Although still young, this twenty-first century has dramatically reminded us that we are social animals whose lives and cultures revolve around how we think about, influence, and relate to one another.

On September 11, 2001, nineteen men with box cutters achieved an act of catastrophic violence that triggered fright, outrage, and a lust for revenge. But it also triggered an outpouring of compassion and care, including gifts of more money, food, clothing, and teddy bears than New Yorkers could possibly use. What drives people to feel such hatred that they would destroy thousands of innocent lives? And what motivates the heroic altruism of those who died trying to save others and of the many more who reached out to those coping with loss?

Echoes of these questions resurfaced after genocide plagued the Darfur region of Sudan beginning in 2003, and during the war in Iraq, where survey-based estimates of deaths ranged from 151,000 to more than 1 million from 2002 through 2006 (Iraq Family Study, 2008; ORB, 2008). What factors affect the decision making of our world leaders? And how can we transform the closed fists of international conflict into the open arms of peace and cooperation?

The fundamental attribution error If our new friend acts grouchy, we may decide she’s a grouchy person. She may be more likely to explain her behavior as a result of losing sleep over a family worry, missing the bus to school, or having a fight with her boyfriend.

Social Thinking

Our social behavior arises from our social cognition. Especially when the unexpected occurs, we analyze why people act as they do. Does her warmth reflect romantic interest, or is that how she relates to everyone? Does his absenteeism signify illness? Laziness? A stressful work atmosphere? Was the horror of 9/11 the work of crazed people, or of ordinary people corrupted by life events?

Attributing behavior to persons or to situations

1: How do we tend to explain others’ behavior and our own?

After studying how people explain others’ behavior, Fritz Heider (1958) proposed an attribution theory. Heider noted that people usually attribute others’ behavior either to their internal dispositions or to their external situations. A teacher, for example, may wonder whether a student’s hostility reflects an aggressive personality (a dispositional attribution) or a reaction to stress or abuse (a situational attribution).

In class, we notice that Juliette seldom talks; over coffee, Jack talks nonstop. Attributing their behaviors to their personal dispositions, we decide Juliette is shy and Jack is outgoing. Because people do have enduring personality traits, such attributions are sometimes valid. However, we often fall prey to the fundamental attribution error, by overestimating the influence of personality and underestimating the influence of situations. In class, Jack may be as quiet as Juliette. Catch Juliette as the lead in the high school musical and you may hardly recognize your quiet classmate.

An experiment by David Napolitan and George Goethals (1979) illustrated the phenomenon. They had Williams College students talk, one at a time, with a young woman who acted either aloof and critical or warm and friendly. Beforehand, they told half the students that the woman’s behavior would be spontaneous. They told the other half the truth—that she had been instructed to act friendly (or unfriendly). What do you suppose was the effect of being told the truth?
There was no effect. The students disregarded the information. If the woman acted friendly, they inferred she really was a warm person. If she acted unfriendly, they inferred she really was a cold person. In other words, they attributed her behavior to her personal disposition even when told that her behavior was situational—that she was merely acting that way for the purposes of the experiment. Although the fundamental attribution error occurs in all cultures studied, this tendency to attribute behavior to people’s dispositions runs especially strong in individualistic Western countries. In East Asian cultures, for example, people are more sensitive to the power of the situation (Masuda & Kitayama, 2004).

Actor and observer perspectives make for differing attributions During their contentious U.S. presidential primaries in 2008, Barack Obama was criticized for seeming—in this camera perspective that faces him—to turn a cold shoulder to his opponent, Hillary Clinton. Obama later explained that he had greeted her earlier, and here was turning to speak to (as a picture shot from behind him might have shown) the unseen person to his left. In laboratory experiments, when a camera shows the actor's perspective, observers better appreciate the situation's influence. Doug Mills/New York Times/Redux

You have surely committed the fundamental attribution error. In judging whether your AP psychology teacher is shy or outgoing, you have perhaps by now inferred that he or she has an outgoing personality. But you know your teacher only from the classroom, a situation that demands outgoing behavior. Catch the teacher in a different situation and you might be surprised. Outside their assigned roles, teachers seem less teacherly, presidents less presidential, servants less servile.

Your teacher, on the other hand, observes his or her own behavior in many different situations—in the classroom, in meetings, at home—and so might say, “Me, outgoing? It all depends on the situation. In class or with good friends, yes, I’m outgoing. But at professional meetings I’m really rather shy.” When explaining the behavior of those we know well and see in varied situations, we are sensitive to how behavior changes with the situation (Idson & Mischel, 2001). After behaving badly, we also recognize how the situation affected our own behavior (recall the self-serving bias discussed in Unit 10). What about our own intentional and admirable actions? Those we more often attribute to our own good reasons than to situational causes (Malle, 2006; Malle et al., 2007).

When explaining others’ behavior, particularly the behavior of strangers we have observed in only one type of situation, we often commit the fundamental attribution error: We disregard the situation and leap to unwarranted conclusions about their personality traits. Many people initially assumed the 9/11 terrorists were obviously crazy, when actually they went unnoticed in their neighborhoods, health clubs, and favorite restaurants.

“Otis, shout at that man to pull himself together.” © The New Yorker Collection, 1980, J. B. Handelsman from cartoonbank.com. All rights reserved.
Researchers who have reversed the perspectives of actor and observer—by having each view a replay of the situation filmed from the other’s perspective—have also reversed the attributions (Lassiter & Irvine, 1986; Storms, 1973). Seeing the world from the actor’s perspective, the observers better appreciate the situation. (As you act, your eyes look outward; you see others’ faces, not your own.) Taking the observer’s point of view, the actors better appreciate their own personal style. Reflecting on our past selves of 5 or 10 years ago also switches our perspective. We now adopt an observer’s perspective and attribute our behavior mostly to our traits (Pronin & Ross, 2006). Likewise, in another 5 or 10 years, our today’s self may seem like another person.

The Effects of Attribution

Some 7 in 10 college women report having experienced a man misattributing her friendliness as a sexual come-on (Jacques-Tiura et al., 2007).

In everyday life we often struggle to explain others’ actions. A jury must decide whether a shooting was malicious or in self-defense. An interviewer must judge whether the applicant’s geniality is genuine. A person must decide whether to interpret another’s friendliness as genuine, or motivated by self-interest (she just needs a ride). When we make such judgments, our attributions—either to the person or to the situation—have important consequences (Fincham & Bradbury, 1993; Fletcher et al., 1990). Happily married couples attribute a spouse’s tart-tongued remark to a temporary situation (“She must have had a bad day at work”). Unhappily married couples attribute the same remark to a mean disposition (“Why did I marry such a hostile person?”).

An attribution question

Some people blamed the New Orleans residents for not evacuating before the predicted 2005 Hurricane Katrina. Others attributed their inaction to the situation—to their not having cars or not being offered bus transportation. AP Photo/LM Otero

Or consider the political effects of attribution. How do you explain poverty or unemployment? Researchers in Britain, India, Australia, and the United States (Furnham, 1982; Pandey et al., 1982; Wagstaff, 1982; Zucker & Weiner, 1993) report that political conservatives tend to attribute such social problems to the personal dispositions of the poor and unemployed themselves: “People generally get what they deserve. Those who don’t work are often freeloaders. Anybody who takes the initiative can still get ahead.” “Society is not to blame for crime, criminals are,” said one conservative U.S. presidential candidate (Dole, 1996). Political liberals (and social scientists) are more likely to blame past and present situations: “If you or I had to live with the same poor education, lack of opportunity, and discrimination, would we be any better off?” To understand and prevent terrorism, they say, consider the situations that breed terrorists. Better to drain the swamps than swat the mosquitoes.

Managers’ attributions also have effects. In evaluating employees, they are likely to attribute poor performance to personal factors, such as low ability or lack of motivation. But remember the actor’s viewpoint: Workers doing poorly on a job recognize situational influences, such as inadequate supplies, poor working conditions, difficult co-workers, or impossible demands (Rice, 1985).

The point to remember: Our attributions—to individuals’ dispositions or to their situations—should be made carefully. They have real consequences

Attitudes and Actions

2. Does what we think affect what we do, or does what we do affect what we think?
Attitudes are feelings, often influenced by our beliefs, that predispose our reactions to objects, people, and events. If we believe someone is mean, we may feel dislike for the person and act unfriendly.

Attitudes Affect Actions

Our attitudes often predict our behavior. Al Gore’s movie An Inconvenient Truth and the Alliance for Climate Protection it has spawned have a simple premise: Public opinion about the reality and dangers of global climate change can change, with effects on both personal behaviors and public policies. Indeed, by the end of 2007, an analysis of international opinion surveys by WorldPublicOpinion.org showed “widespread and growing concern about climate change. Large majorities believe that human activity causes climate change and favor policies designed to reduce emissions.” Thanks to the mass persuasion campaign, many corporations, as well as campuses, are now going green.

This tidal wave of change has occurred as people have engaged scientific evidence and arguments and responded with favorable thoughts. Such central route persuasion occurs mostly when people are naturally analytical or involved in the issue. When issues don’t engage systematic thinking, persuasion may occur through a faster peripheral route, as people respond to incidental cues, such as endorsements by respected people, and make snap judgments. Because central route persuasion is more thoughtful and less superficial, it is more durable and more likely to influence behavior.

Other factors, including the external situation, also influence behavior. Strong social pressures can weaken the attitude-behavior connection (Wallace et al., 2005). For example, the American public’s overwhelming support for former President George W. Bush’s preparation to attack Iraq motivated Democratic leaders to vote to support Bush’s war plan, despite their private reservations (Nagourney, 2002). Nevertheless, attitudes do affect behavior when external influences are minimal, especially when the attitude is stable, specific to the behavior, and easily recalled (Glasman & Albarracín, 2006). One experiment used vivid, easily recalled information to persuade people that sustained tanning put them at risk for future skin cancer. One month later, 72 percent of the participants, and only 16 percent of those in a waiting list control group, had lighter skin (McClendon & Prentice-Dunn, 2001).

Actions Affect Attitudes

Now consider a more surprising principle: Not only will people sometimes stand up for what they believe, they will also come to believe in the idea they have supported. Many streams of evidence confirm that attitudes follow behavior (Figure 14.1).

The Foot-in-the-Door Phenomenon Inducing people to act against their beliefs can affect their attitude. During the Korean war, many captured U.S. soldiers were imprisoned in war camps run by Chinese communists. Without using brutality, the captors secured the prisoners’ collaboration in various activities. Some merely ran errands or
accepted favors. Others made radio appeals and false confessions. Still others informed on fellow prisoners and divulged military information. When the war ended, 21 prisoners chose to stay with the communists. More returned home “brainwashed”—convinced that communism was a good thing for Asia.

A key ingredient of the Chinese “thought-control” program was its effective use of the foot-in-the-door phenomenon—a tendency for people who agree to a small action to comply later with a larger one. The Chinese began with harmless requests but gradually escalated their demands (Schein, 1956). Having “trained” the prisoners to speak or write trivial statements, the communists then asked them to copy or create something more important— noting, perhaps, the flaws of capitalism. Then, perhaps to gain privileges, the prisoners participated in group discussions, wrote self-criticisms, or uttered public confessions. After doing so, they often adjusted their beliefs toward consistency with their public acts.

The point is simple: To get people to agree to something big, “start small and build,” said Robert Cialdini (1993). Knowing this, you can be wary of those who would exploit you with the tactic. This chicken-and-egg spiral, of actions-feeding-attitudes-feeding-actions, enables behavior to escalate. A trivial act makes the next act easier. Succumb to a temptation and you will find the next temptation harder to resist.

Dozens of experiments have simulated part of the war prisoners’ experience by coaxing people into acting against their attitudes or violating their moral standards. The nearly inevitable result: Doing becomes believing. When people are induced to harm an innocent victim—by making nasty comments or delivering electric shocks—they then begin to disparage their victim. If induced to speak or write on behalf of a position they have qualms about, they begin to believe their own words.

“If the King destroys a man, that’s proof to the King it must have been a bad man.”

Thomas Cromwell, in Robert Bolt’s A Man for All Seasons, 1960

Fortunately, the attitudes-follow-behavior principle works as well for good deeds as for bad. The foot-in-the-door tactic has helped boost charitable contributions, blood donations, and product sales. In one experiment, researchers posing as safe-driving volunteers asked Californians to permit the installation of a large, poorly lettered “Drive Carefully” sign in their front yards. Only 17 percent consented. They approached other home owners with a small request first: Would they display a 3-inch-high “Be a Safe Driver” sign? Nearly all readily agreed. When reapproached two weeks later to allow the large, ugly sign in their front yards, 76 percent consented (Freedman & Fraser, 1966). To secure a big commitment, it often pays to put your foot in the door: Start small and build.

“Fake it until you make it.”

Alcoholics Anonymous saying

Racial attitudes likewise follow behavior. In the years immediately following the introduction of school desegregation in the United States and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, White Americans expressed diminishing racial prejudice. And as Americans in different regions came to act more alike—thanks to more uniform national standards against discrimination—they began to think more alike. Experiments confirm the observation: Moral action strengthens moral convictions.

Role-Playing Affects Attitudes When you adopt a new role—when you leave middle school and start high school, become a college student, or begin a new job—you strive to follow the social prescriptions. At first, your behaviors may feel phony, because you are acting a role. The first weeks in the military feel artificial—as if one is pretending to be a soldier. The first weeks of a marriage may feel like “playing house.” Before long, however, what began as play-acting in the theater of life becomes you.
Researchers have confirmed this effect by assessing people’s attitudes before and after they adopt a new role, sometimes in laboratory situations, sometimes in everyday situations, such as before and after taking a job. In one famous laboratory study, male college students volunteered to spend time in a simulated prison devised by Stanford psychologist Philip Zimbardo (1972). Some he randomly designated as guards; he gave them uniforms, billy clubs, and whistles and instructed them to enforce certain rules. The remainder became prisoners; they were locked in barren cells and forced to wear humiliating outfits. After a day or two in which the volunteers self-consciously “played” their roles, the simulation became real—too real. Most of the guards developed disparaging attitudes, and some devised cruel and degrading routines. One by one, the prisoners broke down, rebelled, or became passively resigned, causing Zimbardo to call off the study after only six days. More recently, similar situations have played themselves out in the real world—as in Iraq at the Abu Ghraib prison (see Close-Up: Abu Ghraib Prison—An “Atrocity-Producing Situation?”).

Greece’s military junta during the early 1970s took advantage of the effects of role-playing to train men to become torturers (Staub, 1989). The men’s indoctrination into their roles occurred in small steps. First, the trainee stood guard outside the interrogation cells—the “foot in the door.” Next, he stood guard inside. Only then was he ready to become actively involved in the questioning and torture. As the nineteenth-century writer Nathaniel Hawthorne noted, “No man, for any considerable period, can wear one face to himself and another to the multitude without finally getting bewildered as to which may be true.” What we do, we gradually become.

Psychologists add a cautionary note: In Zimbardo’s prison simulation, at Abu Ghraib prison, and in other atrocity-producing situations, some people succumb to the situation and others do not (Carnahan & McFarland, 2007; Haslam & Reicher, 2007; Mastroianni & Reed, 2006; Zimbardo, 2007). Person and situation interact. Water has the power to dissolve some substances, notes John Johnson (2007), but not all. In a watery situation, salt dissolves, sand does not. So also, when put in with rotten apples, some people, but not others, become bad apples.

Cognitive Dissonance: Relief From Tension So far we have seen that actions can affect attitudes, sometimes turning prisoners into collaborators, doubters into believers, mere acquaintances into friends, and compliant guards into abusers. But why? One explanation is that when we become aware that our attitudes and actions don’t coincide, we experience tension, or cognitive dissonance. To relieve this tension, according to the cognitive dissonance theory proposed by Leon Festinger, we often bring our attitudes into line with our actions. It is as if we rationalize, “If I chose to do it (or say it), I must believe in it.” The less coerced and more responsible we feel for a troubling act, the more dissonance we feel. The more dissonance we feel, the more motivated we are to find consistency, such as changing our attitudes to help justify the act.

Regarding President Lyndon Johnson’s commitment to the Vietnam war: “A president who justifies his actions only to the public might be induced to change them. A president who has justified his actions to himself, believing that he has the truth, becomes impervious to self-correction.”

Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson, Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me), 2007

The U.S. invasion of Iraq was mainly premised on the presumed threat of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As the war began, only 38 percent of Americans surveyed said the war was justified even if Iraq
did not have WMD (Gallup, 2003). Nearly 80 percent believed such weapons would be found (Duffy, 2003; Newport et al., 2003). When no WMD were found, many Americans felt dissonance, which was heightened by their awareness of the war's financial and human costs, by scenes of chaos in Iraq, and by inflamed anti-American and pro-terrorist sentiments in some parts of the world.

To reduce dissonance, some people revised their memories of the main rationale for going to war, which then became liberating an oppressed people and promoting democracy in the Middle East. Before long, the once-minority opinion became the majority view: 58 percent of Americans said they supported the war even if there were no WMD (Gallup, 2003). “Whether or not they find weapons of mass destruction doesn’t matter,” explained Republican pollster Frank Luntz (2003), “because the rationale for the war changed.” It was not until late 2004, when hopes for a flourishing peace waned, that Americans’ support for the war dropped below 50 percent.

Abu Ghraib Prison—An “Atrocity-Producing Situation”?

**Bad apples or bad barrels?** Like the Stanford Prison Experiment in 1971, the real-life Abu Ghraib prison fiasco in 2004 was a powerfully toxic situation, contends social psychologist Philip Zimbardo. Originally published in the New Yorker

As the first photos emerged in 2004 from Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison, the civilized world was shocked. The photos showed U.S. military guards stripping prisoners naked, placing hoods on them, stacking them in piles, prodding them
with electricity, taunting them with attack dogs, and subjecting them to sleep deprivation, humiliation, and extreme stress. Was the problem, as so many people initially supposed, a few bad apples—a few irresponsible or sadistic guards? That was the U.S. Army’s seeming verdict when it court-martialed and imprisoned some of the guards, and then cleared four of the five top commanding officers responsible for Abu Ghraib’s policies and operations. The lower-level military guards were “sick bastards,” explained the defense attorney for one of the commanding officers (Tarbert, 2004).

