish than Gallic in its affinities, as Caesar indicates, and lying outside the influence of the Arvernian confederacy.⁶ But Arvernian Aquitania remained quiet, and aided Caesar with supplies.⁷ By the end of 56 only two cantons, the Morini and Menapii of Flanders who had assisted the Veneti, lay outside the sphere of Roman conquest or influence, saved by General Mud from Caesar's autumn campaign against them, only to be 'mopped up' next year.⁸

Caesar renewed his claim at the end of the season of 56 that 'all Gaul was pacified',⁹ and turned in 55 after the final suppression of the Morini

¹ *B.G.* i. 16-20.

² *Ibid.* ii. 14.

³ *Hist. fr.* iv. 61. 8.

⁴ *B.G.* iii. 8. 4, 10. 1-3.

⁵ *Ibid.* iii. 20-27.

⁶ *Ibid.* iii. 23. 3.

⁷ *Ibid.* iii. 9. 1, 11. 5.

⁸ *Ibid.* iii. 28-29.

⁹ *Ibid.* iii. 28. 1.

and Menapii to operations of a very different character beyond the borders of Gaul. He set about the crossing of Rhine and Channel in the famous German and British expeditions. This means that Caesar regarded the conquest of Gaul as complete, and faced its further implication—the necessity of impressing the neighbours of the new empire with the puissance of Rome. He remarks that the Germans were too apt to cross the Rhine, and hence: ‘suis quoque rebus eos timere voluit, cum intellegent et posse et audere populi Romani exercitum Rhenum transire.’ He rejects from the start, in so many words, the notion of the Rhine as the boundary of the Roman power.¹ The famous bridge was built precisely as a propaganda device to impress the barbarian, just as the Belgae had been impressed in the campaign of 57 with the technical superiority of Roman power: ‘navibus transire neque . . . populi Romani dignitatis esse statuebat. . . id sibi contendendum aut aliter non traducendum exercitum existimabat.’²

So too with the British expedition. Whatever other motive of greed or ambition there may have been, Caesar had a very sound political reason for it. The Britons, like the Germans, had intervened in Gallic affairs,³ but the Romans had and could secure no political or military ‘intelligence’ about the island. Caesar’s spies were arrested, and merchants could or would reveal nothing.⁴ So it was necessary to take the measure of Rome’s new neighbour by going there in force. Caesar remarks, ‘neque quanta esset insulae magnitudo neque . . . quantae nationes incolerent neque quem usum belli haberent aut quibus institutis uterentur neque qui essent ad maiorem navium multitudinem idonei portus reperire poterat’.⁵ A better summary of the sort of evidence that all governments need about their neighbours could hardly be devised.

Caesar gives no other reasons for his expeditions across the waters. The campaigns bear the same relation to his conquest of Gaul as do the campaigns of Pompey against the sub-Caucasian peoples to his conquest of Pontus and Armenia, or his projected attack on the Nabataean Arabs to his conquest of Syria. The neighbouring peoples are made to feel the weight of the Roman arm, to respect the *Romani nominis magnitudo*, and are thus drawn into the fringe of a system of protectorates or *clientela*. Such distant campaigns by no means herald a definitive conquest or annexation, and were not necessarily meant to do more than they in fact achieved. So too in the matter of river frontiers. Caesar and Pompey alike instinctively rejected the proposal made to each that Rome should recognize a great river, Rhine or Euphrates, as the precise

¹ *B.G.* iv. 16. 1, 4.

² *Ibid.* ii. 31. 1, iv. 17. 1.

³ *Ibid.* iv. 20. 1; cf. ii. 4. 7, 14. 3. ⁴ *Ibid.* iv. 20. 4, 27. 3. ⁵ *Ibid.* iv. 20. 4.

demarcation of her zone of influence. Caesar's reply to Ariovistus is the same in essence as Pompey's to Phraates: 'he would take as boundary what seemed fit to him.'¹