Many social psychologists, however, reminded us that a toxic situation can make even good apples go bad (Fiske et al., 2004). “When ordinary people are put in a novel, evil place, such as most prisons, Situations Win, People Lose,” offered Philip Zimbardo (2004), adding, “That is true for the majority of people in all the relevant social psychological research done over the past 40 years.”

Consider the situation, explained Zimbardo. The guards, some of them model soldier-reservists with no prior criminal or sadistic history, were exhausted from working 12-hour shifts, seven days a week. They were dealing with an enemy, and their prejudices were heightened by fears of lethal attacks and by the violent deaths of many fellow soldiers. They were put in an understaffed guard role, with minimal training and supervision. They were then encouraged to “soften up” for interrogation detainees who had been denied access to the Red Cross. “When you put that set of horrendous work conditions and external factors together, it creates an evil barrel. You could put virtually anybody in it and you’re going to get this kind of evil behavior” (Zimbardo, 2005). Atrocious behaviors often emerge in atrocious situations.

Dozens of experiments have explored cognitive dissonance by making people feel responsible for behavior that is inconsistent with their attitudes and that has foreseeable consequences. As a participant in one of these experiments, you might agree for a measly $2 to help a researcher by writing an essay that supports something you don’t believe in (perhaps a tuition increase). Feeling responsible for the statements (which are not consistent with your attitudes), you would probably feel dissonance, especially if you thought an administrator would be reading your essay. How could you reduce the uncomfortable dissonance? One way would be to start believing your phony words. Your pretense would become your reality.

The attitudes-follow-behavior principle has a heartening implication: Although we cannot directly control all our feelings, we can influence them by altering our behavior. (Recall from Unit 8B the emotional effects of facial expressions and of body postures.) If we are down in the dumps, we can do as cognitive therapists advise and talk in more positive, self-accepting ways with fewer self-put-downs. If we are unloving, we can become more loving by behaving as if we were so—by doing thoughtful things, expressing affection, giving affirmation. “Assume a virtue, if you have it not,” says Hamlet to his mother. “For use can almost change the stamp of nature.”

“Sit all day in a moping posture, sigh, and reply to everything with a dismal voice, and your melancholy lingers.... If we wish to conquer undesirable emotional tendencies in ourselves, we must ... go through the outward movements of those contrary dispositions which we prefer to cultivate.”

William James, Principles of Psychology, 1890

The point to remember: Cruel acts shape the self. But so do acts of good will. Act as though you like someone, and you soon.

Social Influence

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY’S GREAT LESSON is the enormous power of social influence. This influence can be seen in our conformity, our compliance, and our group behavior. Suicides, bomb threats, airplane hijackings, and UFO sightings all have a curious tendency to come in clusters. On most high school campuses, jeans are the dress code; on New York’s Wall Street or London’s Bond Street, dress suits are the norm. When we know how to act, how to groom, how to talk, life functions smoothly. Armed with social influence principles, advertisers, fund raisers, and campaign workers aim to sway our decisions to buy, to donate, to vote. Isolated with others who share their grievances, dissenters may gradually become rebels, and rebels may become terrorists. Let’s examine the pull of these social strings. How strong are they? How do they operate?
Conformity and Obedience

What do experiments on conformity and compliance reveal about the power of social influence?

Niche conformity Are these students asserting their individuality or identifying themselves with others of the same microculture? Naki/PYMCA

Behavior is contagious. Consider:

- A cluster of people stand gazing upward, and passersby pause to do likewise.
- Baristas and street musicians know to “seed” their tip containers with money to suggest that others have given.
- One person laughs, coughs, or yawns, and others in the group soon do the same. Chimpanzees, too, are more likely to yawn after observing another chimpanzee yawn (Anderson et al., 2004).
- “Sickness” can also be psychologically contagious. In the anxious 9/11 aftermath, more than two dozen elementary and middle schools had outbreaks of children reporting red rashes, sometimes causing parents to wonder whether biological terrorism was at work (Talbot, 2002). Some cases may have been stress-related, but mostly, health experts concluded, people were just noticing normal early acne, insect bites, eczema, and dry skin from overheated classrooms.

We are natural mimics—an effect Tanya Chartrand and John Bargh (1999) have called the chameleon effect. Unconsciously mimicking others’ expressions, postures, and voice tones helps us feel what they are feeling. This helps explain why we feel happier around happy people than around depressed ones, and why studies of groups of British nurses and accountants reveal mood linkage—sharing up and down moods (Totterdell et al., 1998). Just hearing someone reading a neutral text in either a happy-or sad-sounding voice creates “mood contagion” in listeners (Neumann & Strack, 2000).

Chartrand and Bargh demonstrated the chameleon effect when they had students work in a room alongside a confederate working for the experimenter. Sometimes the confederates rubbed their face; on other occasions, they shook their foot. Sure enough, participants tended to rub their own face when with the face-rubbing person and shake their own foot when with the foot-shaking person. Such automatic mimicry is part of empathy. Empathic people yawn more after seeing others yawn (Morrison, 2007). And empathic, mimicking people are liked more. Those most eager to fit in with a group seem intuitively to know this, for they are especially prone to unconscious mimicry (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003).
Sometimes the effects of suggestibility are more serious. In the eight days following the 1999 shooting rampage at Colorado's Columbine High School, every U.S. state except Vermont experienced threats of copycat violence. Pennsylvania alone recorded 60 such threats (Cooper, 1999). Sociologist David Phillips and his colleagues (1985, 1989) found that suicides, too, sometimes increase following a highly publicized suicide. In the wake of screen idol Marilyn Monroe's suicide on August 6, 1962, for example, the number of suicides in the United States exceeded the usual August count by 200. Within a one-year period, one London psychiatric unit experienced 14 patient suicides (Joiner, 1999). In the days after Saddam Hussein's widely publicized execution in Iraq, there were cases of boys in Turkey, Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the United States who hung themselves, apparently accidently, after slipping nooses around their own heads (AP, 2007).

What causes suicide clusters? Do people act similarly because of their influence on one another? Or because they are simultaneously exposed to the same events and conditions? Seeking answers, social psychologists have conducted experiments on group pressure and conformity.

**Group Pressure and Conformity**

Suggestibility is a subtle type of **conformity**—adjusting our behavior or thinking toward some group standard. To study conformity, Solomon Asch (1955) devised a simple test. As a participant in what you believe is a study of visual perception, you arrive at the experiment location in time to take a seat at a table where five people are already seated. The experimenter asks which of three comparison lines is identical to a standard line (Figure 14.2). You see clearly that the answer is Line 2 and await your turn to say so after the others. Your boredom with this experiment begins to show when the next set of lines proves equally easy.

Now comes the third trial, and the correct answer seems just as clear-cut, but the first person gives what strikes you as a wrong answer: "Line 3." When the second person and then the third and fourth give the same wrong answer, you sit up straight and squint. When the fifth person agrees with the first four, you feel your heart begin to pound. The experimenter then looks to you for your answer. Torn between the unanimity of your five fellow respondents and the evidence of your own eyes, you feel tense and much less sure of yourself than you were moments ago. You hesitate before answering, wondering whether you should suffer the discomfort of being the oddball. What answer do you give?

In the experiments conducted by Asch and others after him, thousands of college students have experienced this conflict. Answering such questions alone, they erred less than 1 percent of the time. But the odds were quite different...
when several others—confederates working for the experimenter—answered incorrectly. Although most people told the truth even when others did not, Asch nevertheless was disturbed by his result: More than one-third of the time, these “intelligent and well-meaning” college-student participants were then “willing to call white black” by going along with the group.

“Have you ever noticed how one example—good or bad—can prompt others to follow? How one illegally parked car can give permission for others to do likewise? How one racial joke can fuel another?”

Marian Wright Edelman, The Measure of Our Success, 1992

Conditions That Strengthen Conformity Asch’s procedure became the model for later investigations. Although experiments have not always found so much conformity, they do reveal that conformity increases when

- one is made to feel incompetent or insecure.
- the group has at least three people.
- the group is unanimous. (The dissent of just one other person greatly increases social courage.)
- one admires the group’s status and attractiveness.
- one has made no prior commitment to any response.
- others in the group observe one’s behavior.
- one’s culture strongly encourages respect for social standards.

Thus, we might predict the behavior of Austin, an enthusiastic but insecure new student government member: Noting that the 10 other members appear unanimous in their plans for a fund raiser, Austin is unlikely to voice his dissent.

Reasons for Conforming Fish swim in schools. Birds fly in flocks. And humans, too, tend to go with their group, to think what it thinks and do what it does. Researchers have seen this in college residence halls, where over time students’ attitudes become more similar to those living near them (Cullum & Harton, 2007). But why? Why do we clap when others clap, eat as others eat, believe what others believe, even see what others see? Frequently, it is to avoid rejection or to gain social approval. In such cases, we are responding to what social psychologists call normative social influence. We are sensitive to social norms—understood rules for accepted and expected behavior—because the price we pay for being different may be severe.

Respecting norms is not the only reason we conform: Groups may provide valuable information, and only an uncommonly stubborn person will never listen to others. When we accept others’ opinions about reality, we are responding to informational social influence. “Those who never retract their opinions love themselves more than they love truth,” observed the eighteenth-century French essayist Joseph Joubert. As Rebecca Denton demonstrated in 2004, sometimes it pays to assume others are right and to follow their lead. Denton set a record for the furthest distance driven on the wrong side of a British divided highway—30 miles, with only one minor sideswipe, before the motorway ran out and police were able to puncture her tires. Denton later explained that she thought the hundreds of other drivers coming at her were all on the wrong side of the road (Woolcock, 2004).

Robert Baron and his colleagues (1996) cleverly demonstrated our openness to informational influence on tough, important judgments. They modernized the Asch experiment by showing University of Iowa students a slide of a stimulus person, followed by a slide of a four-person lineup (Figure 14.3). Their experiment made the task either
easy (viewing the lineup for five seconds) or difficult (viewing the lineup for but half a second). It also led them to think their judgments were either unimportant (just a preliminary test of some eyewitness identification procedures) or important (establishing norms for an actual police procedure, with a $20 award to the most accurate participants). When the accuracy of their judgments seemed important, people rarely conformed when the task was easy, but they conformed half the time when the task was difficult. If we are unsure of what is right, and if being right matters, we are receptive to others’ opinions.

Our view of social influence as bad or good depends on our values. When influence supports what we approve, we applaud those who are “open-minded” and “sensitive” enough to be “responsive.” When influence supports what we disapprove, we scorn the “submissive conformity” of those who comply with others’ wishes. As we saw in Unit 10, cultures vary in the extent to which they value individualism or collectivism. Western Europeans and people in most English-speaking countries tend to prize individualism more than conformity and obedience. These values are reflected in social influence experiments that have been conducted in 17 countries: In individualist cultures, conformity rates are lower (Bond & Smith, 1996). In the individualistic United States, university students tend to see themselves, in domains ranging from consumer purchases to political views, as less conforming than others (Pronin et al., 2007). We are, in our own eyes, individuals amid a crowd of sheep. Thus, tattoos, once a symbol of nonconformity, may lose their appeal if they become too popular.

Obedience
Social psychologist Stanley Milgram (1963, 1974), a student of Solomon Asch, knew that people often comply with social pressures. But how would they respond to outright commands? To find out, he undertook what have become social psychology’s most famous and controversial experiments. Imagine yourself as one of the nearly 1000 participants in Milgram’s 20 experiments.

Responding to an advertisement, you come to Yale University’s psychology department to participate in an experiment. Professor Milgram’s assistant explains that the study concerns the effect of punishment on learning. You and another person draw slips from a hat to see who will be the “teacher” (which your slip says) and who will be the “learner.” The learner is then led to an adjoining room and strapped into a chair that is wired through the wall to an electric shock machine. You sit in front of the machine, which has switches labeled with voltages. Your task: to teach and then test the learner on a list of word pairs. You are to punish the learner for wrong answers by delivering brief electric shocks, beginning with a switch labeled “15 Volts—Slight Shock.” After each of the learner’s errors, you are to move up to the next higher voltage. With each flick of a switch, lights flash, relay switches click on, and an electric buzzing fills the air.

Complying with the experimenter’s instructions, you hear the learner grunt when you flick the third, fourth, and fifth switches. After you activate the eighth switch (labeled “120 Volts—Moderate Shock”), the learner shouts that the shocks are painful. After the tenth switch (“150 Volts—Strong Shock”), he cries, “Get me out of here! I won’t be in the experiment anymore! I refuse to go on!” Hearing these pleas, you draw back. But the experimenter prods you: “Please continue—the experiment requires that you continue.” If you still resist, he insists, “It is absolutely essential that you continue,” or “You have no other choice, you must go on.”

Obeying, you hear the learner’s protests escalate to shrieks of agony as you continue to raise the shock level with each succeeding error. After the 330-volt level, the learner refuses to answer and falls silent. Still, the experimenter pushes you toward the final, 450-volt switch, ordering you to ask the questions and, if no correct answer is given, to administer the next shock level.

How far do you think you would follow the experimenter’s commands? In a survey Milgram conducted before the experiment, most people declared they would stop playing such a sadistic-seeming role soon after the learner first indicated pain and certainly before he shrieked in agony. This also was the prediction made by each of 40 psychiatrists Milgram asked to guess the outcome. When Milgram actually conducted the experiment with men aged...
20 to 50, he was astonished to find that 63 percent complied fully—right up to the last switch. Ten later studies that included women found women’s compliance rates were similar to men’s (Blass, 1999).

Did the teachers figure out the hoax—that no shock was being delivered? Did they correctly guess the learner was a confederate who only pretended to feel the shocks? Did they realize the experiment was really testing their willingness to comply with commands to inflict punishment? No. The teachers typically displayed genuine distress: They perspired, trembled, laughed nervously, and bit their lips. In a recent virtual reality re-creation of these experiments, participants responded much as did Milgram’s participants, including perspiration and racing heart, when shocking a virtual woman on a screen in front of them (Slater et al., 2006).

Milgram’s use of deception and stress triggered a debate over his research ethics. In his own defense, Milgram pointed out that, after the participants learned of the deception and actual research purposes, virtually none regretted taking part (though perhaps by then the participants had reduced their dissonance). When 40 of the teachers who had agonized most were later interviewed by a psychiatrist, none appeared to be suffering emotional aftereffects. All in all, said Milgram, the experiments provoked less enduring stress than university students experience when facing and failing big exams (Blass, 1996).

Wondering whether the participants obeyed because the learners’ protests were not convincing, Milgram repeated the experiment with 40 new teachers. This time his confederate mentioned a “slight heart condition” while being strapped into the chair, and then he complained and screamed more intensely as the shocks became more punishing. Still, 65 percent of the new teachers complied fully (Figure 14.4).

![Figure 14.4 Milgram’s follow-up obedience experiment](image)

In later experiments, Milgram discovered that subtle details of a situation powerfully influence people. When he varied the social conditions, the proportion of fully compliant participants varied from 0 to 93 percent. Obedience was highest when

- the person giving the orders was close at hand and was perceived to be a legitimate authority figure. (Such was the case in 2005 when Temple
University's basketball coach sent a 250-pound bench player, Nehemiah Ingram, into a game with instructions to commit “hard fouls.” Following orders, Ingram fouled out in four minutes after breaking an opposing player’s right arm.

- the authority figure was supported by a prestigious institution. Compliance was somewhat lower when Milgram dissociated his experiments from Yale University.
- the victim was depersonalized or at a distance, even in another room. (Similarly, in combat with an enemy they can see, many soldiers either do not fire their rifles or do not aim them properly. Such refusals to kill are rare among those who operate more distant artillery or aircraft weapons [Padgett, 1989].)
- there were no role models for defiance; that is, no other participants were seen disobeying the experimenter.

The power of legitimate, close-at-hand authorities is dramatically apparent in stories of those who complied with orders to carry out the Holocaust atrocities, and those who didn’t. Obedience alone does not explain the Holocaust; anti-Semitic ideology produced eager killers as well (Mastroianni, 2002). But obedience was a factor. In the summer of 1942, nearly 500 middle-aged German reserve police officers were dispatched to German-occupied Jozefow, Poland. On July 13, the group’s visibly upset commander informed his recruits, mostly family men, that they had been ordered to round up the village’s Jews, who were said to be aiding the enemy. Able-bodied men were to be sent to work camps, and all the rest were to be shot on the spot. Given a chance to refuse participation in the executions, only about a dozen immediately did so. Within 17 hours, the remaining 485 officers killed 1500 helpless women, children, and elderly by shooting them in the back of the head as they lay face down. Hearing the pleas of the victims, and seeing the gruesome results, some 20 percent of the officers did eventually dissent, managing either to miss their victims or to wander away and hide until the slaughter was over (Browning, 1992). But in real life, as in Milgram’s experiments, the disobedient were the minority.

Another story was being played out in the French village of Le Chambon, where French Jews destined for deportation to Germany were being sheltered by villagers who openly defied orders to cooperate with the “New Order.” The villagers’ ancestors had themselves been persecuted and their pastors had been teaching them to “resist whenever our adversaries will demand of us obedience contrary to the orders of the Gospel” (Rochat, 1993). Ordered by police to give a list of sheltered Jews, the head pastor modeled defiance: “I don’t know of Jews, I only know of human beings.” Without realizing how long and terrible the war would be, or how much punishment and poverty they would suffer, the resisters made an initial commitment to resist. Supported by their beliefs, their role models, their interactions with one another, and their own initial acts, they remained defiant to the war’s end.

Lessons From the Conformity and Obedience Studies

What do the Asch and Milgram experiments teach us about ourselves? How does judging the length of a line or flicking a shock switch relate to everyday social behavior? Recall from Unit 2 that psychological experiments aim not to re-create the literal behaviors of everyday life but to capture and explore the underlying processes that shape those behaviors. Asch and Milgram devised experiments in which the participants had to choose between adhering to their own standards and being responsive to others, a dilemma we all face frequently.
“I was only following orders.”

Adolf Eichmann, Director of Nazi deportation of Jews to concentration camps

In Milgram’s experiments, participants were also torn between what they should respond to—the pleas of the victim or the orders of the experimenter. Their moral sense warned them not to harm another, yet it also prompted them to obey the experimenter and to be a good research participant. With kindness and obedience on a collision course, obedience usually won.