Meanwhile what was the condition of the individual states within Caesar's new Gallic empire after 56? He tells very little of the terms or organization imposed at this phase. Throughout the greater part of Gaul it is unlikely that he imposed any new organization at all. Those peoples who took their lead from the Aedui and Sequani in *Gallia* proper, and the whole of the Arvernian confederation, had never refused *fides* and *officium* and their practical expression in military supplies, notably corn and cavalry. There can have been no question yet of imposing regular taxation, or any regular form of provincial control, throughout a great part of the Three Gauls. But the Belgae and Veneti who conspired and fought were in a different case. Caesar lets slip that, apparently at the time of the conquest of the Morini in 55, he had given special privileges to the pro-Roman ruler of the Atrebates, Commius: 'pro meritis civitatem eius immunem esse iusserat iura legesque reddiderat atque ipsi Morinos attribuerat.'² This would seem to imply that Caesar normally imposed regular taxation and even a reorganization of local government upon defeated tribes. Certainly, if surprisingly, he imposed annual taxation on a part of Britain after his second campaign, though in no position to enforce it.³ This is the only place where Caesar deliberately mentions the new income that he was winning for the Roman people. One may assume that only the peoples defeated in the campaigns of 57-55 were required to pay regular *stipendium*.

What of *iura legesque reddiderat*? This phrase is commonly used in Livy for the resumption of local government in communities in Italy or overseas that Rome had defeated, whether or not any form of province existed. It was the normal thing to restore *iura legesque*, and Caesar had no need to alter the Celtic system of local government within the tribal states by imposing any Roman forms. The Celtic communities were moving away from a system of hereditary 'kingships' towards an oligarchical pattern of annually elected magistrates, usually in pairs, called *vergobret*, with an advisory council of notables. The system was remarkably similar to that of Rome itself. But in some states Caesar revived the former monarchy by imposing efficient pro-Roman leaders, like Commius of the Atrebates, as autocratic dynasts, to take sole responsibility towards Rome for the administration of their tribal state. Thus Tasget, a member of the former ruling house among the

¹ Plut. *Pomp.* 33. 6, Dio Cassius xxxvii. 6. 3 f.

² *B.G.* vii. 76. 1.

³ *Ibid.* v. 22. 4.

Carnutes, was restored to the ancestral throne, 'pro eius virtute atque in se benevolentia'. When political opponents murdered him in 54 B.C., Caesar sent a legate and a legion to arrest the guilty.¹ So too the rising of the Senones in the great rebellion was set going by the expulsion of Cavarinus, whom Caesar had made 'king' among them.²

Caesar could be a good republican when it suited him. Among the Aedui the notion of *regnum* was associated with the anti-Roman plots of Dumnorix, who in 58 had hoped to make himself sole ruler of the Aedui with Helvetian help, whereas the champions of the republican system were Caesar's friends.³ So one is not surprised that Caesar was at great pains to respect the local system among the Aedui when he was invited to arbitrate after a disputed election. He claims to have decided the issue after a careful inquiry into the local rules, *more civitatis*.⁴ When on the eve of the second British expedition rivalry arose between the *principes* of the Treveri, Caesar supported the one who was openly pro-Roman, but sought to pacify his rival.⁵ Thus Caesar generally left the internal affairs of the tribal states alone, and intervened only when their loyalty was in question. When he thought that he had been betrayed or served ill he never hesitated to interfere, and he claimed the right of personal jurisdiction over the Gallic nobility. Thus after the revolt of the Senones was put down he held an inquiry into its causes; and the notable Acco, who had instigated the expulsion of Caesar's friend Cavarinus, was sentenced to death.⁶ The treatment of the patriotic Dumnorix, who in 58 had preferred Helvetian to Roman domination, is of interest. He was placed at that time under the surveillance of his brother, but in 54, when serving as a cavalry leader with Caesar's British expedition, he was suspected of treachery.⁷ Caesar authorized his arrest, and his execution if he resisted, as happened. But such extreme measures occur only in times of crisis or after open hostilities. It is remarkable that Acco was given trial at all. Caesar's general Gallic policy is one of non-intervention in local affairs. There are no traces of ordinary proconsular jurisdiction. He deals with the heads of states, who are required to supply so much war material or so many cavalymen. The responsibility and execution is left to the Gauls themselves. At least twice he held a great Durbar to which all the tribal states sent representatives to hear Caesar's advice; from time to time he would summon, in a crisis, a more local meeting of *principes cuiusque civitatis*, and bring his personal influence to bear: 'alias terrendo . . . alias cohortando magnam partem Galliae in officio tenuit.'⁸

¹ B.G. v. 25.² Ibid. v. 54. 1-4.³ Ibid. i. 16-18, v. 6. 1-2.⁴ Ibid. vii. 32-33, esp. 33. 3.⁵ Ibid. v. 3-4.⁶ Ibid. vi. 4. 44.⁷ Ibid. v. 7.⁸ Ibid. v. 24. 1, vi. 3. 4, 44. 1; also v. 54. 1.