Such experiments demonstrate that strong social influences can make people conform to falsehoods or capitulate to cruelty. “The most fundamental lesson of our study,” Milgram noted, is that “ordinary people, simply doing their jobs, and without any particular hostility on their part, can become agents in a terrible destructive process” (1974, p. 6). Milgram did not entrap his teachers by asking them first to zap learners with enough electricity to make their hair stand on end. Rather, he exploited the foot-in-the-door effect, beginning with a little tickle of electricity and escalating step by step. In the minds of those throwing the switches, the small action became justified, making the next act tolerable. In Jozefow, in Le Chambon, and in Milgram’s experiments, those who resisted usually did so early. After the first acts of compliance or resistance, attitudes began to follow and justify behavior.

“The normal reaction to an abnormal situation is abnormal behavior.”


So it happens when people succumb, gradually, to evil. In any society, great evils sometimes grow out of people’s compliance with lesser evils. The Nazi leaders suspected that most German civil servants would resist shooting or gassing Jews directly, but they found them surprisingly willing to handle the paperwork of the Holocaust (Silver & Geller, 1978). Likewise, when Milgram asked 40 men to administer the learning test while someone else did the shocking, 93 percent complied. Contrary to images of devilish villains, cruelty does not require monstrous characters; all it takes is ordinary people corrupted by an evil situation—ordinary soldiers who follow orders to torture prisoners, ordinary students who follow orders to haze initiates into their group, ordinary employees who follow orders to produce and market harmful products. Before leading the 9/11 attacks, Mohammed Atta reportedly was a sane, rational person who had been a “good boy” and an excellent student from a close-knit family—not someone who fits our image of a barbaric monster.

**Group Influence**

How do groups affect our behavior? To find out, social psychologists study the various influences that operate in the simplest of groups—one person in the presence of another—and those that operate in more complex groups, such as families, teams, and committees.

**Individual Behavior in the Presence of Others**

*4: How is our behavior affected by the presence of others or by being part of a group?*

Appropriately, social psychology’s first experiments focused on the simplest of all questions about social behavior: How are we influenced by people watching us or joining us in various activities?
Social facilitation Skilled athletes often find they are “on” before an audience. What they do well, they do even better when people are watching. Courtesy Hope College Public Relations

Social Facilitation Having noticed that cyclists’ racing times were faster when they competed against each other than when they competed with a clock, Norman Triplett (1898) hypothesized that the presence of others boosts performance. To test his hypothesis, Triplett had adolescents wind a fishing reel as rapidly as possible. He discovered that they wound the reel faster in the presence of someone doing the same thing. This phenomenon of stronger performance in others’ presence is called social facilitation. For example, after a light turns green, drivers take about 15 percent less time to travel the first 100 yards when another car is beside them at the intersection than when they are alone (Towler, 1986).

But on tougher tasks (learning nonsense syllables or solving complex multiplication problems), people perform less well when observers or others working on the same task are present. Further studies revealed why the presence of others sometimes helps and sometimes hinders performance (Guerin, 1986; Zajonc, 1965). When others observe us, we become aroused. This arousal strengthens the most likely response—the correct one on an easy task, an incorrect one on a difficult task. Thus, when we are being observed, we perform well-learned tasks more quickly and accurately, and unmastered tasks less quickly and accurately.

James Michaels and his associates (1982) found that expert pool players who made 71 percent of their shots when alone made 80 percent when four people came to watch them. Poor shooters, who made 36 percent of their shots when alone, made only 25 percent when watched. The energizing effect of an enthusiastic audience probably contributes to the home advantage enjoyed by various sports teams. Studies of more than 80,000 college and professional athletic events in Canada, the United States, and England reveal that home teams win about 6 in 10 games (somewhat fewer for baseball and football, somewhat more for basketball and soccer—see Table 14.1.)

Table 14.1
The point to remember: What you do well, you are likely to do even better in front of an audience, especially a friendly audience; what you normally find difficult may seem all but impossible when you are being watched.

Social facilitation also helps explain a funny effect of crowding: Comedy routines that are mildly amusing to people in an uncrowded room seem funnier in a densely packed room (Aiello et al., 1983; Freedman & Perlick, 1979). As comedians and actors know, a “good house” is a full one. The arousal triggered by crowding amplifies other reactions, too. If sitting close to one another, participants in experiments like a friendly person even more, an unfriendly person even less (Schiffenbauer & Schiavo, 1976; Storms & Thomas, 1977). The practical lesson: If choosing a room for a class or setting up chairs for a gathering, have barely enough seating.

Social Loafing
Social facilitation experiments test the effect of others’ presence on performance on an individual task, such as shooting pool. But what happens to performance when people perform the task as a group? In a team tug-of-war, for example, do you suppose your effort would be more than, less than, or the same as the effort you would exert in a one-on-one tug-of-war? To find out, Alan Ingham and his fellow researchers (1974) asked blindfolded University of Massachusetts students to “pull as hard as you can” on a rope. When Ingham fooled the students into believing three others were also pulling behind them, they exerted only 82 percent as much effort as when they knew they were pulling alone.

Bibb Latané and others (1981; Jackson & Williams, 1988) describe this diminished effort as social loafing. In 78 experiments conducted in the United States, India, Thailand, Japan, China, and Taiwan, social loafing occurred on various tasks, though it was especially common among men in individualistic cultures (Karau & Williams, 1993). In one of Latané’s experiments, blindfolded people seated in a group clapped or shouted as loud as they could while listening through headphones to the sound of loud clapping or shouting. When told they were doing it with the others, the participants produced about one-third less noise than when they thought their individual efforts were identifiable.

Why this social loafing? First, people acting as part of a group feel less accountable and therefore worry less about what others think. Second, they may view their contribution as dispensable (Harkins & Szymanski, 1989; Kerr & Bruun, 1983). As many leaders of organizations know—and as you have perhaps observed on student group assignments—if group members share equally in the benefits regardless of how much they contribute, some may slack off. Unless highly motivated and identified with their group, they may free ride on the other group members’ efforts.

Deindividuation
So, the presence of others can arouse people (as in the social facilitation experiments) or can diminish their feelings of responsibility (as in the social loafing experiments). But sometimes the presence of others both arouses people and diminishes their sense of responsibility. The result can be uninhibited behavior ranging from
a food fight in the school cafeteria or screaming at a basketball referee to vandalism or rioting. Abandoning normal restraints to the power of the group is termed **deindividuation**. To be deindividuated is to be less self-conscious and less restrained when in a group situation.

Deindividuation often occurs when group participation makes people feel aroused and anonymous. In one experiment, New York University women dressed in depersonalizing Ku Klux Klan–style hoods delivered twice as much electric shock to a victim as did identifiable women (Zimbardo, 1970). (As in all such experiments, the “victim” did not actually receive the shocks.) Similarly, tribal warriors who depersonalize themselves with face paints or masks are more likely than those with exposed faces to kill, torture, or mutilate captured enemies (Watson, 1973). Whether in a mob, at a rock concert, at a ballgame, or at worship, to lose self-consciousness (to become deindividuated) is to become more responsive to the group experience.

**Effects of Group Interaction**

5. **What are group polarization and groupthink?**

We have examined the conditions under which being in the presence of others can

- motivate people to exert themselves or tempt them to free ride on the efforts of others.
- make easy tasks easier and difficult tasks harder.
- enhance humor or fuel mob violence.

Research shows that interacting with others can similarly have both bad and good effects.

**Group Polarization** Educational researchers have noted that, over time, initial differences between groups of college students tend to grow. If the first-year students at College X tend to be more intellectually oriented than those at College Y, that difference will probably be amplified by the time they are seniors. And if the political conservatism of students who join fraternities and sororities is greater than that of students who do not, the gap in the political attitudes of the two groups will probably widen as they progress through college (Wilson et al., 1975). Similarly, notes Eleanor Maccoby (2002) from her decades of observing gender development, girls talk more intimately than boys do and play and fantasize less aggressively—and these gender differences widen over time as they interact mostly with their own gender.

![Figure 14.5 Group polarization](image)

**Figure 14.5 Group polarization** If a group is like-minded, discussion strengthens its prevailing opinions. Talking over racial issues increased prejudice in a high-prejudice group of high school students and decreased it in a low-prejudice group (Myers & Bishop, 1970).
This enhancement of a group’s prevailing tendencies—called **group polarization**—occurs when people within a group discuss an idea that most of them either favor or oppose. Group polarization can have beneficial results, as when it amplifies a sought-after spiritual awareness or reinforces the resolve of those in a self-help group, or strengthens feelings of tolerance in a low-prejudice group. But it can also have dire consequences. George Bishop and I discovered that when high-prejudice students discussed racial issues, they became more prejudiced (**Figure 14.5**). (Low-prejudice students became even more accepting.) The experiment’s ideological separation and polarization finds a seeming parallel in the growing polarization of American politics. The percentage of landslide counties—voting 60 percent or more for one presidential candidate—increased from 26 percent in 1976 to 48 percent in 2004 (Bishop, 2004). More and more, people are living near and learning from others who think as they do. One experiment brought together small groups of citizens in liberal Boulder, Colorado, and other groups down in conservative Colorado Springs, to discuss global climate change, affirmative action, and same-sex unions. Although the discussions increased agreement within groups, those in Boulder generally moved further left and those in Colorado Springs moved further right (Schkade et al., 2006). Thus ideological separation + deliberation = polarization between groups.

The polarizing effect of interaction among the like-minded applies also to suicide terrorists. After analyzing terrorist organizations around the world, psychologists Clark McCauley and Mary Segal (1987; McCauley, 2002) noted that the terrorist mentality does not erupt suddenly. Rather, it usually arises among people who get together because of a grievance and then become more and more extreme as they interact in isolation from any moderating influences. Increasingly, group members (who may be isolated with other “brothers” and “sisters” in camps) categorize the world as “us” against “them” (Moghaddam, 2005; Qirko, 2004). Suicide terrorism is virtually never done on a personal whim, reports researcher Ariel Merari (2002). The like-minded echo chamber will continue to polarize people, speculates the 2006 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate: “We assess that the operational threat from self-radicalized cells will grow.”

The Internet provides a medium for group polarization. Its tens of thousands of virtual groups enable bereaved parents, peacemakers, and teachers to find solace and support from kindred spirits. But the Internet also enables people who share interests in government conspiracy, extraterrestrial visitors, White supremacy, or citizen militias to find one another and to find support for their shared suspicions (McKenna & Bargh, 1998).

> One’s impulse to blow the whistle on this nonsense was simply undone by the circumstances of the discussion.”

*Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
*A Thousand Days*, 1965

**Groupthink** Does group interaction ever distort important decisions? Social psychologist Irving Janis began to think so as he read historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. ’s account of how President John F. Kennedy and his advisers blundered into an ill-fated plan to invade Cuba with 1400 CIA-trained Cuban exiles. When the invaders were easily captured and soon linked to the U.S. government, Kennedy wondered in hindsight, “How could we have been so stupid?”

> “One of the dangers in a White House, based on my reading of history, is that you get wrapped up in groupthink, and everybody agrees with everything, and there’s no discussion and there are not dissenting views.”

*Barack Obama, New York Daily News,*
*December 1, 2008*

To find out, Janis (1982) studied the decision-making procedures that led to the fiasco. He discovered that the soaring morale of the recently elected president and his advisers fostered undue confidence in the plan. To preserve the good group feeling, any dissenting views were suppressed or self-censored, especially after President Kennedy voiced his enthusiasm for the scheme. Since no one spoke strongly against the idea, everyone assumed consensus support. To describe this harmonious but unrealistic group thinking, Janis coined the term **groupthink.**

Janis and others then examined other historical fiascoes—the failure to anticipate the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the escalation of the Vietnam war, the U.S. Watergate cover-up, the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident (Reason, 1987), and the U.S. space shuttle *Challenger* explosion (Esser & Lindoerfer, 1989). They discovered that in these cases, too, groupthink was fed by overconfidence, conformity, self-justification, and group polarization.

> “Truth springs from argument among friends.”
Groupthink surfaced again, reported the bipartisan U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee (2004), when “personnel involved in the Iraq WMD issue demonstrated several aspects of groupthink: examining few alternatives, selective gathering of information, pressure to conform within the group or withhold criticism, and collective rationalization.” This groupthink led analysts to “interpret ambiguous evidence as conclusively indicative of a WMD program as well as ignore or minimize evidence that Iraq did not have [WMD] programs.”

“If you have an apple and I have an apple and we exchange apples then you and I will still each have one apple. But if you have an idea and I have an idea and we exchange these ideas, then each of us will have two ideas.”

Attributed to dramatist George Bernard Shaw, 1856–1950

Despite such fiascos and tragedies, two heads are better than one in solving some types of problems. Knowing this, Janis also studied instances in which U.S. presidents and their advisers collectively made good decisions, such as when the Truman administration formulated the Marshall Plan, which offered assistance to Europe after World War II, and when the Kennedy administration worked to keep the Soviets from installing missiles in Cuba. In such instances—and in the business world, too, Janis believed—groupthink is prevented when a leader welcomes various opinions, invites experts’ critiques of developing plans, and assigns people to identify possible problems. Just as the suppression of dissent bends a group toward bad decisions, so open debate often shapes good ones. This is especially so with diverse groups, whose varied perspectives enable creative or superior outcomes (Nemeth & Ormiston, 2007; Page, 2007). None of us is as smart as all of us.

**Cultural Influence**

**How do cultural norms affect our behavior?**

As social creatures, our human readiness to learn from and adapt to those around us includes the influences of our surrounding culture. We come equipped with a huge cerebral hard drive ready to receive many gigabytes of cultural software.

**Culture** is the behaviors, ideas, attitudes, values, and traditions shared by a group of people and transmitted from one generation to the next (Brislin, 1988). Human nature, notes Roy Baumeister (2005), seems designed for culture. We are social animals, but more. Wolves are social animals; they live and hunt in packs. Ants are incessantly social, never alone. But “culture is a better way of being social,” notes Baumeister. Wolves function pretty much as they did 10,000 years ago. You and I enjoy things unknown to most of our century-ago ancestors, including electricity, indoor plumbing, antibiotics, and the Internet. Culture works.

Primates exhibit the rudiments of culture, with local customs of tool use, grooming, and courtship. Younger chimpanzees and macaque monkeys sometimes invent customs—potato washing, in one famous example—and pass them on to their peers and offspring. But human culture does more. It supports our species’ survival and reproduction by enabling social and economic systems that give us an edge.

Thanks to our mastery of language, we humans enjoy the preservation of innovation. Within the span of this day, I have, thanks to my culture, made good use of Post-it Notes, Google, and a single-shot skinny latte. On a grander scale, we have culture’s accumulated knowledge to thank for the last century’s 30-year extension of the average life expectancy in most countries where this book is being read. Moreover, culture enables an efficient division of labor. Although one lucky person gets his name on this book’s cover, the product actually results from the coordination and commitment of a team of women and men, no one of whom could produce it alone.

Across cultures, we differ in our language, our monetary systems, our sports, which fork—if any—we eat with, even which side of the road we drive on. But beneath these differences is our great similarity—our capacity for culture. Culture provides the shared and transmitted customs and beliefs that enable us to communicate, to exchange money for things, to play, to eat, and to drive with agreed-upon rules and without crashing into one another. This shared capacity for culture enables our striking group differences. Human nature manifests human diversity.

If we all lived in homogeneous ethnic groups in separate regions of the world, as some people still do, cultural diversity would be less relevant. In Japan, almost 99 percent of the country’s 127 million people are of Japanese descent. Internal cultural differences are therefore minimal compared with those found in Los Angeles, where the public schools recently taught 82 different languages, or in Toronto or Vancouver, where minorities are one-third of
the population and many are immigrants (as are 13.4 percent of all Canadians and 23 percent of Australians) (Axiss, 2007; Statistics Canada, 2002). I am ever mindful that the readers of this book are culturally diverse. Your ancestors reach from Australia to Africa and from Singapore to Sweden.

### Variation Across Cultures

**Cultures differ** Behavior seen as appropriate in one culture may violate the norms of another group. In Arab societies, but not in Western cultures, men often greet one another with a kiss. Annie Griffiths Belt/Corbis

We see our adaptability in cultural variations among our beliefs and our values, in how we raise our children and bury our dead, and in what we wear (or whether we wear anything at all). Riding along with a unified culture is like biking with the wind: As it carries us along, we hardly notice it is there. When we try riding against the wind we feel its force. Face to face with a different culture, we become aware of the cultural winds. Visiting Europe, most North Americans notice the smaller cars, the left-handed use of the fork, the uninhibited attire on the beaches. Stationed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait, American and European soldiers alike realized how liberal their home cultures were. Arriving in North America, visitors from Japan and India struggle to understand why so many people wear their dirty street shoes in the house.

Each cultural group evolves its own **norms**—rules for accepted and expected behavior. Many South Asians, for example, use only the right hand’s fingers for eating. The British have a norm for orderly waiting in line. Sometimes social expectations seem oppressive: “Why should it matter how I dress?” Yet, norms grease the social machinery and free us from self-preoccupation. Knowing when to clap or bow, how to behave on the first day of school, and what sorts of gestures and compliments are appropriate—whether to greet people by shaking hands or kissing each cheek, for example—we can relax and enjoy one another without fear of embarrassment or insult.

When cultures collide, their differing norms often befuddle. For example, if someone invades our **personal space**—the portable buffer zone we like to maintain around our bodies—we feel uncomfortable. Scandinavians, North Americans, and the British have traditionally preferred more personal space than do Latin Americans, Arabs, and the French (Sommer, 1969). At a social gathering, a Mexican seeking a comfortable conversation distance may end up walking around a room with a backpedaling Canadian. (You can experience this at a party by playing Space Invader as you talk with someone.) To the Canadian, the Mexican may seem intrusive; to the Mexican, the Canadian may seem standoffish.

Cultures also vary in their expressiveness. Those with roots in northern European culture have perceived people from Mediterranean cultures as warm and charming but inefficient. The Mediterraneans, in turn, have seen northern Europeans as efficient but cold and preoccupied with punctuality (Triandis, 1981).

Cultures vary in their pace of life, too. People from time-conscious Japan—where bank clocks keep exact time, pedestrians walk briskly, and postal clerks fill requests speedily—may find themselves growing impatient when visiting Indonesia, where clocks keep less accurate time and the pace of life is more leisurely (Levine & Norenzayan, 1999). In adjusting to their host countries, the first wave of U.S. Peace Corps volunteers reported that two of their greatest culture shocks, after the language differences, were the differing pace of life and the people’s differing sense of punctuality (Spradley & Phillips, 1972).

### Variation Over Time
Consider, too, how rapidly cultures may change over time. English poet Geoffrey Chaucer (1342–1400) is separated from a modern Briton by only 20 generations, but the two would converse with great difficulty. In the thin slice of history since 1960, most Western cultures have changed with remarkable speed. Middle-class people fly to places they once only read about, text those they once postal-mailed, and work in air-conditioned comfort where they once sweated. They enjoy the convenience of online shopping, anywhere-anytime electronic communication, and—enriched by doubled per-person real income—eating out more than twice as often as did their elders back in the culture of 1960. With greater economic independence, today's women are more likely to marry for love and less likely to endure abusive relationships out of economic need. Many minority groups enjoy expanded human rights.

But some changes seem not so wonderfully positive. Had you fallen asleep in the United States in 1960 and awakened today, you would open your eyes to a culture with more divorce, delinquency, and depression. You would also find North Americans—like their counterparts in Britain, Australia, and New Zealand—spending more hours at work, fewer hours sleeping, and fewer hours with friends and family (Frank, 1999; Putnam, 2000).

Whether we love or loathe these changes, we cannot fail to be impressed by their breathtaking speed. And we cannot explain them by changes in the human gene pool, which evolves far too slowly to account for high-speed cultural transformations. Cultures vary. Cultures change. And cultures shape our lives.

**The Power of Individuals**

*How much power do we have as individuals? Can a minority sway a majority?*

In affirming the power of social influence, we must not overlook our power as individuals. *Social control* (the power of the situation) and *personal control* (the power of the individual) interact. People aren’t sheep. When feeling pressured, we may react by doing the opposite of what is expected, thereby reasserting our sense of freedom (Brehm & Brehm, 1981).

Three individual soldiers asserted their personal control in response to the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison (O’Connor, 2004). Lt. David Sutton put an end to one incident, which he reported to his commanders. Navy dog-handler William Kimbro refused pressure to participate in improper interrogations using his attack dogs. Specialist Joseph Darby brought visual images of the horrors into the light of day, providing incontestable evidence of the atrocities. Each risked ridicule or even court-martial for not following orders.

As these three soldiers discovered, committed individuals can sway the majority and make social history. Were this not so, communism would have remained an obscure theory, Christianity would be a small Middle Eastern sect, and Rosa Parks' refusal to sit at the back of the bus would not have ignited the U.S. civil rights movement. Technological history, too, is often made by innovative minorities who overcome the majority's resistance to change. To many, the
railroad was a nonsensical idea; some farmers even feared that train noise would prevent hens from laying eggs. People derided Robert Fulton’s steamboat as “Fulton’s Folly.” As Fulton later said, “Never did a single encouraging remark, a bright hope, a warm wish, cross my path.” Much the same reaction greeted the printing press, the telegraph, the incandescent lamp, and the typewriter (Cantril & Bumstead, 1960).

European social psychologists have sought to better understand minority influence—the power of one or two individuals to sway majorities (Moscovici, 1985). They investigated groups in which one or two individuals consistently expressed a controversial attitude or an unusual perceptual judgment. They repeatedly found that a minority that unswervingly holds to its position is far more successful in swaying the majority than is a minority that waffles. Holding consistently to a minority opinion will not make you popular, but it may make you influential. This is especially so if your self-confidence stimulates others to consider why you react as you do. Although people often follow the majority view publicly, they may privately develop sympathy for the minority view. Even when a minority’s influence is not yet visible, it may be persuading some members of the majority to rethink their views (Wood et al., 1994). The powers of social influence are enormous, but so are the powers of the committed individual.

Social Relations

WE HAVE SAMPLED HOW WE THINK about and influence one another. Now we come to social psychology’s third focus—how we relate to one another. What causes us to harm or to help or to fall in love? How can we move a destructive conflict toward a just peace? We will ponder the bad and the good: from prejudice and aggression to attraction, altruism, and peacemaking.

Prejudice

What is prejudice?

Prejudice means “prejudgment.” It is an unjustifiable and usually negative attitude toward a group—often a different cultural, ethnic, or gender group. Like all attitudes, prejudice is a mixture of beliefs (in this case called stereotypes), emotions (hostility, envy, or fear), and predispositions to action (to discriminate). To believe that obese people are gluttonous, to feel dislike for an obese person, and to be hesitant to hire or date an obese person is to be prejudiced. Prejudice is a negative attitude; discrimination is a negative behavior.

How Prejudiced Are People?

To learn about levels of prejudice, we can assess what people say and what they do. Judging by what Americans say, gender and racial attitudes have changed dramatically in the last half-century. The one-third of Americans who in 1937 told Gallup they would vote for a qualified woman whom their party nominated for president soared to 89 percent in 2007. Support for all forms of racial contact, including interracial marriage (Figure 14.6), has also dramatically increased. Nearly everyone agrees that children of all races should attend the same schools and that women and men should receive the same pay for the same job.

![Figure 14.6](image-url)
Yet as overt prejudice wanes, subtle prejudice lingers. Despite increased verbal support for interracial marriage, many people admit that in socially intimate settings (dating, dancing, marrying) they would feel uncomfortable with someone of another race. And in Western Europe, where many “guest workers” and refugees settled at the end of the twentieth century, “modern prejudice”—rejecting immigrant minorities as job applicants for supposedly nonracial reasons—has been replacing blatant prejudice (Jackson et al., 2001; Lester, 2004; Pettigrew, 1998, 2006). A slew of recent experiments illustrates that prejudice can be not only subtle but also automatic and unconscious (see Close-Up: Automatic Prejudice, below).

“In unhappily the world has yet to learn how to live with diversity.”

Pope John Paul II,
Address to the United Nations, 1995

Nevertheless, overt prejudice still surfaces in public settings. In several U.S. states where Black motorists are a minority of the drivers and speeders on interstate highways, they have been the majority of those stopped and searched by state police (Lamberth, 1998; Staples, 1999a,b). In the Los Angeles area, 1,115 landlords received identically worded e-mails from a would-be tenant (actually a researcher) expressing interest in vacant apartments advertised online. Encouraging replies came back to 56 percent of notes signed “Tyrell Jackson,” to 66 percent signed “Said Al-Rahman,” and to 89 percent of those signed “Patrick McDougall” (Carpusor & Loges, 2006).

In the aftermath of 9/11 and the Iraq war, 4 in 10 Americans acknowledged “some feelings of prejudice against Muslims,” and about half of non-Muslims in Western Europe and the United States perceived Muslims as “violent” (Saad, 2006; Wike & Grim, 2007). Muslims reciprocated the negativity, with most in Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, and Britain seeing Westerners as “greedy” and “immoral.”

In the aftermath of China’s one-child social policy and sex-selective abortions, the looming excess of young Chinese men may impact Chinese society. Imbalanced population sex ratios have historically influenced gender roles. Places with a shortage of unmarried women have stressed sexual morality and traditional women’s roles (Guttentag & Secord, 1983). Such places—with lots of unmarried men, as in some frontier towns, immigrant ghettos, and mining camps—have also tended to have high violence rates (Hvistendahl, 2008).

In most places in the world, gays and lesbians cannot comfortably acknowledge who they are and whom they love. Gender prejudice and discrimination persist, too. Despite gender equality in intelligence scores, people tend to perceive their fathers as more intelligent than their mothers (Furnham & Rawles, 1995). In Saudi Arabia, women are not allowed to drive. In Western countries, we pay more to those (usually men) who drive machines that take care of our streets than to those (usually women) who take care of our children. Worldwide, women are more likely to live in poverty (Lipps, 1999), and their 69 percent literacy rate is well below men’s 83 percent (PRB, 2002).

Female infants are no longer left out on a hillside to die of exposure, as was the practice in ancient Greece. Yet even today boys are often valued more than their sisters. With testing that enables sex-selective abortions, several south Asian countries, including certain regions of China and India, have experienced a shortfall in female births. Natural female mortality and the normal male-to-female newborn ratio (105-to-100) hardly explain the world’s estimated 101 million (say that number slowly) “missing women” (Sen, 2003). In 2005, China’s newborn sex ratio reportedly reached 118 boys for every 100 girls (AP, 2007). With demographic predictions of 40 million Chinese bachelors unable to find mates, China has declared that sex-selective abortions—gender genocide—are now a criminal offense.

**Automatic Prejudice**

As we have seen throughout this book, we process information on two levels: conscious and unconscious. To some extent, our thinking, our memories, and our attitudes are explicit—on the radar screen of our awareness. And to an even greater extent, today’s researchers believe, they are implicit—below the radar, out of sight. Modern studies of implicit, automatic attitudes indicate that prejudice is often more of an unthinking knee-jerk response than a decision. Consider these findings on U.S. racial prejudice:

**Implicit racial associations** Asked to tap keys to associate words and images, people more quickly associate positive words such as happy or peace with positive objects such as flowers, and negative words such as rotten or...
ugly with insects. Extending these Implicit Association Tests, Anthony Greenwald and his colleagues (1998) showed that even people who deny harboring racial prejudice may carry negative associations. For example, 9 in 10 White respondents took longer to identify pleasant words (such as peace and paradise) as “good” when presented with Black-sounding names (such as Latisha and Darnell) rather than White-sounding names (such as Katie and Ian). Moreover, people who more quickly associate good things with White names or faces also are the quickest to perceive anger and apparent threat in Black faces (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003). (By 2008, more than 6 million people had taken the Implicit Association Test, as you can at www.implicit.harvard.edu.)

**Unconscious patronization** Kent Harber (1998) asked White university women to evaluate a flawed essay said to be written by a Black or a White fellow student. When they believed the writer was Black, the women gave markedly higher ratings and never expressed the harsh criticisms they assigned to White-authored essays, such as “When I read college work this bad I just want to lay my head down on the table and cry.” Did the evaluators calibrate their evaluations to their racial stereotypes, Harber wondered, leading them to patronize the Black writers with less exacting standards? If used in real-world evaluations, such low expectations and the resulting “inflated praise and insufficient criticism” could hinder minority student achievement. (To preclude such bias, many teachers read essays while “blind” to their authors.)

**Race-influenced perceptions** Two research teams were interested in the shooting of an unarmed man in the doorway of his Bronx apartment building by officers who mistook his wallet for a gun. Each research team reenacted the situation with a video, asking viewers to press buttons quickly to “shoot” or not shoot men who suddenly appeared on screen holding either a gun or a harmless object such as a flashlight or bottle (Correll et al., 2002, 2007; Greenwald et al., 2003). People (both Blacks and Whites, in one of the studies) more often mistakenly shot targets who were Black. Priming people with a flashed Black rather than White face also makes them more likely then to misperceive a flashed tool as a gun (Figure 14.7).

**Figure 14.7 Race primes perceptions** In experiments by Keith Payne (2006), people viewed a White or Black face, immediately followed by a gun or hand tool, which was then quickly obscured by a “visual mask” on the screen. Participants were more likely to misperceive a tool as a gun when it was preceded by a Black rather than White face.

“There are still barriers and biases out there, often unconscious.”
Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, 2008 U.S. presidential primary concession speech

Seeing Black Several studies show that the more a person’s features are perceived as typical of their racial category, the more likely they are to elicit race-based responding (Maddox, 2004). In one study of 182 police officers, Jennifer Eberhardt and her collaborators (2004; 2006) found that “Black faces looked more criminal to police officers; the more Black, the more criminal.” In a follow-up study, they found people more willing to give the death sentence to Black defendants having the most stereotypically Black features.

Reflexive bodily responses Today’s biopsychosocial approach has stimulated neuroscience studies that measure people’s instant responses to viewing White and Black faces. These studies have detected implicit prejudice in people’s facial-muscle responses and in the activation of their amygdala, the emotion-processing center (Cunningham et al., 2004; Eberhardt, 2005; Vanman et al., 2004). Even people who consciously express little prejudice may give off telltale signals as their body responds selectively to another’s race.

If your own gut check sometimes reveals feelings you would rather not have about other people, be assured that you are not alone. It is what we do with our feelings that matters. By monitoring our feelings and actions, and by replacing old habits with new ones based on new friendships, we can work to free ourselves from prejudice.

Suppose that you could only have one child. Would you prefer that it be a boy or a girl? When Gallup asked that question of Americans, two-thirds expressed a gender preference, and for two-thirds of those—in 2003 as in 1941—it was for a boy (Lyons, 2003).

But the news isn’t all bad for girls and women. Most people also feel more positively about women in general than they do about men (Eagly, 1994; Haddock & Zanna, 1994). People worldwide see women as having some traits (such as nurturance, sensitivity, and less aggressiveness) that most people prefer (Glick et al., 2004; Swim, 1994). That may explain why women tend to like women more than men like men (Rudman & Goodwin, 2004). And perhaps that is also why people prefer slightly feminized computer-generated faces—men’s and women’s—to slightly masculinized faces. Researcher David Perrett and his colleagues (1998) speculate that a slightly feminized male face connotes kindness, cooperativeness, and other traits of a good father. When the British Broadcasting Corporation invited 18,000 women to guess which of the men in Figure 14.8 was most likely to place a personal ad seeking “a special lady to love and cherish forever,” which one do you think they picked?

Figure 14.8 Who do you like best? Which one placed an ad seeking “a special lady to love and cherish forever”? (Answer below.) Professor Dave Perrett, St. Andrews University

Research suggests that subtly feminized features convey a likable image, which people tend to associate more with committed dads than with promiscuous dads. Thus, 66 percent of the women picked computer-generated face (b) in response to both of these questions.
Social Roots of Prejudice

9. What are the social and emotional roots of prejudice?

Why does prejudice arise? Inequalities, social divisions, and emotional scapegoating are partly responsible.

French fury Members of France’s marginalized ethnic groups reached the tipping point for tolerance in 2005, when they began destructive rioting. Eric Travers/EPA/Landov

Social Inequalities When some people have money, power, and prestige and others do not, the “haves” usually develop attitudes that justify things as they are. In the extreme case, slave “owners” perceived slaves as innately lazy, ignorant, and irresponsible—as having the very traits that “justified” enslaving them. More commonly, women have been perceived as unassertive but sensitive and therefore suited for the caretaking tasks they have traditionally performed (Hoffman & Hurst, 1990). In short, stereotypes rationalize inequalities.

Discrimination also increases stereotyping and prejudice through the reactions it provokes in its victims. In his classic 1954 book, The Nature of Prejudice, Gordon Allport noted that being a victim of discrimination can produce either self-blame or anger. Both reactions may create new grounds for prejudice through the classic blame-the-victim dynamic. If the circumstances of poverty breed a higher crime rate, someone can then use the higher crime rate to justify continuing the discrimination against those who live in poverty.

Us and Them: Ingroup and Outgroup Thanks to our ancestral need to belong, we are a group-bound species. Our ancestors, living in a world where neighboring tribes occasionally raided and pillaged one another’s camps, knew that there was safety in solidarity (those who didn’t band together left fewer descendants). Whether hunting, defending, or attacking, 10 hands were better than 2. Dividing the world into “us” and “them” entails racism and war, but it also provides the benefits of communal solidarity. Thus we cheer for our groups, kill for them, die for them. Indeed, we define who we are—our identities—partly in terms of our groups. Australian psychologists John Turner (1987, 2007) and Michael Hogg (1996, 2006) note that through our social identities we associate ourselves with certain groups and contrast ourselves with others. When Ian identifies himself as a man, an Aussie, a Labourite, a University of Sydney student, a Catholic, and a MacGregor, he knows who he is, and so do we.
Ironically, we often reserve our most intense dislike for outgroup rivals most like us. Freud (1922, p. 42) long ago recognized that animosities formed around small differences: “Of two neighboring towns, each is the other’s most jealous rival; every little canton looks down upon the others with contempt. Closely related races keep one another at arm’s length; the South German cannot endure the North German, the Englishman casts every kind of aspersion upon the Scot, the Spaniard despises the Portuguese.” In surveys, 7 in 10 Japanese express an unfavorable view of China, and 7 in 10 Chinese similarly dislike Japan (Pew, 2006). Hostilities between the Iraqi Sunni and Shia, the Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi, and the Northern Ireland Protestant and Catholic have pitted ingroups against outgroups who, on a world diversity scale, are much more alike than different.

As an occasional resident of Scotland, I’ve witnessed many examples of *The Xenophobe’s Guide to the Scots* observation—that Scots divide non-Scotts “into two main groups: (1) The English; (2) The Rest.” As rabid Chicago Cubs fans are happy if either the Cubs win or the Chicago White Sox lose, so rabid fans of Scottish soccer rejoice in either a Scotland victory or an England defeat. “Phew! They lost,” rejoiced one Scottish tabloid’s front-page headline after England’s 1996 Euro Cup defeat—by Germany, no less. Perhaps you, too, can recall being most conscious of your school identity when competing with an archrival school.

Numerical minorities, such as the Scots in Britain, are especially conscious of their social identities. The 5 million Scots are more conscious of their national identity vis-à-vis the neighboring 51 million English than vice versa. Likewise, the 4 million New Zealanders are more conscious of their identity vis-à-vis the 21 million Australians, and they are more likely to root for Australia’s sports opponents (Halberstadt et al., 2006).

“All good people agree, And all good people say All nice people, like Us, are We And every one else is They. But if you cross over the sea Instead of over the way You may end by (think of it) Looking on We As only a sort of They.”

—Rudyard Kipling, “We and They,” 1926

The social definition of who we are also implies who we are not. Mentally drawing a circle that defines “us” (the *ingroup*) excludes “them” (the *outgroup*). Such group identifications typically promote an *ingroup bias*—
favoring of one's own group. Even arbitrarily creating an us-them distinction—by grouping people with the toss of a coin—leads people to show favoritism to their own group when dividing any rewards (Tajfel, 1982; Wilder, 1981).