There can be little doubt that Caesar was deliberately avoiding the Roman methods of exploitation that had caused such extreme discontent in southern Gaul, and had led to a series of bitter revolts and bitter repressions during the last twenty years. Caesar devotes a fair amount of space to the Gallic point of view. In several passages he brings out the contrast between *libertas* and *condicio parendi* or *servitus* which faced the Gauls. He is apt to represent the Gauls as willing to pay tribute in various forms, or to provide cavalry as allies, but bitterly opposed to the permanent establishment of military occupation. This is given as the prime cause of the Belgic *coniuratio* in 58 and of the great rebellion of the north in 54: 'nihil nisi hiberna recusent atque hanc inveterascere consuetudinem nolint.'¹ Then in a carefully placed chapter towards the end of his work he brings on the figure of an old Gallic chief at Alesia to remind the rebels of the fate of the southern province: 'depopulata Gallia Cimbri . . . iura leges agros libertatem nobis reliquerunt. Romani vero quid petunt aliud . . . nisi invidia adducti . . . in agris civitatibusque considerare atque his aeternam iniungere servitutem? . . . respicite finitimam Galliam, quae in provinciam redacta, iure et legibus commutatis, securibus subiecta perpetua premitur servitute.'² The methods of the 'propaganda school' of criticism of the *B.G.* may be turned against their authors. In such passages Caesar is making his indictment of the past mistakes of Rome, and indicating the way in which he did *not* intend to organize his new conquests. His advice was very largely followed by his successors. In all the broad fat acres of the Three Gauls the Romans in the following century founded only three *coloniae*, an astonishing contrast with the extensive Italian military colonization in Narbonensis. One of these three was at the very edge of the province at Cologne. The details, too, of the local government of the tribal states show that it was only by the action of the Gauls themselves that during the early Principate their *iura legesque* were changed gradually from the 'vergobretal' system to that of the Italian 'duoviral' municipality.³ And it is hard to believe, however much plunder Caesar may have carted off, that his final assessment of the northern provinces' annual tribute at forty million sesterces was a severe burden for the teeming millions of inhabitants of the country.⁴

The situation of Gaul was changed between 54 and 51 by two great revolts, that of the Belgic north and that of the south and centre under Vercingetorix. These involved at one time or another nearly

¹ *B.G.* ii. 1. 3, v. 41. 5.

² *Ibid.* vii. 77. 14-16.

³ See *C.A.H.* xi. 502 f., 506 f.; *J.L.S.* 7013, 7040, 7042, 7045.

⁴ *Suet. Div. Iul.* 25. 2.