The urge to distinguish enemies from friends and to have one's group be dominant predisposes prejudice against strangers (Whitley, 1999). To Greeks of the classical era, all non-Greeks were “barbarians.” In our own era, most children believe their school is better than all other schools in town. Many high school students form cliques—jocks, emos, skaters, gangsters, freaks, geeks—and disparage those outside their own group. Even chimpanzees have been seen to wipe clean the spot where they were touched by a chimpanzee from another group (Goodall, 1986).

**Emotional Roots of Prejudice**

Prejudice springs not only from the divisions of society but also from the passions of the heart. Facing the terror of death tends to heighten patriotism and produce loathing and aggression toward “them”—those who threaten one's world (Pyszczynski et al., 2002). Recalling such terror may alter attitudes, as happened to participants when Mark Landau and eight others (2004) reminded them of their own mortality or of the terror of 9/11. This terror reminder led to their expressing increased support for then-President George W. Bush.

> “If the Tiber reaches the walls, if the Nile does not rise to the fields, if the sky doesn’t move or the Earth does, if there is famine, if there is plague, the cry is at once: 'The Christians to the lion!'”

Tertullian, *Apologeticus*, 197 C.E.

Prejudice may also express anger. According to the **scapegoat theory** of prejudice, finding someone to blame when things go wrong can provide a target for one’s anger. Following 9/11, some outraged people lashed out at innocent Arab-Americans, about whom negative stereotypes blossomed. Calls to eliminate Saddam Hussein, whom Americans had been grudgingly tolerating, also increased. “Fear and anger create aggression, and aggression against citizens of different ethnicity or race creates racism and, in turn, new forms of terrorism,” noted Philip Zimbardo (2001).

Evidence for the scapegoat theory comes from high prejudice levels among economically frustrated people and from experiments in which a temporary frustration intensifies prejudice. In experiments, students who experience failure or are made to feel insecure will often restore their self-esteem by disparaging a rival school or another person (Cialdini & Richardson, 1980; Crocker et al., 1987). To boost our own sense of status, it helps to have others to denigrate. That is why a rival’s misfortune sometimes provides a twinge of pleasure. By contrast, those made to feel loved and supported become more open to and accepting of others who differ (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001).

**Cognitive Roots of Prejudice**

10: What are the cognitive roots of prejudice?

One seeming antidote to prejudice is intelligence. In a large national study, British children with high intelligence scores at age 10 typically expressed low prejudice at age 30 (Deary et al., 2008).

Prejudice springs not only from a culture’s divisions and the heart’s passions, but also from the mind’s natural workings. Stereotyped beliefs are a by-product of how we cognitively simplify the world.

**Categorization** One way we simplify our world is to categorize. A chemist categorizes molecules as organic and inorganic. A football coach categorizes offensive players as running backs, linemen, or receivers. A mental health professional categorizes psychological disorders by types. In categorizing people into groups, however, we often stereotype them, biasing our perceptions of their diversity. We recognize how greatly we differ from other individuals in our groups. But we overestimate the similarity of those within other groups (we perceive *outgroup homogeneity*). “They”—the members of some other group—seem to look and act alike, but “we” are diverse (Bothwell et al., 1989). To those in one ethnic group, members of another often seem more alike than they really are in appearance, personality, and attitudes. This greater recognition for *own-race faces*—called the **other-race effect**, or *own-race bias*—emerges during infancy, between 3 and 9 months of age (Kelly et al., 2007).

With experience, however, people get better at recognizing individual faces from another group. People of European descent, for example, more accurately identify individual African faces if they have watched a great deal of basketball on television, exposing them to many African-heritage faces (Li et al., 1996). And the longer Chinese people have resided in a Western country, the less they exhibit the other-race effect (Hancock & Rhodes, 2008).
Vivid Cases As we saw in Unit 7B, we often judge the frequency of events by instances that readily come to mind. In a classic experiment, Myron Rothbart and his colleagues (1978) demonstrated this ability to overgeneralize from vivid, memorable cases. They divided University of Oregon student volunteers into two groups, then showed them information about 50 men. The first group’s list included 10 men arrested for nonviolent crimes, such as forgery. The second group’s list included 10 men arrested for violent crimes, such as assault. Later, when both groups recalled how many men on their list had committed any sort of crime, the second group overestimated the number. Vivid (violent) cases are readily available to our memory and therefore influence our judgments of a group (Figure 14.9).

Figure 14.9 Vivid cases feed stereotypes The 9/11 Muslim terrorists created, in many minds, an exaggerated stereotype of Muslims as terror-prone. Actually, reported a U.S. National Research Council panel on terrorism, when offering the inexact illustration at right, most terrorists are not Muslim and “the vast majority of Islamic people have no connection with and do not sympathize with terrorism” (Smelser & Mitchell, 2002).

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The Just-World Phenomenon As we noted earlier, people often justify their prejudice by blaming its victims. Bystanders, too, may blame victims by assuming the world is just and therefore “people get what they deserve.” In experiments, merely observing someone receive painful shocks has led many people to think less of the victim (Lerner, 1980). This just-world phenomenon reflects an idea we commonly teach our children—that good is rewarded and evil is punished. From this it is but a short leap to assume that those who succeed must be good and those who suffer must be bad. Such reasoning enables the rich to see both their own wealth and the poor’s misfortune as justly deserved. As one German civilian is said to have remarked when visiting the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp shortly after World War II, “What terrible criminals these prisoners must have been to receive such treatment.”

Hindsight bias is also at work here (Carli & Leonard, 1989). Have you ever heard people say that rape victims, abused spouses, or people with AIDS got what they deserved? In some countries, women who have been raped have been sentenced to severe punishment for having violated a law against adultery (Mydans, 2002). An experiment by Ronnie Janoff-Bulman and her collaborators (1985) illustrates this phenomenon of blaming the victim. When given a detailed account of a date that ended with the woman being raped, people perceived the woman’s behavior as at least partly to blame. In hindsight, they thought, “She should have known better.” (Blaming the victim also serves to reassure people that it couldn’t happen to them.) Others, given the same account with the rape ending deleted, did not perceive the woman’s behavior as inviting rape.

Aggression
The most destructive force in our social relations is aggression. In psychology, *aggression* has a more precise meaning than it does in everyday usage. The assertive, persistent salesperson is not aggressive. Nor is the dentist who makes you wince with pain. But the person who passes along a vicious rumor about you, the person who verbally assaults you, and the attacker who mugs you are aggressive. Thus, to a psychologist, *aggression* is any physical or verbal behavior intended to hurt or destroy, whether done reactively out of hostility or proactively as a calculated means to an end. Thus, murders and assaults that occurred as hostile outbursts are aggression. So were the 110 million war-related deaths that took place during the last century, many of which were cool and calculated.

In the last 40 years in the United States, well over 1 million people—more than all deaths in all wars in American history—have been killed by firearms in nonwar settings. Compared with people of the same sex, race, age, and neighborhood, those who keep a gun in the home (ironically, often for protection) are nearly three times more likely to be murdered in the home—nearly always by a family member or close acquaintance. For every self-defense use of a gun in the home, there are 4 unintentional shootings, 7 criminal assaults or homicides, and 11 attempted or completed suicides (Kellermann et al., 1993, 1997, 1998).

Aggression research shows that behavior emerges from the interaction of biology and experience. For a gun to fire, the trigger must be pulled; with some people, as with hair-trigger guns, it doesn't take much to trip an explosion. Let us look first at biological factors that influence our thresholds for aggressive behavior, then at the psychological factors that pull the trigger.

### The Biology of Aggression

#### What biological factors make us more prone to hurt one another?

Aggression varies too widely from culture to culture, era to era, and person to person to be considered an unlearned instinct. But biology does influence aggression. Stimuli that trigger aggressive behavior operate through our biological system. We can look for biological influences at three levels—genetic, neural, and biochemical. Our genes engineer our individual nervous systems, which operate electrochemically.

**Genetic Influences** Animals have been bred for aggressiveness—sometimes for sport, sometimes for research. Pit bulls and cocker spaniels are formed by differing genes. Twin studies suggest that genes influence human aggression as well (Miles & Carey, 1997; Rowe et al., 1999). If one identical twin admits to "having a violent temper," the other twin will often independently admit the same. Fraternal twins are much less likely to respond similarly. Researchers are now searching for genetic markers found in those who commit the most violence. (One is already well known and is carried by half the human race: the Y chromosome.)

**Neural Influences** Animal and human brains have neural systems that, when stimulated, either inhibit or produce aggressive behavior (Moyer, 1983). Consider:

- The domineering leader of a caged monkey colony had a radio-controlled electrode implanted in a brain area that, when stimulated, inhibits aggression. When researchers placed the button that activated the electrode in the colony's cage, one small monkey learned to push it every time the boss became threatening.
A mild-mannered woman had an electrode implanted in her brain’s limbic system (in the amygdala) by neurosurgeons seeking to diagnose a disorder. Because the brain has no sensory receptors, she was unable to feel the stimulation. But at the flick of a switch she snarled, “Take my blood pressure. Take it now,” then stood up and began to strike the doctor.

One intensive evaluation of 15 death-row inmates revealed that all 15 had suffered a severe head injury. Although most neurologically impaired people are not violent, researcher Dorothy Lewis and her colleagues (1986) inferred that unrecognized neurological disorders may be one ingredient in the violence recipe. Other studies of violent criminals have revealed diminished activity in the frontal lobes, which play an important role in controlling impulses (Amen et al., 1996; Davidson et al., 2000; Raine, 1999, 2005).

So, does the brain have a “violence center” that produces aggression when stimulated? Actually, no one spot in the brain controls aggression, because aggression is a complex behavior that occurs in particular contexts. Rather, the brain has neural systems that, given provocation, will facilitate aggression. And it has a frontal lobe system for inhibiting aggression, making aggression more likely if this system is damaged, inactive, disconnected, or not yet fully mature.

A lean, mean, fighting machine—the testosterone-laden female hyena The hyena’s unusual embryology pumps testosterone into female fetuses. The result is revved-up young female hyenas who seem born to fight. Karl Ammannt/Getty Images
Biochemical Influences Hormones, alcohol, and other substances in the blood influence the neural systems that control aggression. A raging bull will become a gentle Ferdinand when castration reduces its testosterone level. The same is true of castrated mice. When injected with testosterone, however, the castrated mice once again become aggressive.

Although humans are less sensitive to hormonal changes, violent criminals tend to be muscular young males with lower-than-average intelligence scores, low levels of the neurotransmitter serotonin, and higher-than-average testosterone levels (Dabbs et al., 2001a; Pendick, 1994). Drugs that sharply reduce their testosterone levels also subdue their aggressive tendencies. High testosterone correlates with irritability, assertiveness, impulsiveness, and low tolerance for frustration—qualities that predispose somewhat more aggressive responses to provocation (Dabbs et al., 2001b; Harris, 1999). Among both teenage boys and adult men, high testosterone levels correlate with delinquency, hard drug use, and aggressive-bullying responses to frustration (Berman et al., 1993; Dabbs & Morris, 1990; Olweus et al., 1988). With age, testosterone levels—and aggressiveness—diminish. Hormonally charged, aggressive 17-year-olds mature into hormonally quieter and gentler 70-year-olds.

“We could avoid two-thirds of all crime simply by putting all able-bodied young men in cryogenic sleep from the age of 12 through 28.”

David T. Lykken, The Antisocial Personalities, 1995

The traffic between hormones and behavior is two-way. Testosterone heightens dominance and aggressiveness. But dominating behavior also boosts testosterone levels (Mazur & Booth, 1998). One study measured testosterone levels in the saliva of male college basketball fans before and after a big game. Testosterone levels swelled among the victorious fans and sank among the dejected ones (Bernhardt et al., 1998). Handling and describing a gun also has been found to increase testosterone in research participants’ saliva and to increase the amount of hot sauce they put in water they believe another person will drink (Klinesmith et al., 2006).

For both biological and psychological reasons, alcohol unleashes aggressive responses to frustration (Bushman, 1993; Ito et al., 1996; Taylor & Chermain, 1993). Just thinking you’ve imbibed alcohol has some effect; but so, too, does unknowingly ingesting alcohol slipped into a drink. Unless people are distracted, alcohol tends to focus their attention on a provocation rather than on inhibitory cues (Giancola & Cormany, 2007). Police data and prison surveys reinforce conclusions drawn from experiments on alcohol and aggression: Aggression-prone people are more likely to drink and to become violent when intoxicated (White et al., 1993). People who have been drinking commit 4 in 10 violent crimes and 3 in 4 acts of spousal abuse (Greenfeld, 1998).

Psychological and Social-Cultural Factors in Aggression

What psychological factors may trigger aggressive behavior?

Biological factors influence the ease with which aggression is triggered. But what psychological factors pull the trigger?

Aversive Events Although suffering sometimes builds character, it may also bring out the worst in us. Studies in which animals or humans experience unpleasant events reveal that those made miserable often make others miserable (Berkowitz, 1983, 1989).

Being blocked short of a goal also increases people’s readiness to aggress. This phenomenon is called the frustration-aggression principle: Frustration creates anger, which may in some people generate aggression, especially in the presence of an aggressive cue, such as a gun. One analysis of 27,667 hit-by-pitch major league baseball incidents between 1960 and 2004 found pitchers were most likely to hit batters when frustrated by the previous batter’s hitting a home run, by the current batter’s hitting a home run the last time at bat, or by a teammate’s having been hit by a pitch in the previous half inning (Timmerman, 2007).

Recall that organisms often respond to stress with a fight-or-flight reaction. After the frustration and stress of 9/11, Americans responded with a readiness to fight. Terrorism similarly may spring from a desire for revenge, sometimes after a friend or family member has been killed or injured. Contrary to the popular idea that poverty breeds terrorists, suicide bombers and those who support them actually tend to be neither uneducated nor desperately poor (Krueger, 2007). The 9/11 suicide bombers, for example, were mostly educated men from wealthy Saudi Arabia (McDermott, 2005). Frustration (and aggression) arise less from deprivation than from the gap between reality and expectations, which may rise with education and attainments.
Like frustration, other aversive stimuli—physical pain, personal insults, foul odors, hot temperatures, cigarette smoke, and a host of others—can also evoke hostility. For example, violent crime and spousal abuse rates are higher during hotter years, seasons, months, and days (Figure 14.10). When people get overheated, they think, feel, and act more aggressively. From the available data, Craig Anderson and his colleagues (2000) have projected that, other things being equal, global warming of 4 degrees Fahrenheit (about 2 degrees centigrade) would induce more than 50,000 additional assaults and murders in the United States alone.

**Figure 14.10 Uncomfortably hot weather and aggressive reactions** Between 1980 and 1982 in Houston, murders and rapes were more common on days over 91 degrees Fahrenheit (33 degrees centigrade), as shown in the graph. This finding is consistent with those from laboratory experiments in which people working in a hot room react to provocations with greater hostility. (From Anderson & Anderson, 1984.)

**Social and Cultural Influences** Aggression may be a natural response to aversive events, but learning can alter natural reactions. Animals naturally eat when they are hungry. But if appropriately rewarded or punished, they can be taught either to overeat or to starve.

Our reactions are more likely to be aggressive in situations where experience has taught us that aggression pays. Children whose aggression successfully intimidates other children may become more aggressive. Animals that have successfully fought to get food or mates become increasingly ferocious.

Ostracism, as we noted in Unit 8A, can also be a real pain. In a series of studies, Jean Twenge and her collaborators (2001, 2002, 2003) told some people that others whom they had met didn’t want them in their group, or that a personality test indicated they “were likely to end up alone later in life.” People led to feel socially excluded were later more likely to disparage or even deliver a blast of noise to someone who insulted them. This rejection-induced aggression brings to mind various North American and European school shootings, committed by youths who had been shunned, mocked, and sometimes bullied by peers, as reportedly was also the case in 2007 with Virginia Tech mass murderer Seung-Hui Cho. Other studies confirm that rejection often intensifies aggression (Catanese & Tice, 2005; Gaertner & Iuzzini, 2005).

Different cultures model, reinforce, and evoke different tendencies toward violence. For example, crime rates are higher (and average happiness is lower) in countries marked by a great disparity between rich and poor (Triandis, 1994). Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen (1996) have shown how violence can vary by culture within a country. They analyzed violence among White Americans in southern towns settled by Scots-Irish herders whose tradition emphasized “manly honor,” the use of arms to protect one’s flock, and a history of coercive slavery. Their cultural descendants, Nisbett and Cohen found, have triple the homicide rates and are more supportive of physically punishing children, of warfare initiatives, and of uncontrolled gun ownership than are their White counterparts in New England towns settled by the more traditionally peaceful Puritan, Quaker, and Dutch farmer-artisans.

Social influence also appears in high violence rates among cultures and families that experience minimal father care (Triandis, 1994). Even after controlling for parental education, race, income, and teen motherhood, American male youths from father-absent homes have double their peers’ incarceration rate (Harper & McLanahan, 2004).
It is important, however, to note how many people are leading gentle, even heroic lives amid social stresses, reminding us again that individuals differ. The person matters. That people differ over time and place reminds us that environments also differ, and situations matter. Yesterday's plundering Vikings have become today's peace-promoting Scandinavians. Like all behavior, aggression arises from the interaction of persons and situations.

“Why do we kill people who kill people to show that killing people is wrong?”

National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, 1992

Once established, however, aggressive behavior patterns are difficult to change. To foster a kinder, gentler world we had best model and reward sensitivity and cooperation from an early age, perhaps by training parents to discipline without modeling violence. Modeling violence—screaming and hitting—is precisely what exasperated parents often do. Parents of delinquent youngsters typically discipline with beatings, thus modeling aggression as a method of dealing with problems (Patterson et al., 1982, 1992). They also frequently cave into (reward) their children’s tears and temper tantrums.

Parent-training programs advise a more positive approach. They encourage parents to reinforce desirable behaviors and to frame statements positively (“When you finish loading the dishwasher you can go play,” rather than “If you don’t load the dishwasher, there’ll be no playing”). One aggression-replacement program has brought down re-arrest rates of juvenile offenders and gang members by teaching the youths and their parents communication skills, training them to control anger, and encouraging more thoughtful moral reasoning (Goldstein et al., 1998).

**Figure 14.11** Men who sexually coerce women The recipe for coercion against women combines an impersonal approach to sex with a hostile masculinity. (Adapted from Malamuth, 1996.)

**Observing Models of Aggression** Parents are hardly the only aggression models. As we noted in Unit 6, observing TV violence tends to desensitize people to cruelty and prime them to respond aggressively when provoked. Does this media effect extend to sexual violence? We do know that sexually coercive men typically are sexually promiscuous and hostile in their relationships with women (Figure 14.11). We also know from surveys of American and Australian teens and university students that viewing X-rated films and Internet pornography is several times higher among males than among females (Carroll et al., 2008; Flood, 2007; Wolak et al., 2007). Might sexually explicit media models contribute to sexually aggressive tendencies?

Content analyses reveal that most X-rated films have depicted quick, casual sex between strangers, but that scenes of rape and sexual exploitation of women by men are also common (Cowan et al., 1988; NCTV, 1987; Yang & Linz, 1990). Rape scenes often portray the victim at first fleeing and resisting her attacker, but then becoming aroused and finally driven to ecstasy. In less graphic form, the same unrealistic script—she resists, he persists, she melts—is commonplace on TV and in romance novels. In Gone With the Wind, Scarlett O’Hara is carried to bed screaming and wakes up singing. Most rapists accept this rape myth—the idea that some women invite or enjoy rape and get “swept away” while being “taken” (Brinson, 1992). (In actuality, rape is traumatic, and it frequently harms women’s reproductive and psychological health [Golding, 1996].) Compared with those who watch little television, men and women who watch a great deal are more likely to accept the rape myth (Kahlor & Morrison, 2007).

When interviewed, Canadian and U.S. sex offenders (rapists, child molesters, and serial killers) report a greater-than-usual appetite for sexually explicit and sexually violent materials—materials typically labeled as pornography.
Laboratory experiments reveal that repeatedly watching X-rated films (even if nonviolent) later makes one’s own partner seem less attractive, makes a woman’s friendliness seem more sexual, and makes sexual aggression seem less serious (Harris, 1994). In one such experiment, Dolf Zillmann and Jennings Bryant (1984) showed undergraduates six briefly, sexually explicit films each week for six weeks. A control group viewed nonerotic films during the same six-week period. Three weeks later, both groups read a newspaper report about a man convicted but not yet sentenced for raping a hitchhiker. When asked to suggest an appropriate prison term, those who had viewed sexually explicit films recommended sentences half as long as those recommended by the control group.

In follow-up studies, Zillmann (1989) found that after massive exposure to X-rated sexual films, men and women became more accepting of extramarital sex, of women’s sexual submission to men, and of a man’s seducing a 12-year-old girl. As people heavily exposed to televised crime perceive the world as more dangerous, so people heavily exposed to pornography see the world as more sexual.

Experiments cannot elicit actual sexual violence, but they can assess a man’s willingness to hurt a woman. Often the research gauges the effect of violent versus nonviolent erotic films on men’s willingness to deliver supposed electric shocks to women who had earlier provoked the men. These experiments suggest that it’s not the eroticism but rather the depictions of sexual violence (whether in R-rated slasher films or X-rated films) that most directly affect men’s acceptance and performance of aggression against women. A conference of 21 social scientists, including many of the researchers who conducted these experiments, produced a consensus (Surgeon General, 1986): “Pornography that portrays sexual aggression as pleasurable for the victim increases the acceptance of the use of coercion in sexual relations.” Contrary to much popular opinion, viewing such depictions does not provide an outlet for bottled-up impulses. Rather, “in laboratory studies measuring short-term effects, exposure to violent pornography increases punitive behavior toward women.”

**Acquiring Social Scripts** Significant behaviors, such as violence, usually have many determinants, making any single explanation an oversimplification. Asking what causes violence is therefore like asking what causes cancer. Those who study the effects of asbestos exposure on cancer rates may remind us that asbestos is indeed a cancer cause, albeit only one among many. Likewise, report Neil Malamuth and his colleagues (1991, 1995), several factors can create a predisposition to sexual violence. They include the media but also dominance motives, disinhibition by alcohol, and a history of child abuse. Still, if media depictions of violence can disinhibit and desensitize; if viewing sexual violence fosters hostile, domineering attitudes and behaviors; and if viewing pornography leads viewers to trivialize rape, devalue their partners, and engage in uncommitted sex, then media influence is not a minor issue.

Social psychologists attribute the media’s influence partly to the social scripts (mental tapes for how to act, provided by our culture) they portray. When we find ourselves in new situations, uncertain how to act, we rely on social scripts. After so many action films, youngsters may acquire a script that gets played when they face real-life conflicts. Challenged, they may “act like a man” by intimidating or eliminating the threat. Likewise, after viewing the multiple sexual innuendoes and acts found in most prime-time TV hours—often involving impulsive or short-term relationships—youths may acquire sexual scripts they later enact in real-life relationships (Kunkel et al., 2001; Sapolsky & Tabarlet, 1991). Music lyrics also write social scripts. In one set of experiments, German university men who listened to woman-hating song lyrics administered the most hot chili sauce to a woman and recalled more negative feelings and beliefs about women. Man-hating song lyrics had a similar effect on the aggressive behavior of women listeners (Fischer & Greitemeyer, 2006).

Might public consciousness be raised by making people aware of the information you have just been reading? (See also Close-Up: Parallels Between Smoking Effects and Media Violence Effects.) In the 1940s, movies often depicted African-Americans as childlike superstitious buffoons. Today, we would not tolerate such images. In the 1960s and 1970s, some rock music and movies glamorized drug use. Responding to a tidal change in cultural attitudes, the entertainment industry now more often portrays the dark side of drug use. In response to growing public concern about violence in the media, television violence levels declined in the early 1990s (Gerbner et al., 1993). The growing sensitivity to violence has raised hopes that entertainers, producers, and audiences might someday look back with embarrassment on the days when movies “entertained” people with scenes of torture, mutilation, and sexual coercion.
Do Video Games Teach, or Release, Violence? Violent video games became an issue for public debate after teen assassins in more than a dozen places seemed to mimic the carnage in the splatter games they had so often played (Anderson, 2004a). In 2002, two Grand Rapids, Michigan, teens and a man in his early twenties spent part of a night drinking beer and playing Grand Theft Auto III, using cars to run down simulated pedestrians, before beating them with fists and leaving a bloody body behind (Kolker, 2002). Then they went out on a real drive, spotted a 38-year-old man on a bicycle, ran him down with their car, got out, stomped and punched him, and returned home to play the game some more. (The man, a father of three, died six days later.)

Interactive games transport the player into their own vivid reality. When youths play Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas, they can carjack vehicles; run down pedestrians; do drive-by shootings; pick up a prostitute, have sex with her, and then kill her. When youths play such games, do they learn social scripts?

Most abused children don’t become abusive adults. Most social drinkers don’t become alcohol dependent. And most youths who spend hundreds of hours in these mass murder simulators don’t become teen assassins. Still, we wonder: If, as research has shown, passively viewing violence elevates aggressive responses to provocation and lowers sensitivity to cruelty, what will be the effect of actively role-playing aggression? Although very few will commit slaughter, how many will become desensitized to violence and more open to violent acts?

Parallels Between Smoking Effects and Media Violence Effects

Researchers Brad Bushman and Craig Anderson (2001) note that the correlation between viewing violence and behaving aggressively nearly equals the correlation between smoking and lung cancer. They also note other parallels:
1. Not everyone who smokes gets lung cancer.
2. Smoking is only one cause of lung cancer, although an important one.
3. The first cigarette can nauseate, but the sickening effect lessens with repetition.
4. The short-term effect of one cigarette is minor and dissipates within an hour or so.
5. The long-term, cumulative effect of smoking can be severe.
6. Corporate interests have denied the smoking–lung cancer link.

1. Not everyone who watches violence becomes aggressive.
2. Viewing violence is only one cause of aggression, although an important one.
3. The first violence exposure can upset, but the upset lessens with repetition.
4. One violent TV program can prime aggressive thoughts and behaviors, but the effect dissipates within an hour or so.
5. The long-term, cumulative effect of viewing violence is increased likelihood of habitual aggression.
6. Corporate interests have denied the viewing violence–aggression link.

Thirty-eight studies of more than 7000 people offer some answers (Anderson et al., 2004). One study (Ballard & Wiest, 1998) observed a rising level of arousal and feelings of hostility in college men as they played Mortal Kombat. Other studies have found that video games can prime aggressive thoughts and increase aggression. Consider this report from Craig Anderson and Karen Dill (2000): University men who have spent the most hours playing violent video games tend to be the most physically aggressive (for example, to acknowledge having hit or attacked someone else). In one experiment, people randomly assigned to play a game involving bloody murders with groaning victims (rather than to play nonviolent Myst) became more hostile. On a follow-up task, they also were more likely to blast intense noise at a fellow student. Those with extensive experience in violent video gaming also display desensitization to violent images, as shown by blunted brain responses (Bartholow et al., 2006).

“We are what we repeatedly do.”

Aristotle

Studies of young adolescents by Douglas Gentile and his co-researchers (2004; 2007) further reveal that kids who play a lot of violent video games see the world as more hostile, get into more arguments and fights, and get worse grades (those hours aren’t spent reading or studying). Ah, but is this merely because naturally hostile kids are drawn to such games? No, says Gentile. Even among violent-game players scoring low in hostility, 38 percent had been in fights. That figure is nearly 10 times the rate (4 percent) found among their nongaming counterparts. Moreover, over time, the nongamers became more likely to have fights only if they started playing the violent games. Anderson and his colleagues (2007) believe that, due partly to the more active participation and rewarded violence of game play, violent video games have even greater effects on aggressive behavior and cognition than do violent television and movies.

Although much remains to be learned, these studies again disconfirm the catharsis hypothesis—the idea that we feel better if we “blow off steam” by venting our emotions (Unit 8B). Playing violent video games increases aggressive thoughts, emotions, and behaviors. One video game company’s CEO rationalizes that we are “violent by nature [and] need release valves.” “It’s a way to process violent feelings and anxieties through a fantasy medium,” adds a prominent civil liberties lawyer in explaining her hunch that playing violent games calms violent tendencies (Heins, 2004). Actually, expressing anger breeds more anger, and practicing violence breeds more violence. Tomorrow’s games may have even greater effects. Social psychologists Susan Persky and Jim Blascovich (2005) created a violent
A video game for students to play on either a desktop computer or by putting on a headset and stepping into a virtual reality. As they predicted, the virtual reality more dramatically heightened aggressive feelings and behavior during and after the play.

To sum up, research reveals biological, psychological, and social-cultural influences on aggressive behavior. Like so much else, aggression is a biopsychosocial phenomenon (Figure 14.12).

![Biopsychosocial understanding of aggression](image)

Figure 14.12 Biopsychosocial understanding of aggression Because many factors contribute to aggressive behavior, there are many ways to change such behavior, including learning anger management and communication skills, and avoiding violent media and video games.

**Attraction**

Pause a moment and think about your relationships with two people—a close friend, and someone who stirs in you feelings of romantic love. What is the psychological chemistry that binds us together in these special sorts of attachments that help us cope with all other relationships? Social psychology suggests some answers.

**The Psychology of Attraction**

We endlessly wonder how we can win others’ affections and what makes our own affections flourish or fade. Does familiarity breed contempt, or does it intensify our affection? Do birds of a feather flock together, or do opposites attract? Is beauty only skin deep, or does attractiveness matter greatly? Consider three ingredients of our liking for one another: proximity, physical attractiveness, and similarity.

**Proximity** Before friendships become close, they must begin. Proximity—geographic nearness—is friendship’s most powerful predictor. Proximity provides opportunities for aggression, but much more often it breeds liking. Study after study reveals that people are most inclined to like, and even to marry, those who live in the same neighborhood, who sit nearby in class, who work in the same office, who share the same parking lot, who eat in the same cafeteria. Look around. (For more on modern ways to connect people, see Close-Up: Online Matchmaking and Speed Dating, below.)
Why is proximity so conducive to liking? Obviously, part of the answer is the greater availability of those we often meet. But there is more to it than that. For one thing, repeated exposure to novel stimuli—be they nonsense syllables, musical selections, geometric figures, Chinese characters, human faces, or the letters of our own name—increases our liking for them (Moreland & Zajonc, 1982; Nuttin, 1987; Zajonc, 2001). People are even somewhat more likely to marry someone whose familiar-sounding first or last name resembles their own (Jones et al., 2004).

The mere exposure effect The mere exposure effect applies even to ourselves. Because the human face is not perfectly symmetrical, the face we see in the mirror is not the same as the one our friends see. Most of us prefer the familiar mirror image, while our friends like the reverse (Mita et al., 1977). The Chris Martin (Coldplay lead singer) known to his fans is at left. The person he sees in the mirror each morning is shown at right, and that’s the photo he would probably prefer. Jon Kopaloff/FilmMagic/Getty Images

This phenomenon is the mere exposure effect. Within certain limits (Bornstein, 1989, 1999), familiarity breeds fondness. Richard Moreland and Scott Beach (1992) demonstrated this by having four equally attractive women silently attend a 200-student class for zero, 5, 10, or 15 class sessions. At the end of the course, students were shown slides of each woman and asked to rate each one’s attractiveness. The most attractive? The ones they’d seen most often. The phenomenon will come as no surprise to the young Taiwanese man who wrote more than 700 letters to his girlfriend, urging her to marry him. She did marry—the mail carrier (Steinberg, 1993).

No face is more familiar than one’s own. And that helps explain an interesting finding from Lisa DeBruine’s research (2004): Men liked other men, and women liked other women, when their faces incorporated some morphed features of their own. When DeBruine (2002) had McMaster University students play a game with a supposed other player, they also were more trusting and cooperative when the other person’s image had some features of their own face morphed into it. In me I trust. (See also Figure 14.13.)

Figure 14.13 I like the candidate who looks a bit like dear old me Jeremy Bailenson and his colleagues (2005) incorporated morphed features of voters’ faces into the faces of 2004 U.S. presidential candidates George Bush and John Kerry. Without conscious awareness of their own incorporated features, the participants became more likely to favor the candidate whose face incorporated some of their own features. © Jeremy Bailenson and Nick Yee

CLOSE-UP
Online Matchmaking and Speed Dating

If you have not found a romantic partner in your immediate proximity, why not cast a wider net? In the United States, 16 million people have tried online dating and matchmaking services, as have an estimated 14 million more in China, 10 million in India, and tens of millions in other countries (Cullen & Masters, 2008).

Although published research on the effectiveness of Internet matchmaking services is sparse, this much seems well established: Some people dishonestly represent their age, attractiveness, occupation, or other details, and thus are not who they seem to be. Nevertheless, Katelyn McKenna and John Bargh and their colleagues have found that, on average, Internet-formed friendships and romantic relationships are more likely than relationships formed in person to last beyond two years (Bargh et al. 2002, 2004; McKenna & Bargh, 1998, 2000; McKenna et al., 2002). In one of their studies, people disclosed more, with less posturing, to those whom they met online. When conversing online with someone for 20 minutes, they felt more liking for that person than they did for someone they had met and talked with face to face. This was true even when (unknown to them) it was the same person! Small wonder that Internet friendships often feel as real and important to people as in-person relationships.

*Speed dating* is in-person matchmaking. People rotate through 3-to 8-minute conversations with a succession of prospective partners, deciding after each if they’d like to see the person again. Researchers report that 4 minutes is often enough for participants to form a feeling about the conversational partner and to register whether the partner likes them (Eastwick & Finkel, 2008a,b). It also is enough for researchers to have begun using speed dating as a vehicle for studying influences on people’s first impressions of potential romantic partners.

For our ancestors, the mere exposure effect was adaptive. What was familiar was generally safe and approachable. What was unfamiliar was more often dangerous and threatening. Evolution seems to have hard-wired into us the tendency to bond with those who are familiar and to be wary of those who are unfamiliar (Zajonc, 1998). Gut-level prejudice against those culturally different may thus be a primitive, automatic emotional response (Devine, 1995). It’s what we do with our knee-jerk prejudice that matters, suggest researchers. Do we let those feelings control our behavior? Or do we monitor our feelings and act in ways that reflect our conscious valuing of human equality?
Physical Attractiveness Once proximity affords you contact, what most affects your first impressions: The person’s sincerity? Intelligence? Personality? Hundreds of experiments reveal that it is something far more superficial: Appearance. For people taught that “beauty is only skin deep” and that “appearances can be deceiving,” the power of physical attractiveness is unnerving.

In one early study, Elaine Hatfield and her co-workers (Walster et al., 1966) randomly matched new University of Minnesota students for a Welcome Week dance. Before the dance, each student took a battery of personality and aptitude tests. On the night of the blind date, the couples danced and talked for more than two hours and then took a brief intermission to rate their dates. What determined whether they liked each other? As far as the researchers could determine, only one thing mattered: Physical attractiveness (which had been rated by the researchers beforehand). Both the men and the women liked good-looking dates best. Although women are more likely than men to say that another’s looks don’t affect them (Lippa, 2007), a man’s looks do affect women’s behavior (Feingold, 1990; Sprecher, 1989; Woll, 1986). Recent speed-dating experiments confirm that attractiveness influences first impressions for both sexes (Belot & Francesconi, 2006; Finkel & Eastwick, 2008).

“Personal beauty is a greater recommendation than any letter of introduction.”

Aristotle, Apotegems, 330 B.C.E

People’s physical attractiveness also predicts their frequency of dating, their feelings of popularity, and others’ initial impressions of their personalities. We perceive attractive people to be healthier, happier, more sensitive, more successful, and more socially skilled, though not more honest or compassionate (Eagly et al., 1991; Feingold, 1992; Hatfield & Sprecher, 1986). Attractive, well-dressed people are more likely to make a favorable impression on potential employers and to enjoy occupational success (Cash & Janda, 1984; Langlois et al., 2000; Solomon, 1987). Income analyses show a penalty for plainness or obesity and a premium for beauty (Engemann & Owyang, 2005).