all the tribal states, so that by 51 the previous distinction between the conquered and those that had entered the Roman fold more peacefully no longer held good. All Gaul, with few exceptions, had now been pacified by methods that only the Veneti and a few Belgic cantons had experienced previously. But Caesar's basic policy for the administration of the country did not change. A regular tribute now became general, and the Gauls had to endure the permanent quartering of military forces in Gaul. But for the general administration of the country, and for relations between the cantons and the central government, Caesar reaffirmed the principle of indirect rule, and reliance upon the protectorate of the Aedui and Arverni. In the course of the Vercingetorix rebellion he showed the value that he set on the Aedui by taking the most remarkable military risks to keep them faithful. Twice he left the main zone of battle to visit the Aedui and bolster their tottering loyalties.¹ Finally he failed, the keystone of his system of alliances collapsed, and the most difficult phase of his operations began.² After his final victory he immediately set about rebuilding the system of indirect control. When he found himself the master of 20,000 Arvernian and Aeduan prisoners, the stage seemed set for another of his fearful examples, like the destruction of the Atuatici. But Caesar never showed better the coolness of his political judgement. The other Gallic prisoners of war were indeed distributed among the soldiery as booty. But the Arverni and Aedui were kept back as a bait and bribe, 'si per eos civitates recipere possit'. And the leaders of their tribal cantons duly returned to their ancient loyalty.³ Hirtius in his continuation of the *Bellum Gallicum* describes how Caesar toured the cantons of Gaul in his last year. His object was: 'continere in amicitia civitates.' His means were: 'honorifice civitates appellando principes maximis praemiis adficiendo nulla onera nova iniungendo'; and the result was: 'Galliam condicione parendi meliore . . . in pace continuit.'⁴ But the pride of place was held in all this by the Aedui, 'quorum auctoritas summa esset'.⁵ The value of this system for Caesar is shown by examples of the working of indirect control scattered through the *Bellum Gallicum*. The instance of the Bellovaci and the Aedui in 58 B.C. has already been described. Again, when the Carnutes and Senones wanted to abandon their rebellion in 53, they sent emissaries who secured the mediation of the Aedui and Remi respectively—'quorum antiquitus erat in fide civitas'—before approaching Caesar. So too the Bituriges, when solicited by Vercingetorix, turned to the Aedui for help, and only joined the rebellion when no help was sent.⁶

¹ *B.G.* vii. 33 f., 40 f.² *Ibid.* vii. 59, 63, 75.³ *Ibid.* vii. 89. 5-90. 1-2.⁴ *Ibid.* viii. 49. 1-3.⁵ *Ibid.* viii. 54. 5.⁶ *Ibid.* vi. 4. 2-5, vii. 5.

So Caesar throughout had a coherent diplomatic as well as military policy in Gaul, and followed the dictum that war is a continuation of policy by other means in its truest sense. He saw that Gaul was too vast, too alien, and too unstable as yet for direct government, and that the only way to secure a firm stand in the shifting sands of tribal politics was by attaching to Rome the self-interest of the two or three most influential cantons, whose lead the others in varying degrees were apt to follow. In this he was not mesmerized by the past, but was alive to the rise of new forces. For example, the appearance of the Remi as a new element in Gallic politics did not escape him; he attached them to his interests, and through them their group of dependent tribes; and of all the Gallic tribal states they alone never broke faith with him.¹ Caesar by 52-51 B.C. had advanced far beyond the opportunist policy that led to his intervention in 58-57. One is impressed, more than by his famous *celeritas*, by the clear intelligence with which he appraised the political situation throughout Gaul, and behind all the shifts and turns of the light and fickle Celts discerned the permanent factors on which a stable dominion could be built—the material interests of the pro-Roman cliques and the influence of the suzerain states. So, too, when first among the Romans he faced the Rhine and the Channel, the Germans and the Britons, he solved the problem in terms that proved their worth throughout the next three centuries—the island could be conquered, but the Germans could only be overawed. In all his detailed actions, in his calculated *clementia* and his calculated brutality alike, he stands with Pompey and Lucullus among those who saw that self-interest itself imposes limits to what can be sensibly extracted from or inflicted upon the conquered, in a tradition of restrained exploitation that leads through to the relatively enlightened provincial administration of the Principate.

NOTE ON BIBLIOGRAPHY

THE standard exegesis of the Conquest, as in, for example, T. Rice Holmes, *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul* (Oxford, 1911), and C. Hignett, *C.A.H.* ix, ch. 9, is beginning to be affected by the present interest in the *Bellum Gallicum* as propaganda, for which see J. P. V. D. Balsdon's article, above. G. Walser, 'Caesar und die Germanen', *Historia*, Einzelschriften (1956), Heft 1, 1-93, is characteristic. C. E. Stevens, 'The *Bellum Gallicum* as a Work of Propaganda', *Latomus*, xi (1952), 3 ff., 165 ff., noted above, pp. 25, 28, 37, is speculative and stimulating. Both concentrate largely on Book i and parts of Books iv and v. Serious consideration of Caesar's policy in itself seems to have been lacking in recent years.

¹ *B.G.* ii. 3, v. 54. 4, vi. 12. 7-9, vii. 63. 7.