An analysis of 100 top-grossing films since 1940 found that attractive characters were portrayed as morally superior to unattractive characters (Smith et al., 1999). But Hollywood modeling doesn’t explain why, to judge from their gazing times, even babies prefer attractive over unattractive faces (Langlois et al., 1987). So do some blind people, as University of Birmingham professor John Hull (1990, p. 23) discovered after going blind. A colleague’s remarks on a woman’s beauty would strangely affect his feelings. He found this “deplorable.... What can it matter to me what sighted men think of women...yet I do care what sighted men think, and I do not seem able to throw off this prejudice.”
Percentage of Men and Women Who “Constantly Think About Their Looks”

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<tr>
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<th>Men</th>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>18%</td>
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<td>United States</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
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<td>Venezuela</td>
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From Roper Starch survey, reported by McCool (1999).

The importance of looks seems unfair and unenlightened. Why should it matter? Two thousand years ago the Roman statesman Cicero felt the same way: “The final good and the supreme duty of the wise person is to resist appearance.” Cicero might be reassured by two other findings.

New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd on liposuction (January 19, 2000): “Women in the 50’s vacuumed. Women in the 00’s are vacuumed. Our Hoovers have turned on us!”

First, people’s attractiveness is surprisingly unrelated to their self-esteem and happiness (Diener et al., 1995; Major et al., 1984). One reason may be that, except after comparing themselves with superattractive people, few people (thanks, perhaps, to the mere exposure effect) view themselves as unattractive (Thornton & Moore, 1993). Another reason is that strikingly attractive people are sometimes suspicious that praise for their work may simply be a reaction to their looks. When less attractive people are praised, they are more likely to accept it as sincere (Berscheid, 1981).

Cicero might also find comfort in knowing that attractiveness judgments are relative. The standards by which judges crown Miss Universe hardly apply to the whole planet. Rather, beauty is in the eye of the culture—our standards for beauty reflect our time and place. Hoping to look attractive, people in different cultures have pierced their noses, lengthened their necks, bound their feet, and dyed or painted their skin and hair. They have gorged themselves to achieve a full figure or liposuctioned fat to achieve a slim one, applied chemicals hoping to rid themselves of unwanted hair or to regrow wanted hair, strapped on leather garments to make their breasts seem smaller or surgically filled their breasts with silicone and put on Wonderbras to make them look bigger.

In the eye of the beholder Conceptions of attractiveness vary by culture. Moreover, the current concept of attractiveness in the KwaZulu-Natal province of South Africa; the city of Sana’a, Yemen; and in southern California may well change in the future.

Women have 91 percent of cosmetic procedures (ASAPS, 2008). Women also recall others’ appearance better than do men (Mast & Hall, 2006).
For women in North America, the ultra-thin ideal of the Roaring Twenties gave way to the soft, voluptuous Marilyn Monroe ideal of the 1950s, only to be replaced by today’s lean yet busty ideal. Americans now spend more on beauty supplies than on education and social services combined and, when still not satisfied, undergo 12 million cosmetic medical treatments each year, including plastic surgery, Botox skin smoothing, and laser hair removal—not even counting procedures for teeth capping or whitening (ASAPS, 2008). But the result of the beauty race since 1970 has been that more and more women feel unhappy with their appearance (Feingold & Mazella, 1998).

Some aspects of attractiveness, however, do cross place and time (Cunningham et al., 2005; Langlois et al., 2000). As we noted in Unit 3C, men in a wide range of cultures, from Australia to Zambia, judge women as more attractive if they have a youthful appearance. Women feel attracted to healthy-looking men, but especially to those who seem mature, dominant, and affluent.

People everywhere also seem to prefer physical features—noses, legs, physiques—that are neither unusually large nor small. An averaged face is attractive (Figure 14.14). In one clever demonstration of this, Judith Langlois and Lori Roggman (1990) digitized the faces of up to 32 college students and used a computer to average them. Students judged the averaged, composite faces as more attractive than 96 percent of the individual faces. One reason is that averaged faces are symmetrical, and people with symmetrical faces and bodies are more sexually attractive (Rhodes et al., 1999; Singh, 1995; Thornhill & Gangestad, 1994). Merge either half of your face with its mirror image and your symmetrical new face would boost your attractiveness a notch.

Figure 14.14 Average is attractive Which of these faces offered by University of St. Andrews psychologist David Perrett (2002) is most attractive? Most people say it’s the face on the right—of a nonexistent person that is the average composite of these three plus 57 other actual faces. David Perrett/University of St. Andrews

Extreme makeover Greater wealth and concerns about appearance in China have led to increasing numbers of women seeking to alter their appearance. This woman underwent six months of grueling plastic surgery to transform her eyes,
nose, chin, breasts, abdomen, bottom, legs, and skin in hopes of obtaining a career in film. Newscom

Beauty grows with mere exposure Herman Miller, Inc.’s famed Aeron chair initially received high comfort ratings but abysmal beauty ratings. To some it looked like “lawn furniture” or “a giant prehistoric insect” (Gladwell, 2005). But then, with design awards, media visibility, and imitators, the ugly duckling came to be the company’s best-selling chair ever and to be seen as beautiful. With people, too, beauty lies partly in the beholder’s eye and can grow with exposure. AP Photo/Herman Miller, Inc.

Cultural standards aside, attractiveness also depends on our feelings about the person. If led to believe that someone has appealing traits (such as being honest, humorous, and polite rather than rude, unfair, and abusive) people perceive the person as more physically attractive (Lewandowski et al., 2007). In a Rodgers and Hammerstein musical, Prince Charming asks Cinderella, “Do I love you because you’re beautiful, or are you beautiful because I love you?” Chances are it’s both. As we see our loved ones again and again, their physical imperfections grow less noticeable and their attractiveness grows more apparent (Beaman & Klentz, 1983; Gross & Crofton, 1977). Shakespeare said it in A Midsummer Night’s Dream: “Love looks not with the eyes, but with the mind.” Come to love someone and watch beauty grow.

Similarity Let’s say that proximity has brought you into contact with someone and that your appearance has made an acceptable first impression. What now influences whether acquaintances develop into friends? For example, as you get to know someone better, is the chemistry better if you are opposites or if you are alike?

“Love has ever in view the absolute loveliness of that which it beholds.”

George MacDonald, Unspoken Sermons, 1867

In Italy and the United States, people also like political candidates who share their own self-perceived personality traits. In 2004, John Kerry was seen as open-minded and George Bush as loyal and sincere, and each was favored by voters who saw those traits in themselves (Caprara et al., 2007).

It makes a good story—extremely different types living in harmonious union: Rat, Mole, and Badger in The Wind in the Willows, Frog and Toad in Arnold Lobel’s books. The stories delight us by expressing what we seldom experience, for we tend not to like dissimilar people (Rosenbaum, 1986). In real life, opposites retract. Birds that flock together usually are of a feather. Friends and couples are far more likely to share common attitudes, beliefs, and interests (and, for that matter, age, religion, race, education, intelligence, smoking behavior, and economic status) than are randomly paired people. Moreover, the more alike people are, the more their liking endures (Byrne, 1971). Journalist Walter Lippmann was right to suppose that love is best sustained “when the lovers love many things together, and not merely each other.” Similarity breeds content. Dissimilarity often fosters disfavor, which helps explain many straight men’s disapproval of gay men who are doubly dissimilar from themselves in sexual orientation and gender roles (Lehavot & Lambert, 2007).

Proximity, attractiveness, and similarity are not the only determinants of attraction. We also like those who like us. This is especially so when our self-image is low. When we believe someone likes us, we feel good and respond to them warmly, which leads them to like us even more (Curtis & Miller, 1986). To be liked is powerfully rewarding.
Indeed, a simple *reward theory of attraction*—that we will like those whose behavior is rewarding to us and that we will continue relationships that offer more rewards than costs—can explain all the findings we have considered so far. When a person lives or works in close proximity with someone else, it costs less time and effort to develop the friendship and enjoy its benefits. Attractive people are aesthetically pleasing, and associating with them can be socially rewarding. Those with similar views reward us by validating our own.

**Romantic Love**

**Passionate Love** Noting that arousal is a key ingredient of *passionate love*, Hatfield suggests that the two-factor theory of emotion (*Unit 8B*) can help us understand this intense positive absorption in another. The theory assumes that (1) emotions have two ingredients—physical arousal plus cognitive appraisal—and that (2) arousal from any source can enhance one emotion or another, depending on how we interpret and label the arousal.

In tests of this theory, college men have been aroused by fright, by running in place, by viewing erotic materials, or by listening to humorous or repulsive monologues. They were then introduced to an attractive woman and asked to rate her (or their girlfriend). Unlike unaroused men, those who were stirred up attributed some of their arousal to the woman or girlfriend and felt more attracted to her (Carducci et al., 1978; Dermer & Pyszczynski, 1978; White & Kight, 1984).

Outside the laboratory, Donald Dutton and Arthur Aron (1974, 1989) went to two bridges across British Columbia’s rocky Capilano River. One, a swaying footbridge, was 230 feet above the rocks; the other was low and solid. An attractive young female accomplice intercepted men coming off each bridge, sought their help in filling out a short questionnaire, and then offered her phone number in case they wanted to hear more about her project. Far more of those who had just crossed the high bridge—which left their hearts pounding—accepted the number and later called the woman. To be revved up and to associate some of that arousal with a desirable person is to feel the pull of passion. Adrenaline makes the heart grow fonder.

**Companionate Love** Although the spark of romantic love often endures, the intense absorption in the other, the thrill of the romance, the giddy “floating on a cloud” feeling typically fades. Does this mean the French are correct in saying that “love makes the time pass and time makes love pass”? Or can friendship and commitment keep a relationship going after the passion cools?
Sometimes passionate love becomes enduring companionate love, sometimes not (invert the picture) What, in addition to similar attitudes and interests, predicts long-term loving attachment? Courtship and Matrimony (From the collection of Werner Nekes)

Hatfield reports that as love matures it becomes a steadier companionate love—a deep, affectionate attachment. There may be adaptive wisdom to this change from passion to attachment (Reis & Aron, 2008). Passionate love often produces children, whose survival is aided by the parents’ waning obsession with one another. Social psychologist Ellen Berscheid and her colleagues (1984) noted that the failure to appreciate passionate love’s limited half-life can doom a relationship: “If the inevitable odds against eternal passionate love in a relationship were better understood, more people might choose to be satisfied with the quieter feelings of satisfaction and contentment.” Indeed, recognizing the short duration of passionate love, some societies have deemed such feelings an irrational reason for marrying. Better, such cultures say, to choose (or have someone choose for you) a partner with a compatible background and interests. Non-Western cultures, where people rate love less important for marriage, do have lower divorce rates (Levine et al., 1995).

One key to a gratifying and enduring relationship is equity: Both partners receive in proportion to what they give. When equity exists—when both partners freely give and receive, when they share decision making—their chances for sustained and satisfying companionate love are good (Gray-Little & Burks, 1983; Van Yperen & Buunk, 1990). In one national survey, “sharing household chores” ranked third, after “faithfulness” and a “happy sexual relationship,” on a list of nine things people associated with successful marriages. “I like hugs. I like kisses. But what I really love is help with the dishes,” summarized the Pew Research Center (2007).

“When two people are under the influence of the most violent, most insane, most delusive, and most transient of passions, they are required to swear that they will remain in that excited, abnormal, and exhausting condition continuously until death do them part.”

George Bernard Shaw, “Getting Married,” 1908
Equity's importance extends beyond marriage. Mutually sharing self and possessions, giving and getting emotional support, promoting and caring about each other's welfare are at the core of every type of loving relationship (Sternberg & Grajek, 1984). It is true for lovers, for parent and child, and for intimate friends.

Another vital ingredient of loving relationships is self-disclosure, the revealing of intimate details about ourselves—our likes and dislikes, our dreams and worries, our proud and shameful moments. “When I am with my friend,” noted the Roman statesman Seneca, “me thinks I am alone, and as much at liberty to speak anything as to think it.” Self-disclosure breeds liking, and liking breeds self-disclosure (Collins & Miller, 1994). As one person reveals a little, the other reciprocates, the first then reveals more, and on and on, as friends or lovers move to deeper intimacy. Each increase in intimacy rekindles passion (Baumeister & Bratslavsky, 1999).

One experiment marched pairs of volunteer college students through 45 minutes of increasingly self-disclosing conversation—from “When did you last sing to yourself?” to “When did you last cry in front of another person? By yourself?” By the experiment’s end, those experiencing the escalating intimacy felt remarkably close to their conversation partner, much closer than others who had spent the time with small-talk questions, such as “What was your high school like?” (Aron et al., 1997). Given self-disclosing intimacy plus mutually supportive equality, the odds favor enduring companionate love.

Intimacy can also grow from pausing to ponder and write our feelings. Richard Slatcher and James Pennebaker (2006) discovered this when they invited one person from each of 86 dating couples to spend 20 minutes a day over three days either writing their deepest thoughts and feelings about the relationship or writing merely about their daily activities. Those who wrote their feelings expressed more emotion in their instant messages with their partners in the days following, and 77 percent were still dating three months later (compared with 52 percent of those who had written about their activities).

### Altruism

When are we most—and least—likely to help?
Carl Wilkens, a Seventh Day Adventist missionary, was living with his family in Kigali, Rwanda, when Hutu militia began to slaughter the Tutsi in 1994. The U.S. government, church leaders, and friends all implored Wilkens to leave. He refused. After evacuating his family, and even after every other American had left Kigali, he alone stayed and contended the 800,000-person genocide. When the militia came to kill him and his Tutsi servants, Wilkens' Hutu neighbors deterred them. Despite repeated death threats, he spent his days running roadblocks to take food and water to orphanages and to negotiate, plead, and bully his way through the bloodshed, saving lives time and again. “It just seemed the right thing to do,” he later explained (Kristof, 2004).

Elsewhere in Kigali, Paul Rusesabagina, a Hutu married to a Tutsi and the acting manager of a luxury hotel, was sheltering more than 1200 terrified Tutsis and moderate Hutus. When international peacemakers abandoned the city and hostile militia threatened his guests in the “Hotel Rwanda” (as it came to be called in a 2004 movie), the courageous Rusesabagina began cashing in past favors, bribing the militia, and telephoning influential persons abroad to bring pressure on local authorities, thereby sparing the lives of the hotel’s occupants from the surrounding chaos.

Such selfless goodness exemplifies altruism—the unselfish regard for the welfare of others. Altruism became a major concern of social psychologists after an especially vile act of sexual violence. On March 13, 1964, a stalker repeatedly stabbed Kitty Genovese, then raped her as she lay dying outside her Queens, New York, apartment at 3:30 A.M. “Oh, my God, he stabbed me!” Genovese screamed into the early morning stillness. “Please help me!” Windows opened and lights went on as neighbors—38 of them, according to an initial New York Times report, though the number was later contested—heard her screams. Her attacker fled and then returned to stab and rape her again. Not until he had fled for good did anyone so much as call the police, at 3:50 A.M. “Probably no single incident has caused social psychologists to pay as much attention to an aspect of social behavior as Kitty Genovese’s murder.”

R. Lance Shotland (1984)

Bystander Intervention

Reflecting on initial reports of the Genovese murder and other such tragedies, most commentators were outraged by the bystanders’ “apathy” and “indifference.” Rather than blaming the onlookers, social psychologists John Darley and Bibb Latané (1968b) attributed their inaction to an important situational factor—the presence of others. Given certain circumstances, they suspected, most of us might behave similarly.

After staging emergencies under various conditions, Darley and Latané assembled their findings into a decision scheme: We will help only if the situation enables us first to notice the incident, then to interpret it as an emergency, and finally to assume responsibility for helping (Figure 14.15). At each step, the presence of other bystanders turns people away from the path that leads to helping. In the laboratory and on the street, people in a group of strangers are more likely than solitary individuals to keep their eyes focused on what they themselves are doing or where they are going. If they notice an unusual situation, they may infer from the blasé reactions of the other passersby that the situation is not an emergency. “The person lying on the sidewalk must be drunk,” they think, and move on.

But sometimes the emergency is unambiguous and people still fail to help. The witnesses looking out through their windows initially were reported to have noticed the incident, correctly interpreted the emergency, and yet failed to assume responsibility. Why? To find out, Darley and Latané (1968a) simulated a physical emergency in their laboratory. University students participated in a discussion over an intercom. Each student was in a separate cubicle, and only the person whose microphone was switched on could be heard. One of the students was an accomplice of the
experimenters. When his turn came, he made sounds as though he were having an epileptic seizure and called for help.

How did the other students react? As Figure 14.16 shows, those who believed only they could hear the victim—and therefore thought they bore total responsibility for helping him—usually went to his aid. Those who thought others also could hear were more likely to ignore the victim. When more people shared responsibility for helping—when there was a diffusion of responsibility—any single listener was less likely to help.

Figure 14.16 Responses to a simulated physical emergency When people thought they alone heard the calls for help from a person they believed to be having an epileptic seizure, they usually helped. But when they thought four others were also hearing the calls, fewer than a third responded. (From Darley & Latané, 1968a.)

In hundreds of additional experiments, psychologists have studied the factors that influence bystanders’ willingness to relay an emergency phone call, aid a stranded motorist, donate blood, pick up dropped books, contribute money, and give time. For example, Latané, James Dabbs (1975), and 145 collaborators took 1497 elevator rides in three cities and “accidentally” dropped coins or pencils in front of 4813 fellow passengers. The women coin droppers were more likely to receive help than were the men—a gender difference often reported by other researchers (Eagly & Crowley, 1986). But the major finding was the bystander effect—any particular bystander was less likely to give aid with other bystanders present. When alone with the person in need, 40 percent helped; in the presence of five other bystanders, only 20 percent helped.

From their observations of behavior in tens of thousands of such situations, altruism researchers have discerned some additional patterns. The best odds of our helping someone occur when

- the person appears to need and deserve help.
- the person is in some way similar to us.
- we have just observed someone else being helpful.
- we are not in a hurry.
- we are in a small town or rural area.
- we are feeling guilty.
- we are focused on others and not preoccupied.
- we are in a good mood.
“Oh, make us happy and you make us good!”

Robert Browning, *The Ring and the Book*, 1868

This last result, that happy people are helpful people, is one of the most consistent findings in all of psychology. No matter how people are cheered—whether by being made to feel successful and intelligent, by thinking happy thoughts, by finding money, or even by receiving a posthypnotic suggestion—they become more generous and more eager to help (Carlson et al., 1988).

The Norms for Helping

![Cartoon image](Image)

Steve Kelley/Creators Syndicate

Why do we help? One widely held view is that self-interest underlies all human interactions, that our constant goal is to maximize rewards and minimize costs. Accountants call it *cost-benefit analysis*. Philosophers call it *utilitarianism*. Social psychologists call it **social exchange theory**. If you are pondering whether to donate blood, you may weigh the costs of doing so (time, discomfort, and anxiety) against the benefits (reduced guilt, social approval, and good feelings). If the rewards you anticipate from helping exceed the costs, you will help.

For most people, helping is intrinsically rewarding. Making charitable donations activates brain areas associated with reward (Harbaugh et al., 2007). That helps explain some findings by Elizabeth Dunn and her colleagues (2008). Employees who receive a windfall bonus, for example, are later happier if they have done something for other people with it. In one experiment, researchers gave people an envelope with cash and told them either to spend it on themselves or on others. Which group do you suppose was happiest at the day’s end? It was, indeed, those assigned to the spend-it-on-others condition.
But why does helpfulness breed happiness (as well as the reverse)? And why do we leave tips for people we will never see again and give directions to strangers? In part because we have been socialized to do so, through norms that prescribe how we ought to behave, often to our mutual benefit. Through socialization, we learn the reciprocity norm, the expectation that we should return help, not harm, to those who have helped us. In our relations with others of similar status, the reciprocity norm compels us to give (in favors, gifts, or social invitations) about as much as we receive. We also learn a social-responsibility norm: that we should help those who need our help—young children and others who cannot give as much as they receive—even if the costs outweigh the benefits. In repeated Gallup surveys, people who each week attend religious services often exhibit the social-responsibility norm: They report volunteering more than twice as many hours in helping the poor and infirm than do those who rarely or never attend religious services (Hodgkinson & Weitzman, 1992; Independent Sector, 2002). They also give away three times as much money.

A social-responsibility norm was active on January 2, 2007, as construction worker Wesley Autrey and his 6-and 4-year-old daughters were awaiting a New York City subway train. Before them a man collapsed in a seizure, got up, then stumbled to the platform’s edge and fell onto the tracks. With train headlights approaching, “I had to make a split decision,” Autrey later recalled (Buckley, 2007). His decision, as his girls looked on in horror, was to leap from the platform, push the man off the tracks and into a foot-deep space between them, and lay atop him. As the train screeched to a halt, five cars traveled just above his head, leaving grease on his knit cap. When Autrey cried out, “I’ve got two daughters up there. Let them know their father is okay,” the onlookers erupted into applause.

**Conflict and Peacemaking**

**How do social traps and mirror-image perceptions fuel social conflict?**

We live in surprising times. With astonishing speed, late-twentieth-century democratic movements swept away totalitarian rule in Eastern European countries, and hopes for a new world order displaced the Cold War chill. And yet, the twenty-first century began with terrorist acts and war, and the world continued to spend $2 billion every day for arms and armies—money that could have been used for housing, nutrition, education, and health care. Knowing that wars begin in human minds, psychologists have wondered: What in the human mind causes destructive conflict? How might the perceived threats of social diversity be replaced by a spirit of cooperation?

To a social psychologist, a **conflict** is a perceived incompatibility of actions, goals, or ideas. The elements of conflict are much the same at all levels, from nations at war, to cultural disputes within a society, to individuals in a marital
dispute. In each situation, people become enmeshed in a potentially destructive social process that can produce results no one wants. Among the destructive processes are social traps and distorted perceptions.

Social Traps

In some situations, we support our collective well-being by pursuing our personal interests. As capitalist Adam Smith wrote in *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.” In other situations, we harm our collective well-being by pursuing our personal interests. Such situations are social traps.

**Figure 14.17 Social-trap game matrix** By pursuing our self-interest and not trusting others, we can end up losers. To illustrate this, imagine playing the game below. The peach triangles show the outcomes for Person 1, which depend on the choices made by both players. If you were Person 1, would you choose A or B? (This game is called a non-zero-sum game because the outcomes need not add up to zero; both sides can win or both can lose.)

Consider the simple game matrix in **Figure 14.17**, which is similar to those used in experiments with countless thousands of people. Both sides can win or both can lose, depending on the players' individual choices. Pretend you are Person 1, and that you and Person 2 will each receive the amount shown after you separately choose either A or B. (You might invite someone to look at the matrix with you and take the role of Person 2.) Which do you choose—A or B?

You and Person 2 are caught in a dilemma. If you both choose A, you both benefit, making $5 each. Neither of you benefits if you both choose B, for neither of you makes anything. Nevertheless, on any single trial you serve your own interests if you choose B: You can’t lose, and you might make $10. But the same is true for the other person. Hence, the social trap: As long as you both pursue your own immediate best interest and choose B, you will both end up with nothing—the typical result—when you could have made $5.

Many real-life situations similarly pit our individual interests against our communal well-being. Individual whalers reasoned that the few whales they took would not threaten the species and that if they didn’t take them others would anyway. The result: Some species of whales became endangered. Ditto for the bison hunters of yesterday and the elephant-tusk poachers of today. Individual car owners and home owners reason, “It would cost me comfort or money to buy a more fuel-efficient car and furnace. Besides, the fossil fuels I burn don’t noticeably add to the greenhouse gases.” When enough others reason similarly, the collective result threatens disaster—global climate change, rising seas, and more extreme weather.

Social traps challenge us to find ways of reconciling our right to pursue our personal well-being with our responsibility for the well-being of all. Psychologists are therefore exploring ways to convince people to cooperate for their mutual betterment—through agreed-upon regulations, through better communication, and through promoting awareness of our responsibilities toward community, nation, and the whole of humanity (Dawes, 1980; Linder, 1982; Sato, 1987). Given effective regulations, communication, and awareness, people more often cooperate, whether it be in playing a laboratory game or the real game of life.
Not in my ocean! Many people support alternative energy sources, including wind turbines. But proposals to construct wind farms in real-world neighborhoods elicit less support. One such proposal (shown in this visual simulation), for locating wind turbines off the coast of Massachusetts' Nantucket Island, produced heated debate over the future benefits of clean energy versus the costs of altering treasured ocean views and, possibly, migratory bird routes.

Cape Wind Associates

Enemy Perceptions

Psychologists have noted that those in conflict have a curious tendency to form diabolical images of one another. These distorted images are ironically similar, so similar in fact that we call them mirror-image perceptions: As we see “them”—as untrustworthy and evil intentioned—so “they” see us. Each demonizes the other.

Mirror-image perceptions often feed a vicious cycle of hostility. If Juan believes Maria is annoyed with him, he may snub her, causing her to act in ways that justify his perception. As with individuals, so with countries. Perceptions can become self-fulfilling prophecies. They may confirm themselves by influencing the other country to react in ways that seem to justify them.

People in conflict also tend to see their own actions as responses to provocation, not as the causes of what happens next. When responding to a perceived provocation they often hit back harder, though perceiving themselves as merely returning tit for tat. In one experiment, University College London volunteers used a mechanical device to press on another volunteer’s finger, after feeling pressure on their own finger. Although their task was to reciprocate with the same amount of pressure, they typically responded with about 40 percent more force than they had just experienced. Despite seeking to respond only in kind, their touches soon escalated to hard presses, much as when each child after a fight claims that “I just poked him, but he hit me harder” (Shergill et al., 2003).

In the early twenty-first century, many Americans came to loathe Saddam Hussein. Like the “evil” Saddam Hussein, “some of today's tyrants are gripped by an implacable hatred of the United States of America,” declared then-President George W. Bush (2001). “They hate our friends, they hate our values, they hate democracy and freedom and individual liberty. Many care little for the lives of their own people.” Hussein (2002) reciprocated the perception, seeing the United States as “an evil tyrant” that, with Satan as its protector, lusted for oil and aggressively attacked those who “defend what is right.”

The point is not that truth must lie midway between two such views (one may be more accurate). The point is that enemy perceptions often form mirror images. Moreover, as enemies change, so do perceptions. In American minds and media, the “bloodthirsty, cruel, treacherous” Japanese of World War II later became our “intelligent, hardworking, self-disciplined, resourceful allies” (Gallup, 1972).
How can we make peace? Can contact, cooperation, communication, and conciliation transform the antagonisms fed by prejudice and conflicts into attitudes that promote peace? Research indicates that, in some cases, they can.

Contact

How can we transform feelings of prejudice, aggression, and conflict into attitudes that promote peace?

Does it help to put two conflicting parties into close contact? It depends. When such contact is noncompetitive and between parties of equal status, such as retail clerks working the same shift, it typically helps. Initially prejudiced co-workers of different races have, in such circumstances, usually come to accept one another.

This finding is confirmed by a statistical digest of more than 500 studies of face-to-face contact with outgroups (such as ethnic minorities, the elderly, and those with disabilities). Among the quarter-million people studied across 38 nations, contact has been correlated with, or in experimental studies has led to, more positive attitudes (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Some examples:

- With interracial contact, South African Whites' and Blacks' “attitudes [have moved] into closer alignment” (Dixon et al., 2007).
- Heterosexuals' personal contact with gay people correlates with accepting attitudes. In one national survey, those who knowingly had a gay family member or close friend were twice as likely to support gay marriage as those who didn’t—55 percent versus 25 percent (Neidorf & Morin, 2007).
- Even indirect contact with a member of an outgroup (via story reading or through a friend who has an outgroup friend) tends to reduce prejudice (Cameron & Rutland, 2006; Pettigrew et al., 2007).

“You cannot shake hands with a clenched fist.”

Indira Gandhi, 1971

However, mere contact is not always enough. In most desegregated schools, ethnic groups resegregate themselves in the lunchrooms and on the school grounds (Clack et al., 2005; Schofield, 1986). People in each group often think that they would welcome more contact with the other group, but they assume the other group does not reciprocate the wish (Richeson & Shelton, 2007). “I don’t reach out to them, because I don’t want to be rebuffed; they don’t reach out to me, because they’re just not interested.” When such mirror-image misperceptions are corrected, friendships may then form and prejudices melt.

Cooperation

To see if enemies could overcome their differences, researcher Muzafer Sherif (1966) first instigated conflict. He placed 22 Oklahoma City boys in two separate areas of a Boy Scout camp. He then put the two groups through a series of competitive activities, with prizes going to the victors. Before long, each group became intensely proud of itself and hostile to the other group’s “sneaky,” “smart-alecky stinkers.” Food wars broke out during meals. Cabins were ransacked. Fistfights had to be broken up by members of the camp staff. When Sherif brought the two groups together, they avoided one another, except to taunt and threaten.

Nevertheless, within a few days Sherif transformed these young enemies into jovial comrades. He gave them superordinate goals—shared goals that overrode their differences and that could be achieved only through cooperation. A planned disruption of the camp water supply necessitated that all 22 boys work together to restore water. Renting a movie in those pre-DVD days required their pooled resources. A stalled truck needed the combined force of all the boys pulling and pushing together to get it moving. Having used isolation and competition to make strangers into enemies, Sherif used shared predicaments and goals to reconcile the enemies and make them friends. What reduced conflict was not mere contact, but cooperative contact.
Superordinate goals override differences Cooperative efforts to achieve shared goals are an effective way to break down social barriers.

A shared predicament—a fearsome external threat and a superordinate desire to overcome it—likewise had a powerfully unifying effect in the weeks after 9/11. Patriotism soared as Americans felt that “we” were under attack. Gallup-surveyed approval of “our President” shot up from 51 percent the week before the attack to a highest-ever level of 90 percent 10 days after, just surpassing the previous approval-rating record of 89 percent enjoyed by his father, George Bush, at the climax of the 1991 Persian Gulf war (Newport, 2002). In chat groups and everyday speech, even the word we (relative to I) surged in the immediate aftermath (Pennebaker, 2002).

Cooperation has especially positive effects when it leads people to define a new, inclusive group that dissolves their former subgroups (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1999). Seat the members of two groups not on opposite sides, but alternately around the table. Give them a new, shared name. Have them work together. Such experiences change “us” and “them” into “we.” Those once perceived as being in another group now are seen as part of one’s own group. One 18-year-old New Jersey man would not be surprised. After 9/11, he explained a shift in his social identity: “I just thought of myself as Black. But now I feel like I’m an American, more than ever” (Sengupta, 2001). In one experiment, White Americans who read a newspaper article about a terrorist threat against all Americans subsequently expressed reduced prejudice against African-Americans (Dovidio et al., 2004).

“Most of us have overlapping identities which unite us with very different groups. We can love what we are, without hating what—and who—we are not. We can thrive in our own tradition, even as we learn from others.”

Former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Nobel Prize Lecture, 2001

During the 1970s, several teams of educational researchers simultaneously wondered: If cooperative contacts between members of rival groups encourage positive attitudes, could we apply this principle in multicultural schools? Could we promote interracial friendships by replacing competitive classroom situations with cooperative ones? And could cooperative learning maintain or even enhance student achievement? Many experiments with adolescents from 11 countries confirm that in all three cases, the answer is yes (Roseth, Johnson, & Johnson, 2008). Members of interracial groups who work together on projects and play together on athletic teams typically come to feel friendly toward those of another race. So do those who engage in cooperative classroom learning. So encouraging are these results that thousands of teachers have introduced interracial cooperative learning into their classrooms.

“I am prepared this day to declare myself a citizen of the world, and to invite everyone everywhere to embrace this broader vision of our interdependent world, our common quest for justice, and ultimately for Peace on Earth.”

Father Theodore Hesburgh,
The Human Imperative, 1974

The power of cooperative activity to make friends of former enemies has led psychologists to urge increased international exchange and cooperation (Klineberg, 1984). As we engage in mutually beneficial trade, as we work to
protect our common destiny on this fragile planet, and as we become more aware that our hopes and fears are shared, we can change misperceptions that feed conflict into a solidarity based on common interests.

Working toward shared goals enables diverse peoples to discover unity in their common values and superordinate identity. “Common values” are what we need, declared the chair of Britain’s Commission for Racial Equality as ethnic tensions recently flared (Phillips, 2004). “There is no ethnicity here. We are all Rwandan,” proclaimed Rwanda’s government as it sought to resolve historic animosities between Tutsis and Hutus (Lacey, 2004). Western democracies have largely been spared ethnic tribal warfare because their different racial groups have shared so many of the very same goals, noted sociologist Amitai Etzioni (1999). In the United States, these shared goals include fair treatment for all, higher moral standards, and a wish that all high school graduates “understand the common history and ideas that tie all Americans together.” Although diversity commands attention, we are—as working toward shared goals reminds us—more alike than different.

“We often forget how much unites all the members of humanity,” declared President Ronald Reagan in 1987. “Perhaps we need some outside, universal threat to recognize this common bond.” Echoing those words, climate protection advocate Al Gore (2007) noted, “We—all of us—now face a universal threat [which] requires us, in Reagan’s phrase, to unite in recognition of our common bond.”

Communication

When real-life conflicts become intense, a third-party mediator—a marriage counselor, labor mediator, diplomat, or community volunteer—may facilitate much-needed communication (Rubin et al., 1994). Mediators help each party to voice its viewpoint and to understand the other’s. By leading each side to think about the other’s underlying needs and goals, the mediator aims to replace a competitive win-lose orientation with a cooperative win-win orientation that offers a mutually beneficial resolution. A classic example: Two friends, after quarreling over an orange, agreed to split it. One squeezed his half for juice. The other used the peel from her half to make a cake. If only the two had understood each other’s motives, they could have hit on the win-win solution of one having all the juice, the other all the peel.

Such understanding and cooperative resolution is most needed, yet least likely, in times of anger or crisis (Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Tetlock, 1988).

Conciliation

When conflicts intensify, images become more stereotyped, judgments more rigid, and communication more difficult, or even impossible. Each party is likely to threaten, coerce, or retaliate. In the weeks before the Persian Gulf war, the first President George Bush threatened, in the full glare of publicity, to “kick Saddam’s ass.” Saddam Hussein communicated in kind, threatening to make Americans “swim in their own blood.”

Under such conditions, is there an alternative to war or surrender? Social psychologist Charles Osgood (1962, 1980) advocated a strategy of Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-Reduction, nicknamed GRIT. In applying GRIT, one side first announces its recognition of mutual interests and its intent to reduce tensions. It then initiates one or more small, conciliatory acts. Without weakening one’s retaliatory capability, this modest beginning opens the door for reciprocity by the other party. Should the enemy respond with hostility, one reciprocates in kind. But so, too, with any conciliatory response. Thus, U.S. President John Kennedy’s gesture of stopping atmospheric nuclear tests began a series of reciprocated conciliatory acts that culminated in the 1993 atmospheric test-ban treaty.
"To begin with, I would like to express my sincere thanks and deep appreciation for the opportunity to meet with you. While there are still profound differences between us, I think the very fact of my presence here today is a major breakthrough." © The New Yorker Collection, 1983, W. Miller from cartoonbank.com. All rights reserved.

In laboratory experiments, GRIT has been an effective strategy for increasing trust and cooperation (Lindskold et al., 1978, 1988). Even during intense personal conflict, when communication has been nonexistent, a small conciliatory gesture—a smile, a touch, a word of apology—may work wonders. Conciliations allow both parties to begin edging down the tension ladder to a safer rung where communication and mutual understanding can begin.

And how good that such can happen, for civilization advances not by cultural isolation—maintaining walls around ethnic enclaves—but by tapping the knowledge, the skills, and the arts that are each culture’s legacy to the whole human race. Thomas Sowell (1991) observed that, thanks to cultural sharing, every modern society is enriched by a cultural mix. We have China to thank for paper and printing and for the magnetic compass that opened the great explorations. We have Egypt to thank for trigonometry. We have the Islamic world and India’s Hindus to thank for our Arabic numerals. While celebrating and claiming these diverse cultural legacies, we can also welcome the enrichment of today’s social diversity. We can view ourselves as instruments in a human orchestra. And we can therefore affirm our own culture’s heritage while building bridges of communication, understanding, and cooperation across cultural traditions as we think about, influence, and relate to one another.